

The American Electorate

A Contemporary Study of Selected States

Optimus Consulting

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Part I

State Demographics, Political Parties, and Voting Behavior

1 Iowa

In the following five chapters, we examine demographic and political variables for five states: Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, South Carolina, and Florida. The data and statistics are derived from a current voter file (2014) consisting of active, registered voters in each of the states. Because we are relying on an current voter file, historical data will not be an accurate “historical snapshot,” but rather a snapshot of what took place from the perspective of current active voters that currently live in that state. Thus, some discrepancies are expected with the secretary of state data for more distant elections (e.g., 2006). That being said, we still believe that this data provides invaluable insight into the current demographic makeup of these important states.

1.1 Demographic Splits with Party

This section of the report largely consists of cross-tabulations of demographic information crossed with registered political party. For example, Table 1.1 lists basic demographic variables such as age cohort, gender, ethnicity, and income bracket crossed with political party. For these analyses, each individual was classified as *Democratic*, *Republican*, *Non-Partisan*, or *Other*. In total, our analyses of active registered voters looked at 1,802,397 individuals in the state of Iowa.

Data is presented both as raw counts and as percentages. Thus, while Table 1.1 includes raw counts for demographic factors crossed by political party, Table 1.2 includes the marginal percentages for these same variables. Referring to Table 1.2, we can see that the majority of registered voters in Iowa are female (52.5%), with a plurality being 55 years of age or older (42.8%). There are several instances in which marginal percentages of demographic variables vary as a function of political party. For example, 38% of individuals with an income of \$25,000 or less were registered Democrats while only 29.3% of individuals with an income of \$75,000 to \$100,000 were registered Democrats.

Tables 1.3 and 1.4 report cross-tabulated counts and percentages for household composition crossed by registered political party. Interestingly, the majority of households in Iowa are not heterogeneous when it comes to political party. The majority of households were mixed-gender and consisting of 2 registered voters.

Tables 1.5 and 1.6 present the party counts and percentages crossed by gender by age cohorts. Younger voters are much more likely to be Non-partisan than their older counter-

parts, regardless of gender. Tables 1.7 and 1.8 report similar data for gender by ethnicity cohorts, and Tables 1.9 and 1.10 report data for gender by age by ethnicity cohorts.

1.2 Vote History

The remainder of our analyses focus on voting behavior, specifically marginal turnout for the 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 general and primary elections. Tables are presented in sets of three where the first table presents raw counts, the second percentages, and the third, turnout rates. For example, referring to Table 1.11, we can see that a total of 666,249 male voters turned out for the 2012 general elections, which according to Table 1.12, accounted for 46.5% of the vote. Finally, in Table 1.13, we can see that active registered male voters turned out at a lower rate (77.8%) than active registered female voters (81.0% turnout rate).

Table 1.1: Iowa: Basic Demographic Information by Party (counts)

		Democratic	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican	Total
Gender	F	324,823	342,526	1,147	277,634	946,130
	M	240,579	320,066	2,174	293,448	856,267
Age	18-34	113,447	226,003	2,015	106,967	448,432
	35-54	165,174	235,781	881	180,063	581,899
	55+	286,431	200,633	425	283,653	771,142
Ethnicity	East and South Asian	6,724	8,566	35	4,609	19,934
	European	453,846	533,714	2,611	475,694	1,465,865
	Hispanic and Portuguese	18,994	18,175	112	7,202	44,483
	Likely African-American	8,843	4,566	33	2,017	15,459
	Missing	70,686	92,038	496	78,147	241,367
Income	Other	6,309	5,533	34	3,413	15,289
	0-25k	57,575	46,989	180	46,659	151,403
	25k-50k	91,666	89,134	393	80,611	261,804
	50k-75k	103,445	121,468	391	109,574	334,878
	75k-100k	62,352	74,191	224	76,388	213,155
	100k-125k	34,289	39,097	123	43,353	116,862
	125k-200k	29,349	34,499	112	43,674	107,634
	200k+	11,337	12,849	46	19,508	43,740
	Unknown	175,389	244,365	1,852	151,315	572,921

Table 1.2: Iowa: Basic Demographic Information by Party (percent)

		Democratic	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican	Overall
Gender	F	34.33%	36.20%	0.12%	29.34%	52.49%
	M	28.10%	37.38%	0.25%	34.27%	47.51%
Age	18-34	25.30%	50.40%	0.45%	23.85%	24.88%
	35-54	28.39%	40.52%	0.15%	30.94%	32.28%
	55+	37.14%	26.02%	0.06%	36.78%	42.78%
Ethnicity	East and South Asian	33.73%	42.97%	0.18%	23.12%	1.11%
	European	30.96%	36.41%	0.18%	32.45%	81.33%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	42.70%	40.86%	0.25%	16.19%	2.47%
	Likely African-American	57.20%	29.54%	0.21%	13.05%	0.86%
	Missing	29.29%	38.13%	0.21%	32.38%	13.39%
Income	Other	41.26%	36.19%	0.22%	22.32%	0.85%
	0-25k	38.03%	31.04%	0.12%	30.82%	8.40%
	25k-50k	35.01%	34.05%	0.15%	30.79%	14.53%
	50k-75k	30.89%	36.27%	0.12%	32.72%	18.58%
	75k-100k	29.25%	34.81%	0.11%	35.84%	11.83%
	100k-125k	29.34%	33.46%	0.11%	37.10%	6.48%
	125k-200k	27.27%	32.05%	0.10%	40.58%	5.97%
	200k+	25.92%	29.38%	0.11%	44.60%	2.43%
	Unknown	30.61%	42.65%	0.32%	26.41%	31.79%

Table 1.3: Iowa: Household Information by Registered Party (counts)

		Democratic	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican	Total
Household Party	Democratic	392, 176	0	0	0	392, 176
	Democratic & Independent	118, 314	115, 030	568	0	233, 912
	Democratic & Republican	44, 649	0	0	44, 936	89, 585
	Democratic & Republican & Independent	10, 263	10, 662	57	10, 412	31, 394
Household Gender	Independent	0	427, 172	2, 169	0	429, 341
	Republican	0	0	0	399, 413	399, 413
	Republican & Independent	0	109, 728	527	116, 321	226, 576
	Female Only Household	133, 809	131, 167	626	77, 921	343, 523
Family in Household	Male Only Household	73, 524	103, 683	999	64, 294	242, 500
	Mixed Gender Household	358, 069	427, 742	1, 696	428, 867	1, 216, 374
	1	170, 590	193, 421	1, 324	121, 762	487, 097
	2	285, 121	324, 066	1, 364	315, 117	925, 668
	3	85, 816	109, 800	458	96, 576	292, 650
	4+	23, 875	35, 305	175	37, 627	96, 982

Table 1.4: Iowa: Household Information by Registered Party (percent)

Household Party	Democratc Non-Partisan Other Republican Overall				
	Democratc	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican	Overall
Household Gender	Democratc	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	21.76%
	Democratc & Independent	50.58%	49.18%	0.24%	12.98%
	Democratc & Republican	49.84%	0.00%	0.00%	4.97%
	Democratc & Republican & Independent	32.69%	33.96%	0.18%	1.74%
	Independent	0.00%	99.49%	0.51%	23.82%
	Republican	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%	22.16%
	Republican & Independent	0.00%	48.43%	0.23%	12.57%
	Female Only Household	38.95%	38.18%	0.18%	19.06%
	Male Only Household	30.32%	42.76%	0.41%	13.45%
	Mixed Gender Household	29.44%	35.17%	0.14%	67.49%
Family in Household	1	35.02%	39.71%	0.27%	27.02%
	2	30.80%	35.01%	0.15%	51.36%
	3	29.32%	37.52%	0.16%	16.24%
	4+	24.62%	36.40%	0.18%	5.38%

Table 1.5: Iowa: Gender by Age by Party (counts)

Gender	Age	N	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican
F	18-34	227,400	63,908	114,342	732	48,418
	35-54	302,729	95,586	123,020	271	83,852
	55+	415,232	165,032	105,016	144	145,040
M	18-34	221,032	49,539	111,661	1,283	58,549
	35-54	279,170	69,588	112,761	610	96,211
	55+	355,910	121,399	95,617	281	138,613

Table 1.6: Iowa: Gender by Age by Party (percent)

Gender	Age	Percent	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican
F	18-34	12.62%	28.10%	50.28%	0.32%	21.29%
	35-54	16.80%	31.57%	40.64%	0.09%	27.70%
	55+	23.04%	39.74%	25.29%	0.03%	34.93%
M	18-34	12.26%	22.41%	50.52%	0.58%	26.49%
	35-54	15.49%	24.93%	40.39%	0.22%	34.46%
	55+	19.75%	34.11%	26.87%	0.08%	38.95%

Table 1.7: Iowa: Gender by Ethnicity by Party (counts)

Gender	Ethnicity	N	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican
F	East and South Asian	11,488	4,044	4,829	16	2,599
	European	769,202	261,274	275,716	901	231,311
	Hispanic and Portuguese	24,694	10,786	9,955	47	3,906
	Likely African-American	8,919	5,324	2,541	14	1,040
	Missing	123,858	39,957	46,683	156	37,062
	Other	7,969	3,438	2,802	13	1,716
M	East and South Asian	8,446	2,680	3,737	19	2,010
	European	696,663	192,572	257,998	1,710	244,383
	Hispanic and Portuguese	19,789	8,208	8,220	65	3,296
	Likely African-American	6,540	3,519	2,025	19	977
	Missing	117,509	30,729	45,355	340	41,085
	Other	7,320	2,871	2,731	21	1,697

Table 1.8: Iowa: Gender by Ethnicity by Party (percent)

Gender	Ethnicity	Percent	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican
F	East and South Asian	0.64%	35.20%	42.04%	0.14%	22.62%
	European	42.68%	33.97%	35.84%	0.12%	30.07%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	1.37%	43.68%	40.31%	0.19%	15.82%
	Likely African-American	0.49%	59.69%	28.49%	0.16%	11.66%
	Missing	6.87%	32.26%	37.69%	0.13%	29.92%
	Other	0.44%	43.14%	35.16%	0.16%	21.53%
M	East and South Asian	0.47%	31.73%	44.25%	0.22%	23.80%
	European	38.65%	27.64%	37.03%	0.25%	35.08%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	1.10%	41.48%	41.54%	0.33%	16.66%
	Likely African-American	0.36%	53.81%	30.96%	0.29%	14.94%
	Missing	6.52%	26.15%	38.60%	0.29%	34.96%
	Other	0.41%	39.22%	37.31%	0.29%	23.18%

Table 1.9: Iowa: Gender by Ethnicity by Age by Party (count)

Gender	Ethnicity	Age	N	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican
F	East and South Asian	18-34	3,337	1,195	1,622	13	507
		35-54	4,395	1,439	1,954	2	1,000
		55+	3,754	1,410	1,252	1	1,091
	European	18-34	174,290	47,031	88,332	549	38,378
		35-54	245,169	75,920	99,485	226	69,538
		55+	349,113	138,084	87,775	126	123,128
	Hispanic and Portuguese	18-34	9,451	3,889	4,589	36	937
		35-54	9,058	3,796	3,753	8	1,501
		55+	6,180	3,098	1,613	3	1,466
	Likely African-American	18-34	3,602	2,040	1,254	13	295
		35-54	3,014	1,769	880	1	364
		55+	2,298	1,515	405	0	378
	Missing	18-34	34,607	8,906	17,609	114	7,978
		35-54	38,192	11,411	15,873	31	10,877
		55+	50,941	19,594	13,180	11	18,156
	Other	18-34	2,113	847	936	7	323
		35-54	2,901	1,251	1,075	3	572
		55+	2,946	1,331	791	3	821
M	East and South Asian	18-34	2,490	800	1,264	13	413
		35-54	3,249	962	1,502	4	781
		55+	2,707	918	971	2	816
	European	18-34	172,081	36,924	87,204	965	46,988
		35-54	226,038	54,598	91,044	511	79,885
		55+	298,417	101,006	79,730	234	117,447
	Hispanic and Portuguese	18-34	7,938	2,871	4,064	49	954
		35-54	7,251	3,033	2,902	12	1,304
		55+	4,598	2,304	1,253	4	1,037
	Likely African-American	18-34	2,410	1,270	923	11	206
		35-54	2,138	1,157	668	4	309
		55+	1,992	1,092	434	4	462
	Missing	18-34	34,116	6,984	17,296	229	9,607
		35-54	37,751	8,706	15,597	77	13,371
		55+	45,618	15,031	12,457	34	18,096
	Other	18-34	1,997	690	910	16	381
		35-54	2,743	1,132	1,048	2	561
		55+	2,578	1,048	772	3	755

Table 1.10: Iowa: Gender by Ethnicity by Age by Party (percent)

Gender	Ethnicity	Age	Percent	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican
F	East and South Asian	18-34	0.19%	35.81%	48.61%	0.39%	15.19%
		35-54	0.24%	32.74%	44.46%	0.05%	22.75%
		55+	0.21%	37.56%	33.35%	0.03%	29.06%
	European	18-34	9.67%	26.98%	50.68%	0.31%	22.02%
		35-54	13.60%	30.97%	40.58%	0.09%	28.36%
		55+	19.37%	39.55%	25.14%	0.04%	35.27%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	18-34	0.52%	41.15%	48.56%	0.38%	9.91%
		35-54	0.50%	41.91%	41.43%	0.09%	16.57%
		55+	0.34%	50.13%	26.10%	0.05%	23.72%
	Likely African-American	18-34	0.20%	56.64%	34.81%	0.36%	8.19%
		35-54	0.17%	58.69%	29.20%	0.03%	12.08%
		55+	0.13%	65.93%	17.62%	0.00%	16.45%
	Missing	18-34	1.92%	25.73%	50.88%	0.33%	23.05%
		35-54	2.12%	29.88%	41.56%	0.08%	28.48%
		55+	2.83%	38.46%	25.87%	0.02%	35.64%
	Other	18-34	0.12%	40.09%	44.30%	0.33%	15.29%
		35-54	0.16%	43.12%	37.06%	0.10%	19.72%
		55+	0.16%	45.18%	26.85%	0.10%	27.87%
M	East and South Asian	18-34	0.14%	32.13%	50.76%	0.52%	16.59%
		35-54	0.18%	29.61%	46.23%	0.12%	24.04%
		55+	0.15%	33.91%	35.87%	0.07%	30.14%
	European	18-34	9.55%	21.46%	50.68%	0.56%	27.31%
		35-54	12.54%	24.15%	40.28%	0.23%	35.34%
		55+	16.56%	33.85%	26.72%	0.08%	39.36%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	18-34	0.44%	36.17%	51.20%	0.62%	12.02%
		35-54	0.40%	41.83%	40.02%	0.17%	17.98%
		55+	0.26%	50.11%	27.25%	0.09%	22.55%
	Likely African-American	18-34	0.13%	52.70%	38.30%	0.46%	8.55%
		35-54	0.12%	54.12%	31.24%	0.19%	14.45%
		55+	0.11%	54.82%	21.79%	0.20%	23.19%
	Missing	18-34	1.89%	20.47%	50.70%	0.67%	28.16%
		35-54	2.09%	23.06%	41.32%	0.20%	35.42%
		55+	2.53%	32.95%	27.31%	0.07%	39.67%
	Other	18-34	0.11%	34.55%	45.57%	0.80%	19.08%
		35-54	0.15%	41.27%	38.21%	0.07%	20.45%
		55+	0.14%	40.65%	29.95%	0.12%	29.29%

Table 1.1.1: Iowa: Basic Demographic Information by Vote History (counts)

	2006		2008		2010		2012	
	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary
Gender								
F	451,254	99,643	676,184	83,858	519,851	134,162	766,629	89,932
M	394,933	83,947	572,304	73,901	470,875	127,855	666,249	85,225
Age								
18-34	48,792	5,791	169,042	6,603	101,574	15,242	279,766	10,989
35-54	254,414	32,404	422,337	30,277	306,466	57,255	465,522	36,371
55+	542,503	145,268	656,531	120,768	582,276	189,393	687,081	127,727
Ethnicity								
East and South Asian	6,117	1,062	11,284	910	7,863	1,458	14,275	968
European	710,985	155,189	1,035,431	133,971	827,605	222,075	1,176,128	148,237
Hispanic and Portuguese	10,766	1,894	22,118	1,604	14,099	2,418	29,785	1,682
Likely African-American	4,373	994	8,669	887	5,341	1,064	11,250	647
Missing	108,117	23,285	161,428	19,410	128,350	33,369	189,463	22,565
Other	5,829	1,166	9,558	977	7,468	1,633	11,977	1,058
Income								
0-25k	84,597	23,090	114,150	20,256	93,266	28,859	124,675	19,554
25k-50k	138,962	34,687	196,025	30,588	157,604	46,049	215,309	31,818
50k-75k	175,246	35,019	257,146	31,184	204,978	52,014	282,250	35,468
75k-100k	118,826	22,833	167,969	19,334	138,010	35,426	184,191	22,981
100k-125k	67,722	13,687	93,713	11,035	77,508	20,096	102,038	12,689
125k-200k	64,690	13,096	87,473	10,319	74,519	20,195	95,483	12,856
200k+	27,426	5,903	36,123	4,339	31,584	9,286	39,589	5,452
Unknown	168,718	35,275	295,889	30,704	213,257	50,092	389,343	34,339
Party								
Democratic	309,159	102,551	427,288	74,559	336,952	62,941	475,539	53,392
Non-Partisan	193,603	9,576	372,684	7,702	248,613	9,811	458,059	4,734
Other	670	122	1,428	99	1,200	185	2,417	106
Republican	342,755	71,341	447,088	75,399	403,961	189,080	496,863	116,925

Table 1.12: Iowa: Basic Demographic Information by Vote History (percent)

		2006		2008		2010		2012	
		General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary
Gender	F	53.33%	54.27%	54.16%	53.16%	52.47%	51.20%	53.50%	51.34%
	M	46.67%	45.73%	45.84%	46.84%	47.53%	48.80%	46.50%	48.66%
Age	18-34	5.77%	3.15%	13.54%	4.19%	10.25%	5.82%	19.52%	6.27%
	35-54	30.07%	17.65%	33.83%	19.19%	30.93%	21.85%	32.49%	20.76%
	55+	64.11%	79.13%	52.59%	76.55%	58.77%	72.28%	47.95%	72.92%
		0.72%	0.58%	0.90%	0.58%	0.79%	0.56%	1.00%	0.55%
Ethnicity	East and South Asian	84.02%	84.53%	82.93%	84.92%	83.54%	84.76%	82.08%	84.63%
	European	1.27%	1.03%	1.77%	1.02%	1.42%	0.92%	2.08%	0.96%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	0.52%	0.54%	0.69%	0.56%	0.54%	0.41%	0.79%	0.37%
	Likely African-American	12.78%	12.68%	12.93%	12.30%	12.96%	12.74%	13.22%	12.88%
	Missing	0.69%	0.64%	0.77%	0.62%	0.75%	0.62%	0.84%	0.60%
	Other	10.00%	12.58%	9.14%	12.84%	9.41%	11.01%	8.70%	11.16%
Income	0-25k	16.42%	18.89%	15.70%	19.39%	15.91%	17.57%	15.03%	18.17%
	25k-50k	20.71%	19.07%	20.60%	19.77%	20.69%	19.85%	19.70%	20.25%
	50k-75k	14.04%	12.44%	13.45%	12.26%	13.93%	13.52%	12.85%	13.12%
	75k-100k	8.00%	7.46%	7.51%	6.99%	7.82%	7.67%	7.12%	7.24%
	100k-125k	7.64%	7.13%	7.01%	6.54%	7.52%	7.71%	6.66%	7.34%
	125k-200k	3.24%	3.22%	2.89%	2.75%	3.19%	3.54%	2.76%	3.11%
Party	Unknown	19.94%	19.21%	23.70%	19.46%	21.53%	19.12%	27.17%	19.60%
	Democratic	36.54%	55.86%	34.22%	47.26%	34.01%	24.02%	33.19%	30.48%
	Non-Partisan	22.88%	5.22%	29.85%	4.88%	25.09%	3.74%	31.97%	2.70%
	Other	0.08%	0.07%	0.11%	0.06%	0.12%	0.07%	0.17%	0.06%
	Republican	40.51%	38.86%	35.81%	47.79%	40.77%	72.16%	34.68%	66.75%

Table 1.13: Iowa: Basic Demographic Information by Voter Turnout Rate

	2006		2008		2010		2012	
	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary
Gender								
F	47.69%	10.53%	71.47%	8.86%	54.94%	14.18%	81.03%	9.51%
M	46.12%	9.80%	66.84%	8.63%	54.99%	14.93%	77.81%	9.95%
Age								
18-34	10.88%	1.29%	37.70%	1.47%	22.65%	3.40%	62.39%	2.45%
35-54	43.72%	5.57%	72.58%	5.20%	52.67%	9.84%	80.00%	6.25%
55+	70.35%	18.84%	85.14%	15.66%	75.51%	24.56%	89.10%	16.56%
Ethnicity								
East and South Asian	30.69%	5.33%	56.61%	4.57%	39.45%	7.31%	71.61%	4.86%
European	48.50%	10.59%	70.64%	9.14%	56.46%	15.15%	80.23%	10.11%
Hispanic and Portuguese	24.20%	4.26%	49.72%	3.61%	31.70%	5.44%	66.96%	3.78%
Likely African-American	28.29%	6.43%	56.08%	5.74%	34.55%	6.88%	72.77%	4.19%
Missing	44.79%	9.65%	66.88%	8.04%	53.18%	13.83%	78.50%	9.35%
Other	38.13%	7.63%	62.52%	6.39%	48.85%	10.68%	78.34%	6.92%
Income								
0-25k	55.88%	15.25%	75.39%	13.38%	61.60%	19.06%	82.35%	12.92%
25k-50k	53.08%	13.25%	74.87%	11.68%	60.20%	17.59%	82.24%	12.15%
50k-75k	52.33%	10.46%	76.79%	9.31%	61.21%	15.53%	84.28%	10.59%
75k-100k	55.75%	10.71%	78.80%	9.07%	64.75%	16.62%	86.41%	10.78%
100k-125k	57.95%	11.71%	80.19%	9.44%	66.32%	17.20%	87.31%	10.86%
125k-200k	60.10%	12.17%	81.27%	9.59%	69.23%	18.76%	88.71%	11.94%
200k+	62.70%	13.50%	82.59%	9.92%	72.21%	21.23%	90.51%	12.46%
Unknown	29.45%	6.16%	51.65%	5.36%	37.22%	8.74%	67.96%	5.99%
Party								
Democratic	54.68%	18.14%	75.57%	13.19%	59.60%	11.13%	84.11%	9.44%
Non-Partisan	29.22%	1.45%	56.25%	1.16%	37.52%	1.48%	69.13%	0.71%
Other	20.17%	3.67%	43.00%	2.98%	36.13%	5.57%	72.78%	3.19%
Republican	60.02%	12.49%	78.29%	13.20%	70.74%	33.11%	87.00%	20.47%

Table 1.14: Iowa: Household Information by Vote History (counts)

		2006		2008		2010		2012	
		General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary
Household Party	Democratic	221,687	82,369	297,469	59,331	239,866	49,778	332,369	42,496
	Democratic & Independent	92,533	14,231	153,435	10,190	107,292	7,699	179,627	6,389
	Democratic & Republican	52,129	12,864	70,202	11,531	58,709	17,366	75,736	11,943
	Democratic & Republican & Independent	12,431	1,997	19,245	1,762	14,493	2,714	22,485	1,742
Household Gender	Independent	121,481	5,876	239,277	4,656	156,079	5,979	293,792	2,807
	Republican	251,047	57,336	317,871	60,641	293,625	152,429	352,197	94,952
	Republican & Independent	94,879	8,917	150,989	9,648	120,662	26,052	176,672	14,828
	Female Only Household	136,569	34,957	216,322	28,245	154,467	38,945	254,288	26,580
Family in Household	Male Only Household	80,121	17,589	129,660	14,935	98,733	23,112	161,661	15,765
	Mixed Gender Household	629,497	131,044	902,506	114,579	737,526	199,960	1,016,929	132,812
	1	187,860	46,305	295,002	38,214	217,333	54,870	350,088	37,442
	2	492,091	106,904	707,662	92,898	577,439	157,537	789,864	105,191
	3	129,143	23,601	189,733	20,578	149,632	36,978	220,812	24,304
	4+	37,093	6,780	56,091	6,069	46,322	12,632	72,114	8,220

Table 1.15: Iowa: Household Information by Vote History (percent)

	2006		2008		2010		2012	
	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary
Household Party								
Democratic	26.20%	44.87%	23.83%	37.61%	24.21%	19.00%	23.20%	24.26%
Democratic & Independent	10.94%	7.75%	12.29%	6.46%	10.83%	2.94%	12.54%	3.65%
Democratic & Republican	6.16%	7.01%	5.62%	7.31%	5.93%	6.63%	5.29%	6.82%
Democratic & Republican & Independent	1.47%	1.09%	1.54%	1.12%	1.46%	1.04%	1.57%	0.99%
Independent	14.36%	3.20%	19.17%	2.95%	15.75%	2.28%	20.50%	1.60%
Republican	29.67%	31.23%	25.46%	38.44%	29.64%	58.18%	24.58%	54.21%
Republican & Independent	11.21%	4.86%	12.09%	6.12%	12.18%	9.94%	12.33%	8.47%
Household Gender								
Female Only Household	16.14%	19.04%	17.33%	17.90%	15.59%	14.86%	17.75%	15.17%
Male Only Household	9.47%	9.58%	10.39%	9.47%	9.97%	8.82%	11.28%	9.00%
Mixed Gender Household	74.39%	71.38%	72.29%	72.63%	74.44%	76.32%	70.97%	75.82%
Family in Household								
1	22.20%	25.22%	23.63%	24.22%	21.94%	20.94%	24.43%	21.38%
2	58.15%	58.23%	56.68%	58.89%	58.28%	60.12%	55.12%	60.06%
3	15.26%	12.86%	15.20%	13.04%	15.10%	14.11%	15.41%	13.88%
4+	4.38%	3.69%	4.49%	3.85%	4.68%	4.82%	5.03%	4.69%

Table 1.16: Iowa: Household Information by Voter Turnout Rate

		2006		2008		2010		2012	
		General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary
Household Party	Democratic	56.53%	21.00%	75.85%	15.13%	61.16%	12.69%	84.75%	10.84%
	Democratic & Independent	39.56%	6.08%	65.60%	4.36%	45.87%	3.29%	76.79%	2.73%
	Democratic & Republican	58.19%	14.36%	78.36%	12.87%	65.53%	19.38%	84.54%	13.33%
	Democratic & Republican & Independent	39.60%	6.36%	61.30%	5.61%	46.16%	8.64%	71.62%	5.55%
	Independent	28.29%	1.37%	55.73%	1.08%	36.35%	1.39%	68.43%	0.65%
Household Gender	Republican	62.85%	14.36%	79.58%	15.18%	73.51%	38.16%	88.18%	23.77%
	Republican & Independent	41.88%	3.94%	66.64%	4.26%	53.25%	11.50%	77.97%	6.54%
	Female Only Household	39.76%	10.18%	62.97%	8.22%	44.97%	11.34%	74.02%	7.74%
	Male Only Household	33.04%	7.25%	53.47%	6.16%	40.71%	9.53%	66.66%	6.50%
Family in Household	Mixed Gender Household	51.75%	10.77%	74.20%	9.42%	60.63%	16.44%	83.60%	10.92%
	1	38.57%	9.51%	60.56%	7.85%	44.62%	11.26%	71.87%	7.69%
	2	53.16%	11.55%	76.45%	10.04%	62.38%	17.02%	85.33%	11.36%
	3	44.13%	8.06%	64.83%	7.03%	51.13%	12.64%	75.45%	8.30%
	4+	38.25%	6.99%	57.84%	6.26%	47.76%	13.03%	74.36%	8.48%

Table 1.17: Iowa: Gender by Age by Vote History (counts)

Gender	Age	2006		2008		2010		2012	
		General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary
F	18-34	25,322	2,942	91,672	3,232	51,824	7,267	149,529	5,181
	35-54	134,177	17,106	226,936	15,488	157,847	27,716	246,164	17,791
	55+	291,366	79,498	357,094	65,055	309,844	99,083	370,516	66,906
M	18-34	23,470	2,849	77,370	3,371	49,750	7,975	130,237	5,808
	35-54	120,237	15,298	195,401	14,789	148,619	29,539	219,358	18,580
	55+	251,137	65,770	299,437	55,713	272,432	90,310	316,565	60,821

Table 1.18: Iowa: Gender by Age by Vote History (percent)

Gender	Age	2006		2008		2010		2012	
		General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary
F	18-34	2.99%	1.60%	7.34%	2.05%	5.23%	2.77%	10.44%	2.96%
	35-54	15.86%	9.32%	18.18%	9.82%	15.93%	10.58%	17.18%	10.16%
	55+	34.43%	43.30%	28.60%	41.24%	31.27%	37.82%	25.86%	38.20%
M	18-34	2.77%	1.55%	6.20%	2.14%	5.02%	3.04%	9.09%	3.32%
	35-54	14.21%	8.33%	15.65%	9.37%	15.00%	11.27%	15.31%	10.61%
	55+	29.68%	35.82%	23.98%	35.32%	27.50%	34.47%	22.09%	34.72%

Table 1.19: Iowa: Gender by Age by Voter Turnout Rate

Gender	Age	2006		2008		2010		2012	
		General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary
F	18-34	11.14%	1.29%	40.31%	1.42%	22.79%	3.20%	65.76%	2.28%
	35-54	44.32%	5.65%	74.96%	5.12%	52.14%	9.16%	81.31%	5.88%
	55+	70.17%	19.15%	86.00%	15.67%	74.62%	23.86%	89.23%	16.11%
M	18-34	10.62%	1.29%	35.00%	1.53%	22.51%	3.61%	58.92%	2.63%
	35-54	43.07%	5.48%	69.99%	5.30%	53.24%	10.58%	78.58%	6.66%
	55+	70.56%	18.48%	84.13%	15.65%	76.55%	25.37%	88.95%	17.09%

2 New Hampshire

2.1 Demographic Splits with Party

The next state we examined was New Hampshire. The layout of this section parallels that for Iowa with tables presented in sets of two where the first includes counts and the second consists of marginal percentages. In New Hampshire, each individual was classified as *Democratic*, *Republican*, or *Non-Partisan*. In total, our analyses of active registered voters looked at 787,337 individuals.

The New Hampshire electorate is largely of European descent (84.6%; see Table 2.2), with slightly more Female active registered voters (410,311) than males (371,488; see Table 2.1). Interestingly, those with an income of \$25,000 or less were nearly as likely to be Republican 30.8% as Democrat 31.9%). Similar to Iowa, mixed-party households were the exception rather than the rule (Table 2.4). The young and middle-aged male cohorts do not appear to differ in terms of percentage of Democrats (19.8% vs. 19.5%), however, the same does not hold for the percentage of Republicans (29.5% vs. 40.1%) where there is a near 10 point lift, which appears to come at the expense of the Non-partisan category (50.7% vs. 40.4%).

2.2 Vote History

The remainder of our New Hampshire tables focus on voting behavior, specifically marginal turnout for the 2010 and 2012 general and primary elections as well as the 2012 Presidential Primary. Tables are presented in sets of three where the first table presents raw counts, the second percentages, and the third, turnout rates. For example, referring to Table 2.11, we can see that a total of 208,643 registered Republicans turned out for the 2012 general elections, which according to Table 2.12, accounted for 32.0% of the vote. In Table 2.13, we can see that active registered Republican voters turned out at a rate of 65.9%.

Table 2.1: New Hampshire: Basic Demographic Information by Party (counts)

		Democratic	Non-Partisan	Republican	Total
Gender	F	127,880	171,453	110,978	410,311
	M	85,375	157,739	128,374	371,488
	Missing	1,843	2,420	1,275	5,538
Age	18-34	8,468	18,438	8,928	35,834
	35-54	30,734	51,337	44,932	127,003
	55+	59,739	66,187	71,170	197,096
Ethnicity	East and South Asian	2,608	4,486	1,656	8,750
	European	178,749	278,117	208,834	665,700
	Hispanic and Portuguese	7,662	9,343	4,714	21,719
	Likely African-American	666	861	388	1,915
	Missing	22,250	34,481	22,304	79,035
	Other	3,163	4,324	2,731	10,218
Income	0-25k	12,370	14,503	11,934	38,807
	25k-50k	19,942	27,011	20,475	67,428
	50k-75k	33,712	50,385	38,806	122,903
	75k-100k	26,113	39,454	33,344	98,911
	100k-125k	18,465	27,278	24,958	70,701
	125k-200k	17,397	26,642	25,755	69,794
	200k+	8,044	12,662	13,174	33,880
	Unknown	79,055	133,677	72,181	284,913

Table 2.2: New Hampshire: Basic Demographic Information by Party (percent)

		Democratic	Non-Partisan	Republican	Overall
Gender	F	31.17%	41.79%	27.05%	52.11%
	M	22.98%	42.46%	34.56%	47.18%
	Missing	33.28%	43.70%	23.02%	0.70%
Age	18-34	23.63%	51.45%	24.91%	4.55%
	35-54	24.20%	40.42%	35.38%	16.13%
	55+	30.31%	33.58%	36.11%	25.03%
Ethnicity	East and South Asian	29.81%	51.27%	18.93%	1.11%
	European	26.85%	41.78%	31.37%	84.55%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	35.28%	43.02%	21.70%	2.76%
	Likely African-American	34.78%	44.96%	20.26%	0.24%
	Missing	28.15%	43.63%	28.22%	10.04%
	Other	30.96%	42.32%	26.73%	1.30%
Income	0-25k	31.88%	37.37%	30.75%	4.93%
	25k-50k	29.58%	40.06%	30.37%	8.56%
	50k-75k	27.43%	41.00%	31.57%	15.61%
	75k-100k	26.40%	39.89%	33.71%	12.56%
	100k-125k	26.12%	38.58%	35.30%	8.98%
	125k-200k	24.93%	38.17%	36.90%	8.86%
	200k+	23.74%	37.37%	38.88%	4.30%
	Unknown	27.75%	46.92%	25.33%	36.19%

Table 2.3: New Hampshire: Household Information by Registered Party (counts)

		Democratic	Non-Partisan	Republican	Total
Household Party	Democratic	140,396	0	0	140,396
	Democratic & Independent	50,238	49,862	0	100,100
	Democratic & Republican	18,932	0	19,298	38,230
	Democratic & Republican & Independent	5,532	5,870	5,625	17,027
	Independent	0	222,448	0	222,448
	Republican	0	0	160,151	160,151
	Republican & Independent	0	53,432	55,553	108,985
	Cannot Determine	2,582	3,432	1,945	7,959
	Female Only Household	51,516	65,467	31,651	148,634
	Male Only Household	26,954	51,501	30,719	109,174
Family in Household	Mixed Gender Household	134,046	211,212	176,312	521,570
	1	62,332	94,642	50,883	207,857
	2	101,782	158,522	124,158	384,462
	3	37,679	57,712	46,464	141,855
	4+	13,305	20,736	19,122	53,163

Table 2.4: New Hampshire: Household Information by Registered Party (percent)

		Democratic	Non-Partisan	Republican	Overall
Household Party	Democratic	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	17.83%
	Democratic & Independent	50.19%	49.81%	0.00%	12.71%
	Democratic & Republican	49.52%	0.00%	50.48%	4.86%
	Democratic & Republican & Independent	32.49%	34.47%	33.04%	2.16%
	Independent	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%	28.25%
Household Gender	Republican	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%	20.34%
	Republican & Independent	0.00%	49.03%	50.97%	13.84%
	Cannot Determine	32.44%	43.12%	24.44%	1.01%
	Female Only Household	34.66%	44.05%	21.29%	18.88%
	Male Only Household	24.69%	47.17%	28.14%	13.87%
Family in Household	Mixed Gender Household	25.70%	40.50%	33.80%	66.24%
	1	29.99%	45.53%	24.48%	26.40%
	2	26.47%	41.23%	32.29%	48.83%
	3	26.56%	40.68%	32.75%	18.02%
	4+	25.03%	39.00%	35.97%	6.75%

Table 2.5: New Hampshire: Gender by Age by Party (counts)

Gender	Age	N	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Republican
F	18-34	18,953	5,099	9,894	3,960
	35-54	65,056	18,577	26,271	20,208
	55+	102,957	35,206	34,097	33,654
M	18-34	16,702	3,309	8,460	4,933
	35-54	61,195	11,918	24,739	24,538
	55+	93,083	24,158	31,742	37,183
Missing	18-34	179	60	84	35
	35-54	752	239	327	186
	55+	1,056	375	348	333

Table 2.6: New Hampshire: Gender by Age by Party (percent)

Gender	Age	Percent	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Republican
F	18-34	2.41%	26.90%	52.20%	20.89%
	35-54	8.26%	28.56%	40.38%	31.06%
	55+	13.08%	34.19%	33.12%	32.69%
M	18-34	2.12%	19.81%	50.65%	29.54%
	35-54	7.77%	19.48%	40.43%	40.10%
	55+	11.82%	25.95%	34.10%	39.95%
Missing	18-34	0.02%	33.52%	46.93%	19.55%
	35-54	0.10%	31.78%	43.48%	24.73%
	55+	0.13%	35.51%	32.95%	31.53%

Table 2.7: New Hampshire: Gender by Ethnicity by Party (counts)

Gender	Ethnicity	N	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Republican
F	East and South Asian	4,232	1,360	2,083	789
	European	348,277	107,163	144,672	96,442
	Hispanic and Portuguese	11,733	4,485	4,935	2,313
	Likely African-American	1,021	379	467	175
	Missing	40,040	12,831	17,217	9,992
	Other	5,008	1,662	2,079	1,267
M	East and South Asian	3,482	974	1,817	691
	European	314,285	70,579	132,197	111,509
	Hispanic and Portuguese	9,714	3,055	4,287	2,372
	Likely African-American	869	279	380	210
	Missing	38,134	9,085	16,894	12,155
	Other	5,004	1,403	2,164	1,437
Missing	East and South Asian	1,036	274	586	176
	European	3,138	1,007	1,248	883
	Hispanic and Portuguese	272	122	121	29
	Likely African-American	25	8	14	3
	Missing	861	334	370	157
	Other	206	98	81	27

Table 2.8: New Hampshire: Gender by Ethnicity by Party (percent)

Gender	Ethnicity	Percent	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Republican
F	East and South Asian	0.54%	32.14%	49.22%	18.64%
	European	44.23%	30.77%	41.54%	27.69%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	1.49%	38.23%	42.06%	19.71%
	Likely African-American	0.13%	37.12%	45.74%	17.14%
	Missing	5.09%	32.05%	43.00%	24.96%
	Other	0.64%	33.19%	41.51%	25.30%
M	East and South Asian	0.44%	27.97%	52.18%	19.84%
	European	39.92%	22.46%	42.06%	35.48%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	1.23%	31.45%	44.13%	24.42%
	Likely African-American	0.11%	32.11%	43.73%	24.17%
	Missing	4.84%	23.82%	44.30%	31.87%
	Other	0.64%	28.04%	43.25%	28.72%
Missing	East and South Asian	0.13%	26.45%	56.56%	16.99%
	European	0.40%	32.09%	39.77%	28.14%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	0.03%	44.85%	44.49%	10.66%
	Likely African-American	0.00%	32.00%	56.00%	12.00%
	Missing	0.11%	38.79%	42.97%	18.23%
	Other	0.03%	47.57%	39.32%	13.11%

Table 2.9: New Hampshire: Gender by Ethnicity by Age by Party (count)

Gender	Ethnicity	Age	N	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Republican
F	East and South Asian	18-34	237	74	125	38
		35-54	669	209	313	147
		55+	604	202	238	164
	European	18-34	15,832	4,194	8,256	3,382
		35-54	56,195	15,904	22,642	17,649
		55+	90,780	30,754	30,019	30,007
	Hispanic and Portuguese	18-34	585	201	279	105
		35-54	1,901	642	777	482
		55+	1,928	746	651	531
	Likely African-American	18-34	70	22	35	13
		35-54	133	40	49	44
		55+	131	57	43	31
	Missing	18-34	1,994	534	1,081	379
		35-54	5,301	1,539	2,136	1,626
		55+	8,343	3,042	2,757	2,544
	Other	18-34	235	74	118	43
		35-54	857	243	354	260
		55+	1,171	405	389	377
M	East and South Asian	18-34	140	38	79	23
		35-54	639	156	362	121
		55+	555	157	223	175
	European	18-34	14,113	2,715	7,141	4,257
		35-54	52,693	10,022	21,055	21,616
		55+	81,162	20,855	27,505	32,802
	Hispanic and Portuguese	18-34	380	95	198	87
		35-54	1,556	406	646	504
		55+	1,614	499	576	539
	Likely African-American	18-34	25	5	14	6
		35-54	110	31	54	25
		55+	169	52	57	60
	Missing	18-34	1,809	391	917	501
		35-54	5,289	1,103	2,206	1,980
		55+	8,388	2,245	2,994	3,149
	Other	18-34	235	65	111	59
		35-54	908	200	416	292
		55+	1,195	350	387	458
Missing	East and South Asian	18-34	18	10	7	1
		35-54	146	43	83	20
		55+	168	52	72	44
	European	18-34	120	40	55	25
		35-54	445	134	177	134
		55+	719	252	221	246
	Hispanic and Portuguese	18-34	7	3	3	1
		35-54	21	8	5	8
		55+	22	6	7	9
	Likely African-American	18-34	1	0	1	0
		35-54	5	2	3	0
		55+	3	1	0	2
	Missing	18-34	24	4	13	7
		35-54	104	37	48	19
		55+	111	54	32	25
	Other	18-34	9	3	5	1
		35-54	31	15	11	5
		55+	33	10	16	7

Table 2.10: New Hampshire: Gender by Ethnicity by Age by Party (percent)

Gender	Ethnicity	Age	Percent	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Republican
F	East and South Asian	18-34	0.03%	31.22%	52.74%	16.03%
		35-54	0.08%	31.24%	46.79%	21.97%
		55+	0.08%	33.44%	39.40%	27.15%
	European	18-34	2.01%	26.49%	52.15%	21.36%
		35-54	7.14%	28.30%	40.29%	31.41%
		55+	11.53%	33.88%	33.07%	33.05%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	18-34	0.07%	34.36%	47.69%	17.95%
		35-54	0.24%	33.77%	40.87%	25.36%
		55+	0.24%	38.69%	33.77%	27.54%
	Likely African-American	18-34	0.01%	31.43%	50.00%	18.57%
		35-54	0.02%	30.08%	36.84%	33.08%
		55+	0.02%	43.51%	32.82%	23.66%
	Missing	18-34	0.25%	26.78%	54.21%	19.01%
		35-54	0.67%	29.03%	40.29%	30.67%
		55+	1.06%	36.46%	33.05%	30.49%
	Other	18-34	0.03%	31.49%	50.21%	18.30%
		35-54	0.11%	28.35%	41.31%	30.34%
		55+	0.15%	34.59%	33.22%	32.19%
M	East and South Asian	18-34	0.02%	27.14%	56.43%	16.43%
		35-54	0.08%	24.41%	56.65%	18.94%
		55+	0.07%	28.29%	40.18%	31.53%
	European	18-34	1.79%	19.24%	50.60%	30.16%
		35-54	6.69%	19.02%	39.96%	41.02%
		55+	10.31%	25.70%	33.89%	40.42%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	18-34	0.05%	25.00%	52.11%	22.89%
		35-54	0.20%	26.09%	41.52%	32.39%
		55+	0.20%	30.92%	35.69%	33.40%
	Likely African-American	18-34	0.00%	20.00%	56.00%	24.00%
		35-54	0.01%	28.18%	49.09%	22.73%
		55+	0.02%	30.77%	33.73%	35.50%
	Missing	18-34	0.23%	21.61%	50.69%	27.69%
		35-54	0.67%	20.85%	41.71%	37.44%
		55+	1.07%	26.76%	35.69%	37.54%
	Other	18-34	0.03%	27.66%	47.23%	25.11%
		35-54	0.12%	22.03%	45.81%	32.16%
		55+	0.15%	29.29%	32.38%	38.33%
Missing	East and South Asian	18-34	0.00%	55.56%	38.89%	5.56%
		35-54	0.02%	29.45%	56.85%	13.70%
		55+	0.02%	30.95%	42.86%	26.19%
	European	18-34	0.02%	33.33%	45.83%	20.83%
		35-54	0.06%	30.11%	39.78%	30.11%
		55+	0.09%	35.05%	30.74%	34.21%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	18-34	0.00%	42.86%	42.86%	14.29%
		35-54	0.00%	38.10%	23.81%	38.10%
		55+	0.00%	27.27%	31.82%	40.91%
	Likely African-American	18-34	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%
		35-54	0.00%	40.00%	60.00%	0.00%
		55+	0.00%	33.33%	0.00%	66.67%
	Missing	18-34	0.00%	16.67%	54.17%	29.17%
		35-54	0.01%	35.58%	46.15%	18.27%
		55+	0.01%	48.65%	28.83%	22.52%
	Other	18-34	0.00%	33.33%	55.56%	11.11%
		35-54	0.00%	48.39%	35.48%	16.13%
		55+	0.00%	30.30%	48.48%	21.21%

Table 2.11: New Hampshire: Basic Demographic Information by Vote History (counts)

		2010		2012	
		General	Primary	General	Primary
Gender	F	206,683	88,915	341,621	96,028
	M	197,303	90,493	305,809	87,444
Age	Missing	2,480	996	4,404	970
	18-34	9,819	3,006	26,822	3,490
	35-54	72,756	27,652	114,397	26,606
	55+	148,195	76,704	183,272	76,947
Ethnicity	East and South Asian	3,096	869	6,938	932
	European	351,759	158,120	554,590	161,476
	Hispanic and Portuguese	8,205	2,987	17,403	3,066
	Likely African-American	741	302	1,490	328
	Missing	37,771	16,196	63,008	16,698
Income	Other	4,894	1,930	8,405	1,942
	0-25k	24,211	12,136	34,269	12,438
	25k-50k	40,600	19,883	59,729	20,659
	50k-75k	72,622	32,513	109,907	33,595
	75k-100k	59,677	26,348	89,169	26,771
	100k-125k	43,756	19,494	64,004	19,648
	125k-200k	44,483	19,893	63,609	19,372
	200k+	22,031	10,409	30,937	9,925
Party	Unknown	99,086	39,728	200,210	42,034
	Democratic	114,083	40,234	176,066	57,455
	Non-Partisan	133,792	46,129	267,125	47,394
	Republican	158,591	94,041	208,643	79,593

Table 2.12: New Hampshire: Basic Demographic Information by Vote History (percent)

		2010		2012		
		General	Primary	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.
Gender	F	50.85%	49.29%	52.41%	52.06%	49.26%
	M	48.54%	50.16%	46.92%	47.41%	50.21%
Age	Missing	0.61%	0.55%	0.68%	0.53%	0.54%
	18-34	2.42%	1.67%	4.11%	1.89%	3.51%
	35-54	17.90%	15.33%	17.55%	14.43%	17.69%
	55+	36.46%	42.52%	28.12%	41.72%	35.75%
	East and South Asian	0.76%	0.48%	1.06%	0.51%	0.62%
Ethnicity	European	86.54%	87.65%	85.08%	87.55%	86.95%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	2.02%	1.66%	2.67%	1.66%	1.86%
	Likely African-American	0.18%	0.17%	0.23%	0.18%	0.18%
	Missing	9.29%	8.98%	9.67%	9.05%	9.25%
	Other	1.20%	1.07%	1.29%	1.05%	1.15%
	0-25k	5.96%	6.73%	5.26%	6.74%	5.52%
	25k-50k	9.99%	11.02%	9.16%	11.20%	9.55%
Income	50k-75k	17.87%	18.02%	16.86%	18.21%	17.58%
	75k-100k	14.68%	14.60%	13.68%	14.51%	14.77%
	100k-125k	10.76%	10.81%	9.82%	10.65%	10.89%
	125k-200k	10.94%	11.03%	9.76%	10.50%	11.34%
	200k+	5.42%	5.77%	4.75%	5.38%	5.84%
Party	Unknown	24.38%	22.02%	30.71%	22.79%	24.50%
	Democratic	28.07%	22.30%	27.01%	31.15%	16.54%
	Non-Partisan	32.92%	25.57%	40.98%	25.70%	31.38%
	Republican	39.02%	52.13%	32.01%	43.15%	52.08%

Table 2.14: New Hampshire: Household Information by Vote History (counts)

Household Party	2010			2012		
	General	Primary	General	Primary	Pres.	Prim.
Household Party	Democratic	75,639	28,051	114,066	40,190	31,155
	Democratic & Independent	46,331	13,843	83,044	19,176	21,961
	Democratic & Republican	22,460	10,049	32,121	10,317	15,412
	Democratic & Republican & Independent	7,756	3,006	13,499	3,013	5,734
	Independent	88,082	29,968	178,454	30,859	57,606
	Republican	108,453	67,742	138,956	57,464	101,668
	Republican & Independent	57,745	27,745	91,694	23,423	50,902
	Cannot Determine	3,759	1,533	6,487	1,557	2,340
	Female Only Household	59,554	24,451	113,209	27,405	37,253
	Male Only Household	44,025	18,357	80,029	17,433	29,593
Household Gender	Mixed Gender Household	299,128	136,063	452,109	138,047	215,252
	1	84,004	35,073	155,474	36,086	53,773
	2	223,736	101,087	336,336	103,215	154,367
	3	72,274	32,053	116,521	32,885	54,044
Family in Household	4+	26,452	12,191	43,503	12,256	22,254

Table 2.15: New Hampshire: Household Information by Vote History (percent)

Table 2.16: New Hampshire: Household Information by Voter Turnout Rate

	2010					2012		
	General		Primary		General	Primary		Pres. Prim.
	General	Primary	General	Primary		Primary	Pres. Prim.	
Household Party	Democratic	53.88%	19.98%	81.25%	28.63%	22.19%		
	Democratic & Independent	46.28%	13.83%	82.96%	19.16%	21.94%		
	Democratic & Republican	58.75%	26.29%	84.02%	26.99%	40.31%		
	Democratic & Republican & Independent	45.55%	17.65%	79.28%	17.70%	33.68%		
	Independent	39.60%	13.47%	80.22%	13.87%	25.90%		
	Republican	67.72%	42.30%	86.77%	35.88%	63.48%		
Household Gender	Republican & Independent	52.98%	25.46%	84.13%	21.49%	46.71%		
	Cannot Determine	47.23%	19.26%	81.51%	19.56%	29.40%		
	Female Only Household	40.07%	16.45%	76.17%	18.44%	25.06%		
	Male Only Household	40.33%	16.81%	73.30%	15.97%	27.11%		
	Mixed Gender Household	57.35%	26.09%	86.68%	26.47%	41.27%		
	Family in Household	40.41%	16.87%	74.80%	17.36%	25.87%		
Family in Household	1	40.41%	16.87%	74.80%	17.36%	25.87%		
	2	58.19%	26.29%	87.48%	26.85%	40.15%		
	3	50.95%	22.60%	82.14%	23.18%	38.10%		
	4+	49.76%	22.93%	81.83%	23.05%	41.86%		

Table 2.17: New Hampshire: Gender by Age by Vote History (counts)

Gender	Age	2010		2012		
		General	Primary	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.
F	18-34	4,940	1,453	14,480	1,801	4,792
	35-54	36,248	13,234	59,006	13,700	24,429
	55+	75,595	37,976	95,740	39,877	50,538
M	18-34	4,832	1,543	12,211	1,682	5,163
	35-54	36,121	14,267	54,739	12,760	25,643
	55+	71,824	38,347	86,562	36,713	50,667
Missing	18-34	47	10	131	7	33
	35-54	387	151	652	146	238
	55+	776	381	970	357	482

Table 2.18: New Hampshire: Gender by Age by Vote History (percent)

Gender	Age	2010		2012		
		General	Primary	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.
F	18-34	1.22%	0.81%	2.22%	0.98%	1.68%
	35-54	8.92%	7.34%	9.05%	7.43%	8.59%
	55+	18.60%	21.05%	14.69%	21.62%	17.77%
M	18-34	1.19%	0.86%	1.87%	0.91%	1.82%
	35-54	8.89%	7.91%	8.40%	6.92%	9.02%
	55+	17.67%	21.26%	13.28%	19.90%	17.81%
Missing	18-34	0.01%	0.01%	0.02%	0.00%	0.01%
	35-54	0.10%	0.08%	0.10%	0.08%	0.08%
	55+	0.19%	0.21%	0.15%	0.19%	0.17%

Table 2.19: New Hampshire: Gender by Age by Voter Turnout Rate

Gender	Age	2010		2012		
		General	Primary	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.
F	18-34	26.06%	7.67%	76.40%	9.50%	25.28%
	35-54	55.72%	20.34%	90.70%	21.06%	37.55%
	55+	73.42%	36.89%	92.99%	38.73%	49.09%
M	18-34	28.93%	9.24%	73.11%	10.07%	30.91%
	35-54	59.03%	23.31%	89.45%	20.85%	41.90%
	55+	77.16%	41.20%	92.99%	39.44%	54.43%
Missing	18-34	26.26%	5.59%	73.18%	3.91%	18.44%
	35-54	51.46%	20.08%	86.70%	19.41%	31.65%
	55+	73.48%	36.08%	91.86%	33.81%	45.64%

3 Nevada

3.1 Demographic Splits with Party

The third state we examined is Nevada, which consisted of a total of 1,076,381 active registered voters at the time of our analyses. Each voter was classified as *Democratic*, *Republican*, *Non-Partisan*, *Independent*, or *Other*. The Nevada electorate is much more ethnically diverse compared to Iowa and New Hampshire, with 15.5% of the voters being Hispanic and 2.6% of voters being Asian. The Nevadan elctorate followed a similar gender breakdown as Iowa and New Hampshire with more female than male registered voters (see Table 3.2). A plurality of households in Nevada appear to be Democrat-only (32.9%; see Table 3.4). The biggest difference in Age by Gender by Party cohorts (Table 3.6) was between male and females aged 35 to 54, where females were slightly more likely to be registered Democrats whereas males were much more likely to be registered Republicans.

3.2 Vote History

The marginal turnout counts, percentages, and turnout rates are presented for Nevadan subgroups in Tables 3.11 through 3.19. Data is presented for 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 general and primary elections. Tables are presented in sets of three where the first table presents raw counts, the second percentages, and the third, turnout rates. For example, referring to Table 3.11, we can see that a total of 14,095 inviduals making \$25,000 or less turned out for the 2012 primary elections, which according to Table 3.12, accounted for 7.9% of the vote. In Table 3.13, we can see that this segment had a turnout rate of 24.4%.

Table 3.1: Nevada: Basic Demographic Information by Party (counts)

	Democratic	Independent	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican	Total
Gender	F	257,256	24,259	88,355	5,354	184,437
	M	190,114	26,608	98,682	8,970	192,346
	Missing	10,021	816	4,208	222	4,406
	18-34	101,323	13,379	59,974	5,410	59,358
Age	35-54	148,060	17,521	66,396	5,271	124,089
	55+	207,860	20,776	64,850	3,864	197,647
	East and South Asian	11,413	1,189	7,547	287	8,066
	European	277,593	37,264	122,589	10,264	290,529
Ethnicity	Hispanic and Portuguese	98,653	5,603	31,592	1,812	32,581
	Likely African-American	15,416	691	2,519	160	1,936
	Missing	43,087	5,827	21,641	1,748	40,938
	Other	11,229	1,109	5,357	275	7,139
Income	0-25k	28,613	2,616	8,220	585	17,845
	25k-50k	53,084	5,066	17,461	1,296	34,235
	50k-75k	79,716	8,613	30,859	2,215	63,978
	75k-100k	55,224	6,200	23,765	1,562	56,249
	100k-125k	31,135	3,681	13,908	986	35,593
	125k-200k	26,606	3,080	12,336	735	35,839
	200k+	12,137	1,354	6,025	363	20,872
	Unknown	170,876	21,073	78,671	6,804	116,578
						394,002

Table 3.2: Nevada: Basic Demographic Information by Party (percent)

		Democratic	Independent	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican	Overall
Gender	F	45.97%	4.33%	15.79%	0.96%	32.96%	51.06%
	M	36.79%	5.15%	19.10%	1.74%	37.22%	47.14%
Age	Missing	50.94%	4.15%	21.39%	1.13%	22.40%	1.79%
	18-34	42.32%	5.59%	25.05%	2.26%	24.79%	21.85%
	35-54	40.98%	4.85%	18.38%	1.46%	34.34%	32.97%
	55+	41.99%	4.20%	13.10%	0.78%	39.93%	45.16%
Ethnicity	East and South Asian	40.04%	4.17%	26.48%	1.01%	28.30%	2.60%
	European	37.60%	5.05%	16.61%	1.39%	39.35%	67.35%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	57.95%	3.29%	18.56%	1.06%	19.14%	15.53%
	Likely African-American	74.39%	3.33%	12.16%	0.77%	9.34%	1.89%
	Missing	38.05%	5.15%	19.11%	1.54%	36.15%	10.33%
	Other	44.72%	4.42%	21.33%	1.10%	28.43%	2.29%
Income	0-25k	49.44%	4.52%	14.20%	1.01%	30.83%	5.28%
	25k-50k	47.76%	4.56%	15.71%	1.17%	30.80%	10.14%
	50k-75k	43.00%	4.65%	16.65%	1.19%	34.51%	16.91%
	75k-100k	38.62%	4.34%	16.62%	1.09%	39.33%	13.05%
	100k-125k	36.50%	4.32%	16.30%	1.16%	41.73%	7.78%
	125k-200k	33.85%	3.92%	15.70%	0.94%	45.60%	7.17%
	200k+	29.78%	3.32%	14.78%	0.89%	51.22%	3.72%
	Unknown	43.37%	5.35%	19.97%	1.73%	29.59%	35.95%

Table 3.3: Nevada: Household Information by Registered Party (counts)

	Democratic	Independent	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican	Total
Household Party	Democratic	359,943	0	0	0	359,943
	Democratic & Independent	51,863	8,530	35,864	2,526	98,783
	Democratic & Republican	40,514	0	0	40,561	81,075
	Democratic & Republican & Independent	5,071	980	3,677	304	15,087
	Independent	0	33,123	122,370	9,080	164,573
Household Gender	Republican	0	0	0	0	289,983
	Republican & Independent	0	9,050	29,334	2,636	45,590
	Cannot Determine	13,561	1,131	5,662	299	27,074
	Female Only Household	134,009	11,694	43,895	2,872	259,393
	Male Only Household	85,887	12,359	45,913	4,516	214,044
Family in Household	Mixed Gender Household	223,934	26,499	95,775	6,859	595,543
	1	175,874	19,850	74,213	6,092	385,191
	2	200,695	23,329	84,627	5,982	508,942
	3	64,556	6,830	25,671	1,962	158,409
	4+	16,266	1,674	6,734	510	43,512

Table 3.4: Nevada: Household Information by Registered Party (percent)

		Democratic	Independent	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican	Overall
Household Party	Democratic	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	32.84%
	Democratic & Independent	52.50%	8.64%	36.31%	2.56%	0.00%	9.01%
	Democratic & Republican	49.97%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	50.03%	7.40%
	Democratic & Republican & Independent	33.61%	6.50%	24.37%	2.01%	33.51%	1.38%
Household Gender	Independent	0.00%	20.13%	74.36%	5.52%	0.00%	15.02%
	Republican	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%	26.46%
	Republican & Independent	0.00%	10.45%	33.87%	3.04%	52.64%	7.90%
	Cannot Determine	50.09%	4.18%	20.91%	1.10%	23.72%	2.47%
	Female Only Household	51.66%	4.51%	16.92%	1.11%	25.80%	23.67%
	Male Only Household	40.13%	5.77%	21.45%	2.11%	30.54%	19.53%
Family in Household	Mixed Gender Household	37.60%	4.45%	16.08%	1.15%	40.72%	54.34%
	1	45.66%	5.15%	19.27%	1.58%	28.34%	35.14%
	2	39.43%	4.58%	16.63%	1.18%	38.18%	46.43%
	3	40.75%	4.31%	16.21%	1.24%	37.49%	14.45%
	4+	37.38%	3.85%	15.48%	1.17%	42.12%	3.97%

Table 3.5: Nevada: Gender by Age by Party (counts)

Gender	Age	N	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican
F	18-34	227,400	63,908	114,342	732	48,418
	35-54	302,729	95,586	123,020	271	83,852
	55+	415,232	165,032	105,016	144	145,040
M	18-34	221,032	49,539	111,661	1,283	58,549
	35-54	279,170	69,588	112,761	610	96,211
	55+	355,910	121,399	95,617	281	138,613

Table 3.6: Nevada: Gender by Age by Party (percent)

Gender	Age	Percent	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican
F	18-34	12.62%	28.10%	50.28%	0.32%	21.29%
	35-54	16.80%	31.57%	40.64%	0.09%	27.70%
	55+	23.04%	39.74%	25.29%	0.03%	34.93%
M	18-34	12.26%	22.41%	50.52%	0.58%	26.49%
	35-54	15.49%	24.93%	40.39%	0.22%	34.46%
	55+	19.75%	34.11%	26.87%	0.08%	38.95%

Table 3.7: Nevada: Gender by Ethnicity by Party (counts)

Gender	Ethnicity	N	Democratic	Independent	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican
F	East and South Asian	13,583	5,753	569	3,259	132	3,870
	European	377,843	159,646	17,571	56,269	3,641	140,716
	Hispanic and Portuguese	88,522	53,341	2,664	15,441	807	16,269
	Likely African-American	11,623	8,973	332	1,261	66	991
	Missing	55,609	23,644	2,626	9,642	616	19,081
	Other	12,481	5,899	497	2,483	92	3,510
	East and South Asian	11,343	4,283	465	3,176	126	3,293
M	European	352,032	113,649	19,315	64,900	6,529	147,639
	Hispanic and Portuguese	78,504	43,504	2,832	15,435	971	15,762
	Likely African-American	8,348	5,852	336	1,164	89	907
	Missing	54,713	17,949	3,084	11,323	1,083	21,274
	Other	11,780	4,877	576	2,684	172	3,471
	East and South Asian	3,576	1,377	155	1,112	29	903
	European	8,364	4,298	378	1,420	94	2,174
Missing	Hispanic and Portuguese	3,215	1,808	107	716	34	550
	Likely African-American	751	591	23	94	5	38
	Missing	2,919	1,494	117	676	49	583
	Other	848	453	36	190	11	158

Table 3.8: Nevada: Gender by Ethnicity by Party (percent)

Gender	Ethnicity	Percent	Democratic	Independent	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican
F	East and South Asian	1.24%	42.35%	4.19%	23.99%	0.97%	28.49%
	European	34.47%	42.25%	4.65%	14.89%	0.96%	37.24%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	8.08%	60.26%	3.01%	17.44%	0.91%	18.38%
	Likely African-American	1.06%	77.20%	2.86%	10.85%	0.57%	8.53%
	Missing	5.07%	42.52%	4.72%	17.34%	1.11%	34.31%
	Other	1.14%	47.26%	3.98%	19.89%	0.74%	28.12%
	East and South Asian	1.03%	37.76%	4.10%	28.00%	1.11%	29.03%
	European	32.12%	32.28%	5.49%	18.44%	1.85%	41.94%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	7.16%	55.42%	3.61%	19.66%	1.24%	20.08%
	Likely African-American	0.76%	70.10%	4.02%	13.94%	1.07%	10.86%
M	Missing	4.99%	32.81%	5.64%	20.70%	1.98%	38.88%
	Other	1.07%	41.40%	4.89%	22.78%	1.46%	29.47%
	East and South Asian	0.33%	38.51%	4.33%	31.10%	0.81%	25.25%
	European	0.76%	51.39%	4.52%	16.98%	1.12%	25.99%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	0.29%	56.24%	3.33%	22.27%	1.06%	17.11%
	Likely African-American	0.07%	78.70%	3.06%	12.52%	0.67%	5.06%
	Missing	0.27%	51.18%	4.01%	23.16%	1.68%	19.97%
	Other	0.08%	53.42%	4.25%	22.41%	1.30%	18.63%
	East and South Asian						
	European						
Missing	East and South Asian						
	European						
	Hispanic and Portuguese						
	Likely African-American						
	Missing						

Table 3.9: Nevada: Gender by Ethnicity by Age by Party (count)

Gender	Age	N	Democratic	Independent	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican
F	18-34	122,305	56,330	6,540	29,031	2,136	28,268
	35-54	183,990	83,137	8,118	30,841	1,905	59,989
	55+	253,186	117,688	9,595	28,470	1,312	96,121
M	18-34	110,770	41,492	6,556	29,357	3,171	30,194
	35-54	170,786	61,565	9,135	34,106	3,293	62,687
	55+	235,074	87,012	10,916	35,207	2,506	99,433
Missing	18-34	6,369	3,501	283	1,586	103	896
	35-54	6,561	3,358	268	1,449	73	1,413
	55+	6,737	3,160	265	1,173	46	2,093

Table 3.10: Nevada: Gender by Ethnicity by Age by Party (percent)

Gender	Age	Percent	Democratic	Independent	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican
F	18-34	11.16%	46.06%	5.35%	23.74%	1.75%	23.11%
	35-54	16.79%	45.19%	4.41%	16.76%	1.04%	32.60%
	55+	23.10%	46.48%	3.79%	11.24%	0.52%	37.96%
M	18-34	10.11%	37.46%	5.92%	26.50%	2.86%	27.26%
	35-54	15.58%	36.05%	5.35%	19.97%	1.93%	36.70%
	55+	21.45%	37.01%	4.64%	14.98%	1.07%	42.30%
Missing	18-34	0.58%	54.97%	4.44%	24.90%	1.62%	14.07%
	35-54	0.60%	51.18%	4.08%	22.09%	1.11%	21.54%
	55+	0.61%	46.91%	3.93%	17.41%	0.68%	31.07%

Table 3.11: Nevada: Basic Demographic Information by Vote History (counts)

		2006		2008		2010		2012	
		General		Primary		General		Primary	
		General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary
Gender	F	211,669	107,396	355,939	76,401	300,813	131,867	451,574	91,508
	M	193,817	95,804	311,159	67,109	277,590	124,183	402,949	84,989
Age	Missing	4,207	1,975	9,122	1,425	7,080	2,434	13,395	1,840
	18-34	19,973	5,868	80,169	5,148	54,541	10,825	150,902	7,717
	35-54	119,991	45,673	229,577	28,685	182,632	57,749	286,238	32,426
	55+	269,630	153,570	366,333	111,059	348,192	189,850	430,614	138,150
Ethnicity	East and South Asian	7,146	3,040	14,429	2,151	11,445	3,962	20,084	2,855
	European	311,850	160,040	482,909	114,322	426,361	202,842	601,452	139,018
	Hispanic and Portuguese	37,562	16,533	87,556	10,162	70,246	18,881	124,787	13,538
	Likely African-American	4,005	1,887	11,104	1,653	7,571	2,272	15,182	1,974
	Missing	41,998	20,635	66,256	14,656	58,486	26,413	87,382	18,251
	Other	7,132	3,040	13,966	1,991	11,374	4,114	19,031	2,701
Income	0-25k	27,308	15,983	41,102	11,999	36,426	18,739	48,443	14,095
	25k-50k	48,470	26,955	76,964	19,770	67,107	32,342	91,252	23,855
	50k-75k	78,505	38,312	131,002	26,877	113,066	48,806	155,928	32,681
	75k-100k	66,095	31,203	104,945	21,286	91,999	39,735	123,904	25,674
	100k-125k	41,189	20,180	63,215	14,125	56,159	25,978	74,790	16,568
	125k-200k	40,033	19,850	58,897	13,669	53,885	25,453	70,029	16,285
Party	200k+	22,047	11,063	31,290	7,841	29,206	14,494	36,698	9,127
	Unknown	86,046	41,629	168,805	29,368	137,635	52,937	266,874	40,052
	Democratic	165,499	84,793	291,222	58,548	240,016	92,018	365,128	70,193
	Independent	12,697	4,359	25,699	3,100	22,077	5,779	37,549	3,794
	Non-Partisan	46,241	14,180	91,538	10,390	73,734	15,944	135,067	11,152
	Other	3,451	1,074	6,330	762	5,462	1,347	9,751	932
	Republican	181,805	100,769	261,431	72,135	244,194	143,396	320,423	92,266

Table 3.12: Nevada: Basic Demographic Information by Vote History (percent)

		2006		2008		2010		2012	
		General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary
		51.67%	52.34%	52.64%	52.71%	51.38%	51.02%	52.03%	51.31%
Gender	F	47.31%	46.69%	46.01%	46.30%	47.41%	48.04%	46.43%	47.66%
	M	1.03%	0.96%	1.35%	0.98%	1.21%	0.94%	1.54%	1.03%
Age	Missing	4.88%	2.86%	11.86%	3.55%	9.32%	4.19%	17.39%	4.33%
	18-34	29.29%	22.26%	33.95%	19.79%	31.19%	22.34%	32.98%	18.18%
Ethnicity	35-54	65.81%	74.85%	54.17%	76.63%	59.47%	73.45%	49.61%	77.47%
	55+	1.74%	1.48%	2.13%	1.48%	1.95%	1.53%	2.31%	1.60%
East and South Asian	European	76.12%	78.00%	71.41%	78.88%	72.82%	78.47%	69.30%	77.95%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	9.17%	8.06%	12.95%	7.01%	12.00%	7.30%	14.38%	7.59%
Likely African-American	Likely African-American	0.98%	0.92%	1.64%	1.14%	1.29%	0.88%	1.75%	1.11%
	Missing	10.25%	10.06%	9.80%	10.11%	9.99%	10.22%	10.07%	10.23%
Income	Other	1.74%	1.48%	2.07%	1.37%	1.94%	1.59%	2.19%	1.51%
	0-25k	6.67%	7.79%	6.08%	8.28%	6.22%	7.25%	5.58%	7.90%
25k-50k	25k-50k	11.83%	13.14%	11.38%	13.64%	11.46%	12.51%	10.51%	13.38%
	50k-75k	19.16%	18.67%	19.37%	18.54%	19.31%	18.88%	17.97%	18.33%
75k-100k	75k-100k	16.13%	15.21%	15.52%	14.69%	15.71%	15.37%	14.28%	14.40%
	100k-125k	10.05%	9.84%	9.35%	9.75%	9.59%	10.05%	8.62%	9.29%
125k-200k	125k-200k	9.77%	9.67%	8.71%	9.43%	9.20%	9.85%	8.07%	9.13%
	200k+	5.38%	5.39%	4.63%	5.41%	4.99%	5.61%	4.23%	5.12%
Unknown	Unknown	21.00%	20.29%	24.96%	20.26%	23.51%	20.48%	30.75%	22.46%
	Democratic	40.40%	41.33%	43.07%	40.40%	40.99%	35.60%	42.07%	39.36%
Independent	Independent	3.10%	2.12%	3.80%	2.14%	3.77%	2.24%	4.33%	2.13%
	Non-Partisan	11.29%	6.91%	13.54%	7.17%	12.59%	6.17%	15.56%	6.25%
Other	Other	0.84%	0.52%	0.94%	0.53%	0.93%	0.52%	1.12%	0.52%
	Republican	44.38%	49.11%	38.66%	49.77%	41.71%	55.48%	36.92%	51.74%

Table 3.13: Nevada: Basic Demographic Information by Voter Turnout Rate

		2006		2008		2010		2012	
		General		Primary		General		Primary	
		General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary
Gender	F	37.82%	19.19%	63.60%	13.65%	53.75%	23.56%	80.69%	16.35%
	M	37.51%	18.54%	60.22%	12.99%	53.72%	24.03%	77.98%	16.45%
Age	Missing	21.38%	10.04%	46.37%	7.24%	35.99%	12.37%	68.09%	9.35%
	18-34	8.34%	2.45%	33.48%	2.15%	22.78%	4.52%	63.02%	3.22%
	35-54	33.21%	12.64%	63.54%	7.94%	50.54%	15.98%	79.22%	8.97%
	55+	54.47%	31.02%	74.01%	22.44%	70.34%	38.35%	86.99%	27.91%
Ethnicity	East and South Asian	25.07%	10.67%	50.62%	7.55%	40.16%	13.90%	70.47%	10.02%
	European	42.24%	21.68%	65.41%	15.49%	57.75%	27.48%	81.47%	18.83%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	22.06%	9.71%	51.43%	5.97%	41.26%	11.09%	73.30%	7.95%
	Likely African-American	19.33%	9.11%	53.59%	7.98%	36.54%	10.96%	73.27%	9.53%
	Missing	37.09%	18.22%	58.51%	12.94%	51.65%	23.32%	77.16%	16.12%
	Other	28.40%	12.11%	55.62%	7.93%	45.30%	16.38%	75.79%	10.76%
Income	0-25k	47.18%	27.61%	71.01%	20.73%	62.93%	32.38%	83.70%	24.35%
	25k-50k	43.61%	24.25%	69.25%	17.79%	60.38%	29.10%	82.10%	21.46%
	50k-75k	42.35%	20.67%	70.67%	14.50%	60.99%	26.33%	84.11%	17.63%
	75k-100k	46.22%	21.82%	73.39%	14.89%	64.33%	27.79%	86.65%	17.95%
	100k-125k	48.29%	23.66%	74.11%	16.56%	65.83%	30.45%	87.68%	19.42%
	125k-200k	50.94%	25.26%	74.94%	17.39%	68.56%	32.38%	89.10%	20.72%
Party	200k+	54.10%	27.15%	76.78%	19.24%	71.67%	35.57%	90.05%	22.40%
	Unknown	21.84%	10.57%	42.84%	7.45%	34.93%	13.44%	67.73%	10.17%
	Democratic	36.18%	18.54%	63.67%	12.80%	52.48%	20.12%	79.83%	15.35%
	Independent	24.57%	8.43%	49.72%	6.00%	42.72%	11.18%	72.65%	7.34%
	Non-Partisan	24.18%	7.41%	47.86%	5.43%	38.55%	8.34%	70.63%	5.83%
	Other	23.72%	7.38%	43.52%	5.24%	37.55%	9.26%	67.04%	6.41%
	Republican	47.69%	26.44%	68.58%	18.92%	64.06%	37.62%	84.06%	24.20%

Table 3.14: Nevada: Household Information by Vote History (counts)

		2006		2008		2010		2012	
Household Party		General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary
		126,542	66,029	225,670	46,218	185,860	71,917	286,265	56,725
	Democratic	29,618	11,108	57,082	7,133	45,938	11,789	76,033	8,218
	Democratic & Independent	38,370	20,841	57,326	14,359	49,601	24,389	66,062	15,450
	Democratic & Republican	5,438	2,388	9,220	1,541	7,515	2,707	11,295	1,569
	Democratic & Republican & Independent								
	Independent	38,271	12,044	76,206	8,879	62,052	13,755	113,839	9,768
	Republican	139,846	79,666	198,527	57,760	188,009	114,980	245,042	75,571
	Republican & Independent	31,608	13,099	52,189	9,045	46,508	18,947	69,382	11,036
	Cannot Determine	6,616	3,188	13,665	2,274	10,798	3,856	19,348	2,850
	Female Only Household	78,228	39,635	147,349	28,999	114,564	45,995	192,441	33,427
	Male Only Household	60,277	28,273	108,249	19,682	91,205	35,669	147,948	25,558
	Mixed Gender Household	264,572	134,079	406,957	93,980	368,916	172,964	508,181	116,502
Family in Household	1	112,279	55,592	206,505	40,192	165,826	66,812	274,616	48,551
	2	217,756	110,605	340,855	78,625	306,047	142,613	429,997	98,709
	3	62,973	30,604	101,465	20,424	89,167	38,402	127,906	24,490
	4+	16,685	8,374	27,395	5,694	24,443	10,657	35,399	6,587

Table 3.15: Nevada: Household Information by Vote History (percent)

		2006		2008		2010		2012	
		General		Primary		General		Primary	
		General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary
Household Party	Democratic	30.89%	32.18%	33.37%	31.89%	31.74%	27.82%	32.98%	31.81%
	Democratic & Independent	7.23%	5.41%	8.44%	4.92%	7.85%	4.56%	8.76%	4.61%
	Democratic & Republican	9.37%	10.16%	8.48%	9.91%	8.47%	9.44%	7.61%	8.66%
	Democratic & Republican & Independent	1.33%	1.16%	1.36%	1.06%	1.28%	1.05%	1.30%	0.88%
	Independent	9.34%	5.87%	11.27%	6.13%	10.60%	5.32%	13.12%	5.48%
Household Gender	Republican	34.13%	38.83%	29.36%	39.85%	32.11%	44.48%	28.23%	42.38%
	Republican & Independent	7.72%	6.38%	7.72%	6.24%	7.94%	7.33%	7.99%	6.19%
	Cannot Determine	1.61%	1.55%	2.02%	1.57%	1.84%	1.49%	2.23%	1.60%
	Female Only Household	19.09%	19.32%	21.79%	20.01%	19.57%	17.79%	22.17%	18.74%
	Male Only Household	14.71%	13.78%	16.01%	13.58%	15.58%	13.80%	17.05%	14.33%
Family in Household	Mixed Gender Household	64.58%	65.35%	60.18%	64.84%	63.01%	66.91%	58.55%	65.33%
	1	27.41%	27.09%	30.54%	27.73%	28.32%	25.85%	31.64%	27.22%
	2	53.15%	53.91%	50.41%	54.25%	52.27%	55.17%	49.54%	55.35%
	3	15.37%	14.92%	15.00%	14.09%	15.23%	14.86%	14.74%	13.73%
	4+	4.07%	4.08%	4.05%	3.93%	4.17%	4.12%	4.08%	3.69%

Table 3.16: Nevada: Household Information by Voter Turnout Rate

		2006		2008		2010		2012	
Household Party		General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary
		35.16%	18.34%	62.70%	12.84%	51.64%	19.98%	79.53%	15.76%
	Democratic	29.98%	11.24%	57.79%	7.22%	46.50%	11.93%	76.97%	8.32%
	Democratic & Independent	47.33%	25.71%	70.71%	17.71%	61.18%	30.08%	81.48%	19.06%
	Democratic & Republican	36.04%	15.83%	61.11%	10.21%	49.81%	17.94%	74.87%	10.40%
	Democratic & Republican & Independent								
	Independent	23.25%	7.32%	46.31%	5.40%	37.70%	8.36%	69.17%	5.94%
	Republican	48.23%	27.47%	68.46%	19.92%	64.83%	39.65%	84.50%	26.06%
	Republican & Independent	36.49%	15.12%	60.26%	10.44%	53.70%	21.88%	80.11%	12.74%
	Republican & Independent Cannot Determine	24.44%	11.78%	50.47%	8.40%	39.88%	14.24%	71.46%	10.53%
	Female Only Household	30.16%	15.28%	56.81%	11.18%	44.17%	17.73%	74.19%	12.89%
	Male Only Household	28.16%	13.21%	50.57%	9.20%	42.61%	16.66%	69.12%	11.94%
	Mixed Gender Household	44.43%	22.51%	68.33%	15.78%	61.95%	29.04%	85.33%	19.56%
Family in Household	1	29.15%	14.43%	53.61%	10.43%	43.05%	17.35%	71.29%	12.60%
	2	42.79%	21.73%	66.97%	15.45%	60.13%	28.02%	84.49%	19.39%
	3	39.75%	19.32%	64.05%	12.89%	56.29%	24.24%	80.74%	15.46%
	4+	38.35%	19.25%	62.96%	13.09%	56.18%	24.49%	81.35%	15.14%

Table 3.17: Nevada: Gender by Age by Vote History (counts)

Gender	Age	2006		2008		2010		2012	
		General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary
F	18-34	25,322	2,942	91,672	3,232	51,824	7,267	149,529	5,181
	35-54	134,177	17,106	226,936	15,488	157,847	27,716	246,164	17,791
	55+	291,366	79,498	357,094	65,055	309,844	99,083	370,516	66,906
M	18-34	23,470	2,849	77,370	3,371	49,750	7,975	130,237	5,808
	35-54	120,237	15,298	195,401	14,789	148,619	29,539	219,358	18,580
	55+	251,137	65,770	299,437	55,713	272,432	90,310	316,565	60,821

Table 3.18: Nevada: Gender by Age by Vote History (percent)

Gender	Age	2006		2008		2010		2012	
		General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary
F	18-34	2.57%	1.52%	6.45%	1.86%	4.91%	2.12%	9.34%	2.20%
	35-54	15.30%	11.86%	17.95%	10.65%	16.08%	11.47%	17.15%	9.31%
	55+	33.78%	38.95%	28.22%	40.18%	30.37%	37.41%	25.53%	39.78%
M	18-34	2.24%	1.31%	5.18%	1.65%	4.26%	2.02%	7.64%	2.06%
	35-54	13.68%	10.21%	15.51%	8.93%	14.70%	10.66%	15.30%	8.68%
	55+	31.37%	35.17%	25.32%	35.72%	28.45%	35.36%	23.48%	36.92%
Missing	18-34	0.06%	0.03%	0.23%	0.04%	0.15%	0.05%	0.41%	0.07%
	35-54	0.30%	0.20%	0.49%	0.21%	0.41%	0.22%	0.53%	0.20%
	55+	0.66%	0.73%	0.63%	0.73%	0.65%	0.67%	0.60%	0.76%

Table 3.19: Nevada: Gender by Age by Voter Turnout Rate

Gender	Age	2006		2008		2010		2012	
		General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary
F	18-34	8.60%	2.54%	35.63%	2.20%	23.49%	4.48%	66.25%	3.21%
	35-54	34.07%	13.22%	65.99%	8.39%	51.18%	16.11%	80.90%	9.02%
	55+	54.66%	31.56%	75.38%	23.00%	70.24%	38.19%	87.52%	28.02%
M	18-34	8.29%	2.43%	31.62%	2.16%	22.50%	4.70%	59.89%	3.31%
	35-54	32.83%	12.26%	61.39%	7.58%	50.40%	16.13%	77.74%	9.06%
	55+	54.68%	30.70%	72.85%	22.02%	70.85%	38.89%	86.69%	28.01%
Missing	18-34	4.11%	1.11%	24.51%	0.97%	14.04%	2.14%	55.58%	1.95%
	35-54	18.84%	6.13%	50.54%	4.68%	36.26%	8.54%	70.40%	5.35%
	55+	40.20%	22.28%	62.95%	15.64%	56.48%	25.77%	77.69%	20.25%

4

South Carolina

4.1 Demographic splits with Party

The fourth state we examined was South Carolina, which consisted of a total of 2,521,845 active registered voters at the time of our analyses. Each voter was classified as *Democratic*, *Republican*, or *Non-Partisan*. The South Carolina electorate, like Nevada, is much more ethnically diverse than Iowa and New Hampshire, although with a smaller population of Hispanic individuals (2.0%) and a much larger percentage of African Americans (29.1%; see Table 4.2). The South Carolina electorate followed a similar gender breakdown as other states, which was even more pronounced (54.6% female). A plurality of households in South Carolina are Republican-only (43.3%; see Table 4.4). A large majority of Female-only households are Democratic (57.3%). The large majority of African Americans were registered Democrats (95.9%).

4.2 Vote History

The marginal turnout counts, percentages, and turnout rates are presented for South Carolina subgroups in Tables 4.11 through 4.19. Data is presented for 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 general and primary elections. Data is also presented for the 2008 and 2012 presidential primary elections. Similar to other states, tables are presented in sets of three where the first table presents raw counts, the second percentages, and the third, turnout rates. For example, referring to Table 4.14, we can see that a total of 860,154 individuals from Republican-only households turned out in the 2012 General Election, which according to Table 4.15, accounted for 54.4% of the vote. In Table 4.16, we can see that this segment had a turnout rate of 78.76%.

Table 4.1: South Carolina: Basic Demographic Information by Party (counts)

		Democratic	Non-Partisan	Republican	Total
Gender	F	630,973	145,733	601,046	1,377,752
	M	404,745	155,523	583,825	1,144,093
	Missing	15	1	1	17
Age	18-34	325,478	70,198	158,301	553,977
	35-54	334,113	120,614	390,371	845,098
	55+	375,810	110,154	636,053	1,122,017
Ethnicity	East and South Asian	3,303	4,460	7,950	15,713
	European	263,523	257,023	1,035,942	1,556,488
	Hispanic and Portuguese	34,122	4,992	12,233	51,347
	Likely African-American	703,970	905	29,552	734,427
	Missing	26,880	29,632	89,644	146,156
	Other	3,935	4,245	9,551	17,731
Income	0-25k	144,232	14,810	89,498	248,540
	25k-50k	146,444	34,565	153,460	334,469
	50k-75k	124,394	38,410	221,805	384,609
	75k-100k	67,834	21,800	164,177	253,811
	100k-125k	34,754	14,378	103,211	152,343
	125k-200k	26,896	9,101	89,752	125,749
	200k+	10,070	3,918	48,515	62,503
	Unknown	481,109	164,275	314,454	959,838

Table 4.2: South Carolina: Basic Demographic Information by Party (percent)

		Democratic	Non-Partisan	Republican	Overall
Gender	F	45.80%	10.58%	43.63%	54.63%
	M	35.38%	13.59%	51.03%	45.37%
	Missing	88.24%	5.88%	5.88%	0.00%
Age	18-34	58.75%	12.67%	28.58%	21.97%
	35-54	39.54%	14.27%	46.19%	33.51%
	55+	33.49%	9.82%	56.69%	44.49%
Ethnicity	East and South Asian	21.02%	28.38%	50.60%	0.62%
	European	16.93%	16.51%	66.56%	61.72%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	66.45%	9.72%	23.82%	2.04%
	Likely African-American	95.85%	0.12%	4.02%	29.12%
	Missing	18.39%	20.27%	61.33%	5.80%
	Other	22.19%	23.94%	53.87%	0.70%
Income	0-25k	58.03%	5.96%	36.01%	9.86%
	25k-50k	43.78%	10.33%	45.88%	13.26%
	50k-75k	32.34%	9.99%	57.67%	15.25%
	75k-100k	26.73%	8.59%	64.68%	10.06%
	100k-125k	22.81%	9.44%	67.75%	6.04%
	125k-200k	21.39%	7.24%	71.37%	4.99%
	200k+	16.11%	6.27%	77.62%	2.48%
	Unknown	50.12%	17.11%	32.76%	38.06%

Table 4.3: South Carolina: Household Information by Registered Party (counts)

	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Republican	Total
Household Party				
Democratic	941,389	0	0	941,389
Democratic & Independent	9,738	9,153	0	18,891
Democratic & Republican	83,516	0	90,175	173,691
Democratic & Republican & Independent	1,090	973	1,333	3,396
Independent	0	289,842	0	289,842
Republican	0	0	1,092,111	1,092,111
Republican & Independent	0	1,289	1,253	2,542
Household Gender				
Cannot Determine	12	1	2	15
Female Only Household	342,642	115,797	139,503	597,942
Male Only Household	147,290	123,131	95,593	366,014
Mixed Gender Household	545,789	62,328	949,774	1,557,891
Family in Household				
1	355,426	208,355	186,462	750,243
2	388,738	80,561	693,969	1,163,268
3	212,349	11,214	240,747	464,310
4+	79,220	1,127	63,694	144,041

Table 4.4: South Carolina: Household Information by Registered Party (percent)

		Democratic	Non-Partisan	Republican	Overall
Household Party	Democratic	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	37.33%
	Democratic & Independent	51.55%	48.45%	0.00%	0.75%
	Democratic & Republican	48.08%	0.00%	51.92%	6.89%
	Democratic & Republican & Independent	32.10%	28.65%	39.25%	0.13%
	Independent	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%	11.49%
Household Gender	Republican	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%	43.31%
	Republican & Independent	0.00%	50.71%	49.29%	0.10%
	Cannot Determine	80.00%	6.67%	13.33%	0.00%
	Female Only Household	57.30%	19.37%	23.33%	23.71%
	Male Only Household	40.24%	33.64%	26.12%	14.51%
Family in Household	Mixed Gender Household	35.03%	4.00%	60.97%	61.78%
	1	47.37%	27.77%	24.85%	29.75%
	2	33.42%	6.93%	59.66%	46.13%
	3	45.73%	2.42%	51.85%	18.41%
	4+	55.00%	0.78%	44.22%	5.71%

Table 4.5: South Carolina: Gender by Age by Party (counts)

Gender	Age	N	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican
F	18-34	227,400	63,908	114,342	732	48,418
	35-54	302,729	95,586	123,020	271	83,852
	55+	415,232	165,032	105,016	144	145,040
M	18-34	221,032	49,539	111,661	1,283	58,549
	35-54	279,170	69,588	112,761	610	96,211
	55+	355,910	121,399	95,617	281	138,613

Table 4.6: South Carolina: Gender by Age by Party (percent)

Gender	Age	Percent	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican
F	18-34	12.62%	28.10%	50.28%	0.32%	21.29%
	35-54	16.80%	31.57%	40.64%	0.09%	27.70%
	55+	23.04%	39.74%	25.29%	0.03%	34.93%
M	18-34	12.26%	22.41%	50.52%	0.58%	26.49%
	35-54	15.49%	24.93%	40.39%	0.22%	34.46%
	55+	19.75%	34.11%	26.87%	0.08%	38.95%

Table 4.7: South Carolina: Gender by Ethnicity by Party (counts)

Gender	Ethnicity	N	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Republican
F	East and South Asian	8,390	2,377	1,874	4,139
	European	830,247	177,661	127,502	525,084
	Hispanic and Portuguese	30,151	23,098	354	6,699
	Likely African-American	423,628	406,630	487	16,511
	Missing	76,078	18,616	13,659	43,803
	Other	9,258	2,591	1,857	4,810
M	East and South Asian	7,323	926	2,586	3,811
	European	726,238	85,860	129,521	510,857
	Hispanic and Portuguese	21,194	11,022	4,638	5,534
	Likely African-American	310,788	297,329	418	13,041
	Missing	70,078	8,264	15,973	45,841
	Other	8,472	1,344	2,387	4,741
Missing	East and South Asian	0	0	0	0
	European	3	2	0	1
	Hispanic and Portuguese	2	2	0	0
	Likely African-American	11	11	0	0
	Missing	0	0	0	0
	Other	1	0	1	0

Table 4.8: South Carolina: Gender by Ethnicity by Party (percent)

Gender	Ethnicity	Percent	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Republican
F	East and South Asian	0.33%	28.33%	22.34%	49.33%
	European	32.92%	21.40%	15.36%	63.24%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	1.20%	76.61%	1.17%	22.22%
	Likely African-American	16.80%	95.99%	0.11%	3.90%
	Missing	3.02%	24.47%	17.95%	57.58%
	Other	0.37%	27.99%	20.06%	51.96%
M	East and South Asian	0.29%	12.65%	35.31%	52.04%
	European	28.80%	11.82%	17.83%	70.34%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	0.84%	52.01%	21.88%	26.11%
	Likely African-American	12.32%	95.67%	0.13%	4.20%
	Missing	2.78%	11.79%	22.79%	65.41%
	Other	0.34%	15.86%	28.18%	55.96%
Missing	East and South Asian	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	European	0.00%	66.67%	0.00%	33.33%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Likely African-American	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Missing	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Other	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%

Table 4.9: South Carolina: Gender by Ethnicity by Age by Party (count)

Gender	Age	N	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Republican
F	18-34	302,584	209,783	20,520	72,281
	35-54	459,368	200,929	57,781	200,658
	55+	615,215	220,009	67,210	327,996
M	18-34	251,380	115,683	49,678	86,019
	35-54	385,726	133,181	62,832	189,713
	55+	506,802	155,801	42,944	308,057
Missing	18-34	13	12	0	1
	35-54	4	3	1	0
	55+	0	0	0	0

Table 4.10: South Carolina: Gender by Ethnicity by Age by Party (percent)

Gender	Age	Percent	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Republican
F	18-34	12.00%	69.33%	6.78%	23.89%
	35-54	18.22%	43.74%	12.58%	43.68%
	55+	24.40%	35.76%	10.92%	53.31%
M	18-34	9.97%	46.02%	19.76%	34.22%
	35-54	15.30%	34.53%	16.29%	49.18%
	55+	20.10%	30.74%	8.47%	60.78%
Missing	18-34	0.00%	92.31%	0.00%	7.69%
	35-54	0.00%	75.00%	25.00%	0.00%
	55+	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Table 4.11: South Carolina: Basic Demographic Information by Vote History (counts)

	2006			2008			2010			2012		
	General	Primary		General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary		General	Primary	Pres. Prim.
Gender	F	503,764	188,915	911,465	224,243	409,371	667,186	323,835	987,322	146,365	267,257	
	M	409,486	160,957	703,393	192,682	325,550	540,870	280,875	772,640	129,497	269,049	
	Missing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	0	0	
Age	18-34	44,096	11,440	205,770	18,965	34,964	104,683	34,506	285,319	17,959	40,457	
	35-54	274,070	75,689	553,804	98,632	212,547	379,750	155,238	585,453	65,050	154,788	
	55+	594,889	262,657	854,933	299,246	487,266	723,422	414,910	888,967	192,812	341,019	
Ethnicity	East and	3,431	957	7,338	1,110	2,491	4,626	1,996	8,362	710	2,237	
	South Asian											
	European	631,234	246,807	1,017,447	286,177	461,043	785,436	437,228	1,098,762	186,185	478,257	
	Hispanic and	9,652	2,578	23,388	3,372	7,211	14,282	5,641	28,228	2,156	7,193	
	Portuguese											
	Likely	214,405	80,030	473,654	103,155	223,899	333,651	123,447	519,718	71,743	6,611	
	African-											
	American											
	Missing	49,643	17,962	83,550	21,011	36,610	63,459	33,234	94,175	13,834	38,419	
	Other	4,885	1,538	9,481	2,100	3,667	6,602	3,164	10,730	1,234	3,589	
Income	0-25k	108,540	49,074	180,848	57,709	93,035	138,625	72,148	188,189	36,871	45,666	
	25k-50k	144,238	59,817	243,236	71,326	120,214	186,824	96,583	257,442	47,092	74,754	
	50k-75k	165,770	60,043	284,232	74,457	132,653	221,781	111,903	308,255	49,482	103,074	
	75k-100k	116,650	41,364	191,449	49,901	91,961	153,906	78,839	207,851	32,098	79,451	
	100k-125k	73,146	26,751	115,695	30,984	57,715	94,261	49,932	125,327	19,331	51,651	
	125k-200k	62,714	23,529	96,991	27,121	48,975	81,019	44,199	105,429	18,335	46,254	
	200k+	32,208	12,423	48,254	13,954	25,590	41,539	23,591	53,307	8,979	26,488	
Party	Unknown	209,984	76,871	454,153	91,473	164,778	290,101	127,515	514,175	63,674	108,968	
	Democratic	300,416	116,263	634,360	149,962	277,435	436,325	173,685	694,032	106,662	17,049	
	Non-Partisan	43,006	117	117,817	0	20,462	52,415	0	128,694	465	0	
	Republican	569,828	233,492	862,681	266,963	437,024	719,316	431,025	937,249	168,735	519,257	

Table 4.12: South Carolina: Basic Demographic Information by Vote History (percent)

		2006			2008			2010			2012		
		General	Primary		General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary		General	Primary	Pres. Prim.
Gender	F	55.16%	54.00%	56.44%	53.78%	55.70%	55.23%	53.55%	56.10%	53.06%	49.83%		
	M	44.84%	46.00%	43.56%	46.22%	44.30%	44.77%	46.45%	43.90%	46.94%	50.17%		
Age	Missing	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%		
	18-34	4.83%	3.27%	12.74%	4.55%	4.76%	8.67%	5.71%	16.21%	6.51%	7.54%		
	35-54	30.01%	21.63%	34.29%	23.66%	28.92%	31.43%	25.67%	33.26%	23.58%	28.86%		
	55+	65.14%	75.07%	52.94%	71.77%	66.30%	59.88%	68.61%	50.51%	69.89%	63.59%		
	East and South Asian	0.38%	0.27%	0.45%	0.27%	0.34%	0.38%	0.33%	0.48%	0.26%	0.42%		
Ethnicity	European	69.12%	70.54%	63.01%	68.64%	62.73%	65.02%	72.30%	62.43%	67.49%	89.18%		
	Hispanic and Portuguese	1.06%	0.74%	1.45%	0.81%	0.98%	1.18%	0.93%	1.60%	0.78%	1.34%		
	Likely African-American	23.48%	22.87%	29.33%	24.74%	30.47%	27.62%	20.41%	29.53%	26.01%	1.23%		
	Missing	5.44%	5.13%	5.17%	5.04%	4.98%	5.25%	5.50%	5.35%	5.01%	7.16%		
	Other	0.53%	0.44%	0.59%	0.50%	0.50%	0.55%	0.52%	0.61%	0.45%	0.67%		
Income	0-25k	11.89%	14.03%	11.20%	13.84%	12.66%	11.48%	11.93%	10.69%	13.37%	8.51%		
	25k-50k	15.79%	17.10%	15.06%	17.11%	16.36%	15.46%	15.97%	14.63%	17.07%	13.94%		
	50k-75k	18.15%	17.16%	17.60%	17.86%	18.05%	18.36%	18.51%	17.51%	17.94%	19.22%		
	75k-100k	12.77%	11.82%	11.86%	11.97%	12.51%	12.74%	13.04%	11.81%	11.64%	14.81%		
	100k-125k	8.01%	7.65%	7.16%	7.43%	7.85%	7.80%	8.26%	7.12%	7.01%	9.63%		
	125k-200k	6.87%	6.73%	6.01%	6.51%	6.66%	6.71%	7.31%	5.99%	6.65%	8.62%		
	200k+	3.53%	3.55%	2.99%	3.35%	3.48%	3.44%	3.90%	3.03%	3.25%	4.94%		
	Unknown	22.99%	21.97%	28.12%	21.94%	22.42%	24.01%	21.09%	29.21%	23.08%	20.32%		
	Democratic	32.90%	33.23%	39.28%	35.97%	37.75%	36.12%	28.72%	39.43%	38.66%	3.18%		
	Non-Partisan	4.71%	0.03%	7.30%	0.00%	2.78%	4.34%	0.00%	7.31%	0.17%	0.00%		
Party	Republican	62.40%	66.74%	53.42%	64.03%	59.47%	59.54%	71.28%	53.25%	61.17%	96.82%		

Table 4.13: South Carolina: Basic Demographic Information by Voter Turnout Rate

	2006			2008			2010			2012		
	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.
Gender												
F	36.56%	13.71%	66.16%	16.28%	29.71%	71.66%	23.50%	10.62%	19.40%	71.66%	10.62%	19.40%
M	35.79%	14.07%	61.48%	16.84%	28.45%	67.53%	24.55%	11.32%	23.52%	67.53%	11.32%	23.52%
Age												
Missing	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	76.47%	0.00%	0.00%
18-34	7.96%	2.07%	37.14%	3.42%	6.31%	51.50%	6.23%	3.24%	7.30%	51.50%	3.24%	7.30%
35-54	32.43%	8.96%	65.53%	11.67%	25.15%	69.28%	18.37%	7.70%	18.32%	69.28%	7.70%	18.32%
55+	53.02%	23.41%	76.20%	26.67%	43.43%	79.23%	36.98%	17.18%	30.39%	79.23%	17.18%	30.39%
Ethnicity												
East and South Asian	21.84%	6.09%	46.70%	7.06%	15.85%	53.22%	12.70%	4.52%	14.24%	53.22%	4.52%	14.24%
European	40.56%	15.86%	65.37%	18.39%	29.62%	70.59%	28.09%	11.96%	30.73%	70.59%	11.96%	30.73%
Hispanic and	18.80%	5.02%	45.55%	6.57%	14.04%	54.97%	10.99%	4.20%	14.01%	54.97%	4.20%	14.01%
Portuguese												
Likely	29.19%	10.90%	64.49%	14.05%	30.49%	70.77%	16.81%	9.77%	0.90%	70.77%	9.77%	0.90%
African-American												
Missing	33.97%	12.29%	57.16%	14.38%	25.05%	64.43%	22.74%	9.47%	26.29%	64.43%	9.47%	26.29%
Other	27.55%	8.67%	53.47%	11.84%	20.68%	60.52%	17.84%	6.96%	20.24%	60.52%	6.96%	20.24%
Income												
0-25k	43.67%	19.74%	72.76%	23.22%	37.43%	75.72%	29.03%	14.84%	18.37%	75.72%	14.84%	18.37%
25k-50k	43.12%	17.88%	72.72%	21.33%	35.94%	76.97%	28.88%	14.08%	22.35%	76.97%	14.08%	22.35%
50k-75k	43.10%	15.61%	73.90%	19.36%	34.49%	80.15%	29.10%	12.87%	26.80%	80.15%	12.87%	26.80%
75k-100k	45.96%	16.30%	75.43%	19.66%	36.23%	81.89%	31.06%	12.65%	31.30%	81.89%	12.65%	31.30%
100k-125k	48.01%	17.56%	75.94%	20.34%	37.88%	82.27%	32.78%	12.69%	33.90%	82.27%	12.69%	33.90%
125k-200k	49.87%	18.71%	77.13%	21.57%	38.95%	83.84%	35.15%	14.58%	36.78%	83.84%	14.58%	36.78%
200k+	51.53%	19.88%	77.20%	22.33%	40.94%	85.29%	37.74%	14.37%	42.38%	85.29%	14.37%	42.38%
Party												
Unknown	21.88%	8.01%	47.32%	9.53%	17.17%	53.57%	13.29%	6.63%	11.35%	53.57%	6.63%	11.35%
Democratic	29.01%	11.23%	61.25%	14.48%	26.79%	67.01%	16.77%	10.30%	1.65%	67.01%	10.30%	1.65%
Non-Partisan	14.28%	0.04%	39.11%	0.00%	6.79%	42.72%	0.00%	0.15%	0.00%	42.72%	0.15%	0.00%
Republican	48.09%	19.71%	72.81%	22.53%	36.88%	79.10%	36.38%	14.24%	43.82%	79.10%	14.24%	43.82%

Table 4.14: South Carolina: Household Information by Vote History (counts)

	2006			2008			2010			2012		
	General	Primary		General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary		General	Primary	Pres. Prim.
Household Party	Democratic	274,954	106,274	584,819	137,776	256,818	402,738	158,743	636,197	98,121	13,137	
	Democratic &	2,318	94	7,249	151	1,304	3,107	210	8,539	97	17	
	Independent											
	Democratic &	75,608	30,321	117,766	34,980	62,580	93,132	50,580	128,467	20,491	44,061	
	Republican											
	Democratic &	983	223	1,922	254	697	1,265	440	2,055	121	585	
	Republican											
	Independent											
	Independent	40,427	114	111,865	0	19,068	49,491	0	122,674	451	0	
	Republican	517,804	212,708	789,378	243,629	393,718	656,971	394,475	860,154	156,481	478,175	
Household	Republican &	1,156	138	1,859	135	736	1,352	262	1,889	100	331	
	Independent											
	Cannot Deter-	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	14	0	1	
	mine											
	Female	Only	168,892	63,533	349,803	74,897	140,196	226,796	99,671	372,801	47,222	63,205
Gender	Household											
	Male	Only	88,555	33,274	176,914	39,974	67,236	118,543	54,956	191,787	26,108	46,571
	Household											
	Mixed Gender	655,803	253,065	1,088,140	302,053	527,489	862,717	450,083	1,195,373	202,532	426,529	
	Household											
Family in Household	1	204,872	78,371	409,747	91,854	161,459	270,211	124,136	435,212	58,066	92,120	
	2	481,890	186,740	804,918	223,700	384,104	635,269	330,933	883,282	148,235	318,684	
	3	173,571	64,137	303,966	77,015	143,379	229,575	113,102	333,983	52,026	96,929	
	4+	52,917	20,624	96,227	24,356	45,979	73,001	36,539	107,498	17,535	28,573	

Table 4.15: South Carolina: Household Information by Vote History (percent)

		2006			2008			2010			2012		
		General	Primary		General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary		General	Primary	Pres. Prim.
Household Party	Democratic	30.11%	30.38%		36.21%	33.05%	34.94%	33.34%	26.25%		36.15%	35.57%	2.45%
	Democratic & Independent	0.25%	0.03%		0.45%	0.04%	0.18%	0.26%	0.03%		0.49%	0.04%	0.00%
	Democratic & Republican	8.28%	8.67%		7.29%	8.39%	8.52%	7.71%	8.36%		7.30%	7.43%	8.22%
	Democratic & Republican & Independent	0.11%	0.06%		0.12%	0.06%	0.09%	0.10%	0.07%		0.12%	0.04%	0.11%
	Independent	4.43%	0.03%		6.93%	0.00%	2.59%	4.10%	0.00%		6.97%	0.16%	0.00%
Household Gender	Republican	56.70%	60.80%		48.88%	58.43%	53.57%	54.38%	65.23%		48.87%	56.72%	89.16%
	Republican & Independent	0.13%	0.04%		0.12%	0.03%	0.10%	0.11%	0.04%		0.11%	0.04%	0.06%
	Cannot Determine	0.00%	0.00%		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Female Only	18.49%	18.16%		21.66%	17.96%	19.08%	18.77%	16.48%		21.18%	17.12%	11.79%
	Household Male Only	9.70%	9.51%		10.96%	9.59%	9.15%	9.81%	9.09%		10.90%	9.46%	8.68%
Family in Household	Mixed Gender	71.81%	72.33%		67.38%	72.45%	71.77%	71.41%	74.43%		67.92%	73.42%	79.53%
	Household 1	22.43%	22.40%		25.37%	22.03%	21.97%	22.37%	20.53%		24.73%	21.05%	17.18%
	Household 2	52.77%	53.37%		49.84%	53.65%	52.26%	52.59%	54.73%		50.19%	53.74%	59.42%
	Household 3	19.01%	18.33%		18.82%	18.47%	19.51%	19.00%	18.70%		18.98%	18.86%	18.07%
	Household 4+	5.79%	5.89%		5.96%	5.84%	6.26%	6.04%	6.04%		6.11%	6.36%	5.33%

Table 4.16: South Carolina: Household Information by Voter Turnout Rate

	2006			2008			2010			2012		
	General	Primary		General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary		General	Primary	Pres. Prim.
Household Party	Democratic	29.21%	11.29%	62.12%	14.64%	27.28%	42.78%	16.86%	67.58%	10.42%	1.40%	
	Democratic &	12.27%	0.50%	38.37%	0.80%	6.90%	16.45%	1.11%	45.20%	0.51%	0.09%	
	Independent											
	Democratic &	43.53%	17.46%	67.80%	20.14%	36.03%	53.62%	29.12%	73.96%	11.80%	25.37%	
	Republican											
	Democratic &	28.95%	6.57%	56.60%	7.48%	20.52%	37.25%	12.96%	60.51%	3.56%	17.23%	
	Republican											
	Independent											
	Independent	13.95%	0.04%	38.60%	0.00%	6.58%	17.08%	0.00%	42.32%	0.16%	0.00%	
	Republican	47.41%	19.48%	72.28%	22.31%	36.05%	60.16%	36.12%	78.76%	14.33%	43.78%	
Household	Republican &	45.48%	5.43%	73.13%	5.31%	28.95%	53.19%	10.31%	74.31%	3.93%	13.02%	
	Independent											
	Cannot Deter-	0.00%	0.00%	6.67%	6.67%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	93.33%	0.00%	6.67%	
	mine											
	Female Only	28.25%	10.63%	58.50%	12.53%	23.45%	37.93%	16.67%	62.35%	7.90%	10.57%	
Gender	Household											
	Male Only	24.19%	9.09%	48.34%	10.92%	18.37%	32.39%	15.01%	52.40%	7.13%	12.72%	
	Household											
	Mixed Gender	42.10%	16.24%	69.85%	19.39%	33.86%	55.38%	28.89%	76.73%	13.00%	27.38%	
	Household											
Family in Household	1	27.31%	10.45%	54.62%	12.24%	21.52%	36.02%	16.55%	58.01%	7.74%	12.28%	
	2	41.43%	16.05%	69.19%	19.23%	33.02%	54.61%	28.45%	75.93%	12.74%	27.40%	
	3	37.38%	13.81%	65.47%	16.59%	30.88%	49.44%	24.36%	71.93%	11.21%	20.88%	
	4+	36.74%	14.32%	66.81%	16.91%	31.92%	50.68%	25.37%	74.63%	12.17%	19.84%	

Table 4.17: South Carolina: Gender by Age by Vote History (counts)

Gender	Age	2006			2008			2010			2012		
		General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.
F	18-34	24,868	5,936	119,286	10,322	19,506	18,923	168,532	9,885	20,027			
	35-54	154,718	41,467	315,360	53,817	121,099	84,278	330,101	35,230	77,268			
	55+	324,023	141,444	476,534	160,038	268,650	220,589	488,495	101,216	169,932			
M	18-34	19,228	5,504	86,484	8,643	15,458	15,583	116,777	8,074	20,430			
	35-54	119,352	34,222	238,444	44,815	91,448	70,960	255,349	29,820	77,520			
	55+	270,866	121,213	378,399	139,208	218,616	194,321	400,472	91,596	171,087			
Missing	18-34	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0			
	35-54	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0			
	55+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			

Table 4.18: South Carolina: Gender by Age by Vote History (percent)

Gender	Age	2006			2008			2010			2012		
		General	Primary		General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary		General	Primary	Pres. Prim.
F	18-34	2.72%	1.70%		7.39%	2.48%	2.65%	5.05%	3.13%		9.58%	3.58%	3.73%
	35-54	16.94%	11.85%		19.53%	12.91%	16.48%	17.65%	13.94%		18.76%	12.77%	14.41%
	55+	35.48%	40.43%		29.51%	38.39%	36.55%	32.52%	36.48%		27.76%	36.69%	31.69%
M	18-34	2.11%	1.57%		5.36%	2.07%	2.10%	3.62%	2.58%		6.64%	2.93%	3.81%
	35-54	13.07%	9.78%		14.77%	10.75%	12.44%	13.79%	11.73%		14.51%	10.81%	14.45%
	55+	29.66%	34.64%		23.43%	33.39%	29.75%	27.36%	32.13%		22.75%	33.20%	31.90%
Missing	18-34	0.00%	0.00%		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	35-54	0.00%	0.00%		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	55+	0.00%	0.00%		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Table 4.19: South Carolina: Gender by Age by Voter Turnout Rate

		2006			2008			2010			2012		
Gender	Age	General	Primary		General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary		General	Primary	Pres. Prim.
F	18-34	8.22%	1.96%		39.42%	3.41%	6.45%	20.15%	6.25%		55.70%	3.27%	6.62%
	35-54	33.68%	9.03%		68.65%	11.72%	26.36%	46.41%	18.35%		71.86%	7.67%	16.82%
	55+	52.67%	22.99%		77.46%	26.01%	43.67%	63.86%	35.86%		79.40%	16.45%	27.62%
M	18-34	7.65%	2.19%		34.40%	3.44%	6.15%	17.39%	6.20%		46.45%	3.21%	8.13%
	35-54	30.94%	8.87%		61.82%	11.62%	23.71%	43.18%	18.40%		66.20%	7.73%	20.10%
	55+	53.45%	23.92%		74.66%	27.47%	43.14%	65.22%	38.34%		79.02%	18.07%	33.76%
Missing	18-34	0.00%	0.00%		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%		76.92%	0.00%	0.00%
	35-54	0.00%	0.00%		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%		75.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	55+	0.00%	0.00%		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

5 Florida

5.1 Demographic Splits with Party

The final state included in our our base analyses was Florida, which consisted of 10,117,193 active registered voters at the time of our analyses, which is more than all of the other four states we have examined up to this point combined. Each voter's party was classified as *Democratic*, *Republican*, or *Non-Partisan, Independent*, or *Other*. Florida is the most ethnically diverse of the five states, with 58% of registered voters being of European descent, 18% Hispanic, and 14% African American (see Table 5.2). A plurality of households in Florida are Democrat-only (30.4%; see Table 5.4). The majority of households are also mixed-gender (59.2%).

5.2 Vote History

The marginal turnout counts, percentages, and turnout rates are presented for Florida subgroups in Tables 5.11 through 5.19. Data is presented for 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 general and primary elections. Data is also presented for the 2008 and 2012 presidential primary elections. Similar to other states, tables are presented in sets of three where the first table presents raw counts, the second percentages, and the third, turnout rates. For example, referring to Table 5.11, we can see that a total of 1,164,025 individuals aged 55 or older turned out in the 2012 Presidential Primary Election, which according to Table 5.12, accounted for 72.49% of the vote. In Table 5.13, we can see that this segment had a turnout rate of 23.96%.

Table 5.1: Florida: Basic Demographic Information by Party (counts)

	Democratic	Independent	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican	Total
Gender	F	2,380,184	99,691	1,054,056	61,588	1,833,845
	M	1,681,226	110,882	1,033,273	71,574	1,779,166
Age	Missing	2,960	63	4,026	873	786
	18-34	848,733	37,245	621,122	41,660	543,356
	35-54	1,210,561	63,961	723,955	46,672	1,108,557
	55+	1,999,823	109,309	745,167	45,668	1,957,977
Ethnicity	East and South Asian	47,398	2,484	52,148	2,809	40,413
	European	1,851,462	152,517	1,120,698	81,876	2,667,470
	Hispanic and Portuguese	686,380	23,753	535,107	21,830	561,956
	Likely African-American	1,171,417	10,961	176,818	13,145	53,223
	Missing	241,245	17,086	158,424	11,489	238,316
	Other	66,468	3,835	48,160	2,886	52,419
Income	0-25k	420,638	18,500	140,665	8,628	274,446
	25k-50k	612,793	32,406	258,819	16,246	481,660
	50k-75k	614,743	34,787	311,086	19,680	612,627
	75k-100k	346,441	20,835	189,777	11,509	426,296
	100k-125k	217,595	13,178	123,762	7,270	289,750
	125k-200k	159,737	10,848	96,387	5,838	267,895
	200k+	99,010	6,520	65,820	3,653	184,468
	Unknown	1,593,413	73,562	905,039	61,211	1,076,655

Table 5.2: Florida: Basic Demographic Information by Party (percent)

		Democratic	Independent	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican	Overall
Gender	F	43.84%	1.84%	19.41%	1.13%	33.78%	53.68%
	M	35.95%	2.37%	22.10%	1.53%	38.05%	46.23%
Age	Missing	33.99%	0.72%	46.23%	10.03%	9.03%	0.09%
	18-34	40.57%	1.78%	29.69%	1.99%	25.97%	20.68%
	35-54	38.39%	2.03%	22.96%	1.48%	35.15%	31.18%
	55+	41.17%	2.25%	15.34%	0.94%	40.30%	48.03%
Ethnicity	East and South Asian	32.63%	1.71%	35.90%	1.93%	27.82%	1.44%
	European	31.52%	2.60%	19.08%	1.39%	45.41%	58.08%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	37.53%	1.30%	29.26%	1.19%	30.72%	18.08%
	Likely African-American	82.17%	0.77%	12.40%	0.92%	3.73%	14.09%
	Missing	36.19%	2.56%	23.77%	1.72%	35.75%	6.59%
	Other	38.25%	2.21%	27.72%	1.66%	30.17%	1.72%
Income	0-25k	48.75%	2.14%	16.30%	1.00%	31.81%	8.53%
	25k-50k	43.71%	2.31%	18.46%	1.16%	34.36%	13.86%
	50k-75k	38.59%	2.18%	19.53%	1.24%	38.46%	15.75%
	75k-100k	34.82%	2.09%	19.08%	1.16%	42.85%	9.84%
	100k-125k	33.40%	2.02%	18.99%	1.12%	44.47%	6.44%
	125k-200k	29.54%	2.01%	17.83%	1.08%	49.55%	5.35%
	200k+	27.54%	1.81%	18.31%	1.02%	51.32%	3.55%
	Unknown	42.95%	1.98%	24.40%	1.65%	29.02%	36.68%

Table 5.3: Florida: Household Information by Registered Party (counts)

	Democratic	Independent	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican	Total
Household Party	Democratic	3,073,122	0	0	0	3,073,122
	Democratic & Independent	522,788	37,248	408,648	0	996,412
	Democratic & Republican	404,088	0	0	411,455	815,543
	Democratic & Republican & Independent	64,372	4,948	54,717	64,599	192,043
	Independent Republican	0	129,065	1,277,346	79,390	1,485,801
Household Gender	Republican	0	0	0	0	2,673,135
	Cannot Determine	0	39,375	350,644	23,510	464,608
	Female Only Household	4,720	99	4,351	792	11,191
	Male Only Household	1,208,211	42,677	510,556	30,534	2,438,460
	Mixed Gender Household	668,352	41,565	429,389	31,168	1,673,483
Family in Household	1	2,183,087	126,295	1,147,059	71,541	5,991,059
	2	1,444,138	68,396	741,523	49,079	3,231,993
	3	1,722,731	101,109	889,017	56,656	4,563,370
	4+	679,782	32,489	346,175	21,413	1,743,477
		217,719	8,642	114,640	6,887	575,353

Table 5.4: Florida: Household Information by Registered Party (percent)

		Democratic	Independent	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican	Overall
Household Party	Democratic	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	30.38%
	Democratic & Independent	52.47%	3.74%	41.01%	2.78%	0.00%	9.85%
	Democratic & Republican	49.55%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	50.45%	8.06%
	Democratic & Republican & Independent	33.52%	2.58%	28.49%	1.77%	33.64%	1.90%
	Independent	0.00%	8.69%	85.97%	5.34%	0.00%	14.69%
Household Gender	Republican	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%	26.43%
	Republican & Independent	0.00%	4.48%	39.93%	2.68%	52.91%	8.68%
	Cannot Determine	42.18%	0.88%	38.88%	7.08%	10.98%	0.11%
	Female Only Household	49.55%	1.75%	20.94%	1.25%	26.51%	24.11%
	Male Only Household	39.94%	2.48%	25.66%	1.86%	30.06%	16.55%
	Mixed Gender Household	36.44%	2.11%	19.15%	1.19%	41.11%	59.23%
	1	44.68%	2.12%	22.94%	1.52%	28.74%	31.96%
Family in Household	2	37.75%	2.22%	19.48%	1.24%	39.31%	45.12%
	3	38.99%	1.86%	19.86%	1.23%	38.06%	17.24%
	4+	37.84%	1.50%	19.93%	1.20%	39.53%	5.69%

Table 5.5: Florida: Gender by Age by Party (counts)

Gender	Age	N	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican
F	18-34	227,400	63,908	114,342	732	48,418
	35-54	302,729	95,586	123,020	271	83,852
	55+	415,232	165,032	105,016	144	145,040
M	18-34	221,032	49,539	111,661	1,283	58,549
	35-54	279,170	69,588	112,761	610	96,211
	55+	355,910	121,399	95,617	281	138,613

Table 5.6: Florida: Gender by Age by Party (percent)

Gender	Age	Percent	Democratic	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican
F	18-34	12.62%	28.10%	50.28%	0.32%	21.29%
	35-54	16.80%	31.57%	40.64%	0.09%	27.70%
	55+	23.04%	39.74%	25.29%	0.03%	34.93%
M	18-34	12.26%	22.41%	50.52%	0.58%	26.49%
	35-54	15.49%	24.93%	40.39%	0.22%	34.46%
	55+	19.75%	34.11%	26.87%	0.08%	38.95%

Table 5.7: Florida: Gender by Ethnicity by Party (counts)

Gender	Ethnicity	N	Democratic	Independent	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican
F	East and South Asian	78,398	27,078	1,264	26,759	1,414	21,883
	European	3,084,122	1,083,565	72,268	550,823	36,110	1,341,356
	Hispanic and Portuguese	1,019,085	398,452	12,170	290,187	11,502	306,774
	Likely African-American	819,543	697,263	4,423	87,301	6,206	24,350
	Missing	341,038	137,847	7,837	76,421	5,058	113,875
	Other	87,178	35,979	1,729	22,565	1,298	25,607
M	East and South Asian	66,076	20,160	1,209	24,952	1,297	18,458
	European	2,787,507	767,250	80,237	568,645	45,576	1,325,799
	Hispanic and Portuguese	808,246	287,491	11,566	244,041	10,200	254,948
	Likely African-American	603,463	472,769	6,522	88,684	6,660	28,828
	Missing	324,482	103,135	9,243	81,471	6,287	124,346
	Other	86,347	30,421	2,105	25,480	1,554	26,787
Missing	East and South Asian	778	160	11	437	98	72
	European	2,394	647	12	1,230	190	315
	Hispanic and Portuguese	1,695	437	17	879	128	234
	Likely African-American	2,558	1,385	16	833	279	45
	Missing	1,040	263	6	532	144	95
	Other	243	68	1	115	34	25

Table 5.8: Florida: Gender by Ethnicity by Party (percent)

Gender	Ethnicity	Percent	Democratic	Independent	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican
F	East and South Asian	0.78%	34.54%	1.61%	34.13%	1.80%	27.91%
	European	30.49%	35.13%	2.34%	17.86%	1.17%	43.49%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	10.08%	39.10%	1.19%	28.48%	1.13%	30.10%
	Likely African-American	8.10%	85.08%	0.54%	10.65%	0.76%	2.97%
	Missing	3.37%	40.42%	2.30%	22.41%	1.48%	33.39%
	Other	0.86%	41.27%	1.98%	25.88%	1.49%	29.37%
	East and South Asian	0.65%	30.51%	1.83%	37.76%	1.96%	27.93%
	European	27.56%	27.52%	2.88%	20.40%	1.64%	47.56%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	7.99%	35.57%	1.43%	30.19%	1.26%	31.54%
	Likely African-American	5.97%	78.34%	1.08%	14.70%	1.10%	4.78%
M	Missing	3.21%	31.78%	2.85%	25.11%	1.94%	38.32%
	Other	0.85%	35.23%	2.44%	29.51%	1.80%	31.02%
	East and South Asian	0.01%	20.57%	1.41%	56.17%	12.60%	9.25%
	European	0.02%	27.03%	0.50%	51.38%	7.94%	13.16%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	0.02%	25.78%	1.00%	51.86%	7.55%	13.81%
	Likely African-American	0.03%	54.14%	0.63%	32.56%	10.91%	1.76%
	Missing	0.01%	25.29%	0.58%	51.15%	13.85%	9.13%
	Other	0.00%	27.98%	0.41%	47.33%	13.99%	10.29%
	East and South Asian						
	European						

Table 5.9: Florida: Gender by Ethnicity by Age by Party (count)

Gender	Age	N	Democratic	Independent	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican
F	18-34	1,091,627	478,620	17,949	311,739	19,174	264,145
	35-54	1,684,124	712,611	29,449	368,873	21,244	551,947
	55+	2,646,199	1,185,165	52,211	372,713	21,146	1,014,964
M	18-34	995,489	368,505	19,274	306,908	21,941	278,861
	35-54	1,467,362	497,195	34,488	354,072	25,213	556,394
	55+	2,210,265	814,064	57,081	371,917	24,409	942,794
Missing	18-34	5,000	1,608	22	2,475	545	350
	35-54	2,220	755	24	1,010	215	216
	55+	1,480	594	17	537	113	219

Table 5.10: Florida: Gender by Ethnicity by Age by Party (percent)

Gender	Age	Percent	Democratic	Independent	Non-Partisan	Other	Republican
F	18-34	10.79%	43.84%	1.64%	28.56%	1.76%	24.20%
	35-54	16.65%	42.31%	1.75%	21.90%	1.26%	32.77%
	55+	26.16%	44.79%	1.97%	14.08%	0.80%	38.36%
M	18-34	9.84%	37.02%	1.94%	30.83%	2.20%	28.01%
	35-54	14.51%	33.88%	2.35%	24.13%	1.72%	37.92%
	55+	21.85%	36.83%	2.58%	16.83%	1.10%	42.66%
Missing	18-34	0.05%	32.16%	0.44%	49.50%	10.90%	7.00%
	35-54	0.02%	34.01%	1.08%	45.50%	9.68%	9.73%
	55+	0.01%	40.14%	1.15%	36.28%	7.64%	14.80%

Table 5.11: Florida: Basic Demographic Information by Vote History (counts)

	2006			2008			2010			2012		
	General		Primary	General		Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.
Gender	F	2,016,978	861,249	3,655,291	841,714	1,871,525	2,484,375	1,122,703	4,054,565	1,110,843	813,341	
	M	1,705,017	710,265	2,934,574	685,091	1,528,991	2,136,976	986,567	3,306,934	943,253	792,349	
Age	Missing	551	147	2,756	199	471	1,165	308	4,637	338	150	
	18-34	147,025	40,142	797,269	58,574	151,516	323,058	83,362	1,146,676	111,705	85,664	
	35-54	938,680	321,597	2,069,388	316,036	835,120	1,244,284	438,310	2,241,137	425,294	355,388	
	55+	2,633,288	1,208,332	3,721,574	1,150,992	2,411,913	3,052,628	1,586,512	3,975,289	1,516,323	1,164,025	
Ethnicity	East and South Asian	34,390	10,189	78,739	9,768	28,468	45,072	14,890	94,587	14,334	11,888	
	European	2,603,954	1,141,019	4,106,704	1,071,238	2,371,932	3,112,614	1,513,010	4,469,866	1,455,668	1,258,122	
	Hispanic and Portuguese	421,409	147,540	1,020,388	159,204	417,406	571,214	208,762	1,189,681	207,060	190,233	
	Likely African-American	385,300	167,110	898,858	187,459	335,331	552,743	230,995	1,037,153	241,084	33,555	
	Missing	222,540	86,369	382,712	80,731	200,289	272,514	115,056	453,100	111,010	91,580	
	Other	54,953	19,434	105,220	18,604	47,561	68,359	26,865	121,749	25,278	20,462	
	0-25k	404,267	192,144	638,124	190,291	361,289	471,694	241,765	674,960	236,247	145,814	
Income	25k-50k	626,808	282,589	1,031,175	278,830	570,298	754,361	368,457	1,105,386	362,665	244,495	
	50k-75k	685,762	288,365	1,188,133	282,637	633,093	860,019	393,171	1,289,774	387,769	292,815	
	75k-100k	455,256	191,749	760,348	181,969	422,449	569,069	262,604	829,268	253,110	211,142	
	100k-125k	318,860	133,136	508,536	122,296	294,414	388,280	180,743	551,817	167,653	149,684	
	125k-200k	273,812	118,886	427,338	108,980	254,334	340,442	163,711	469,760	153,605	144,141	
	200k+	189,872	77,873	289,012	70,251	176,337	233,743	108,626	316,730	98,135	104,218	
	Unknown	767,909	286,919	1,749,955	291,750	688,773	1,004,908	390,501	2,128,441	395,270	313,531	
	Democratic	1,515,707	665,540	2,721,930	650,481	1,384,222	1,789,778	797,502	2,977,266	781,128	93,686	
	Independent	70,721	16,390	131,486	17,470	51,884	92,038	21,429	147,431	23,343	4,686	
	Non-Partisan	433,016	82,435	1,034,800	99,687	314,996	590,377	118,774	1,284,526	139,439	37,590	
Party	Other	25,914	5,629	65,895	6,184	19,548	39,611	7,865	79,061	9,265	2,360	
	Republican	1,677,188	801,667	2,638,510	753,182	1,630,337	2,110,712	1,164,008	2,877,852	1,101,259	1,467,518	

Table 5.12: Florida: Basic Demographic Information by Vote History (percent)

		2006			2008			2010			2012		
		General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.
Gender	F	54.18%	54.80%	55.45%	55.12%	55.03%	55.03%	53.75%	53.22%	53.22%	55.04%	54.07%	50.65%
	M	45.80%	45.19%	44.51%	44.87%	44.96%	44.96%	46.23%	46.77%	46.77%	44.89%	45.91%	49.34%
Age	Missing	0.01%	0.01%	0.04%	0.01%	0.01%	0.01%	0.03%	0.01%	0.01%	0.06%	0.02%	0.01%
	18-34	3.95%	2.55%	12.09%	3.84%	4.46%	4.46%	6.99%	3.95%	3.95%	15.57%	5.44%	5.33%
	35-54	25.22%	20.46%	31.39%	20.70%	24.56%	24.56%	26.92%	20.78%	20.78%	30.42%	20.70%	22.13%
	55+	70.74%	76.88%	56.45%	75.38%	70.92%	70.92%	66.04%	75.21%	75.21%	53.97%	73.81%	72.49%
Ethnicity	East and South Asian	0.92%	0.65%	1.19%	0.64%	0.84%	0.84%	0.98%	0.71%	0.71%	1.28%	0.70%	0.74%
	European	69.95%	72.60%	62.29%	70.15%	69.74%	69.74%	67.34%	71.72%	71.72%	60.68%	70.85%	78.35%
	Hispanic and Portuguese	11.32%	9.39%	15.48%	10.43%	12.27%	12.27%	12.36%	9.90%	9.90%	16.15%	10.08%	11.85%
	Likely African-American	10.35%	10.63%	13.63%	12.28%	9.86%	9.86%	11.96%	10.95%	10.95%	14.08%	11.73%	2.09%
	Missing	5.98%	5.50%	5.81%	5.29%	5.89%	5.89%	5.90%	5.45%	5.45%	6.15%	5.40%	5.70%
Income	Other	1.48%	1.24%	1.60%	1.22%	1.40%	1.40%	1.48%	1.27%	1.27%	1.65%	1.23%	1.27%
	0-25k	10.86%	12.23%	9.68%	12.46%	10.62%	10.62%	10.20%	11.46%	11.46%	9.16%	11.50%	9.08%
	25k-50k	16.84%	17.98%	15.64%	18.26%	16.77%	16.77%	16.32%	17.47%	17.47%	15.01%	17.65%	15.23%
	50k-75k	18.42%	18.35%	18.02%	18.51%	18.61%	18.61%	18.60%	18.64%	18.64%	17.51%	18.87%	18.23%
	75k-100k	12.23%	12.20%	11.53%	11.92%	12.42%	12.42%	12.31%	12.45%	12.45%	11.26%	12.32%	13.15%
	100k-125k	8.57%	8.47%	7.71%	8.01%	8.66%	8.66%	8.40%	8.57%	8.57%	7.49%	8.16%	9.32%
	125k-200k	7.36%	7.56%	6.48%	7.14%	7.48%	7.48%	7.36%	7.76%	7.76%	6.38%	7.48%	8.98%
	200k+	5.10%	4.95%	4.38%	4.60%	5.18%	5.18%	5.06%	5.15%	5.15%	4.30%	4.78%	6.49%
Party	Unknown	20.63%	18.26%	26.54%	19.11%	20.25%	20.25%	21.74%	18.51%	18.51%	28.89%	19.24%	19.52%
	Democratic	40.72%	42.35%	41.29%	42.60%	40.70%	40.70%	38.72%	37.80%	37.80%	40.42%	38.02%	5.83%
	Independent	1.90%	1.04%	1.99%	1.14%	1.53%	1.53%	1.99%	1.02%	1.02%	2.00%	1.14%	0.29%
	Non-Partisan	11.63%	5.25%	15.70%	6.53%	9.26%	9.26%	12.77%	5.63%	5.63%	17.44%	6.79%	2.34%
	Other	0.70%	0.36%	1.00%	0.40%	0.57%	0.57%	0.86%	0.37%	0.37%	1.07%	0.45%	0.15%
	Republican	45.05%	51.01%	40.02%	49.32%	47.94%	47.94%	45.66%	55.18%	55.18%	39.07%	53.60%	91.39%

Table 5.13: Florida: Basic Demographic Information by Voter Turnout Rate

		2006		2008			2010		2012			
		General	Primary	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	
Gender	F	37.15%	15.86%	67.32%	15.50%	34.47%	45.76%	20.68%	74.68%	20.46%	14.98%	
	M	36.46%	15.19%	62.76%	14.65%	32.70%	45.70%	21.10%	70.72%	20.17%	16.94%	
	Missing	6.33%	1.69%	31.65%	2.29%	5.41%	13.38%	3.54%	53.25%	3.88%	1.72%	
Age	18-34	7.03%	1.92%	38.11%	2.80%	7.24%	15.44%	3.98%	54.81%	5.34%	4.09%	
	35-54	29.76%	10.20%	65.62%	10.02%	26.48%	39.45%	13.90%	71.06%	13.49%	11.27%	
	55+	54.21%	24.87%	76.61%	23.69%	49.65%	62.84%	32.66%	81.83%	31.21%	23.96%	
Ethnicity	East and South Asian	23.68%	7.01%	54.21%	6.72%	19.60%	31.03%	10.25%	65.12%	9.87%	8.18%	
	European	44.33%	19.42%	69.91%	18.24%	40.38%	52.99%	25.76%	76.10%	24.78%	21.42%	
	Hispanic and Portuguese	23.04%	8.07%	55.79%	8.70%	22.82%	31.23%	11.41%	65.04%	11.32%	10.40%	
	Likely African-American	27.03%	11.72%	63.05%	13.15%	23.52%	38.77%	16.20%	72.75%	16.91%	2.35%	
	Missing	33.39%	12.96%	57.42%	12.11%	30.05%	40.88%	17.26%	67.98%	16.65%	13.74%	
	Other	31.62%	11.18%	60.55%	10.71%	27.37%	39.34%	15.46%	70.06%	14.55%	11.78%	
	Income	0-25k	46.85%	22.27%	73.95%	22.05%	41.87%	54.67%	28.02%	78.22%	27.38%	16.90%
	25k-50k	44.71%	20.16%	73.55%	19.89%	40.68%	53.81%	26.28%	78.85%	25.87%	17.44%	
	50k-75k	43.05%	18.10%	74.59%	17.74%	39.74%	53.99%	24.68%	80.97%	24.34%	18.38%	
	75k-100k	45.76%	19.27%	76.43%	18.29%	42.46%	57.20%	26.40%	83.36%	25.44%	21.22%	
Party	100k-125k	48.94%	20.43%	78.05%	18.77%	45.19%	59.59%	27.74%	84.69%	25.73%	22.97%	
	125k-200k	50.64%	21.99%	79.03%	20.16%	47.04%	62.96%	30.28%	86.88%	28.41%	26.66%	
	200k+	52.82%	21.66%	80.40%	19.54%	49.05%	65.02%	30.22%	88.11%	27.30%	28.99%	
	Unknown	20.70%	7.73%	47.17%	7.86%	18.57%	27.09%	10.53%	57.37%	10.65%	8.45%	
	Democratic	37.29%	16.37%	66.97%	16.00%	34.06%	44.04%	19.62%	73.25%	19.22%	2.31%	
	Independent	33.57%	7.78%	62.42%	8.29%	24.63%	43.70%	10.17%	69.99%	11.08%	2.22%	
	Non-Partisan	20.71%	3.94%	49.48%	4.77%	15.06%	28.23%	5.68%	61.42%	6.67%	1.80%	
	Other	19.33%	4.20%	49.16%	4.61%	14.58%	29.55%	5.87%	58.99%	6.91%	1.76%	
	Republican	46.41%	22.18%	73.01%	20.84%	45.11%	58.41%	32.21%	79.64%	30.47%	40.61%	

Table 5.14: Florida: Household Information by Vote History (counts)

	2006			2008			2010			2012		
	General	Primary		General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	
Household Party	Democratic	1, 158, 150	526, 247	2, 053, 604	516, 251	1, 060, 834	1, 364, 220	629, 806	2, 255, 837	619, 776	72, 575	
	Democratic & Independent	275, 410	80, 316	589, 921	80, 667	227, 061	345, 243	100, 601	681, 604	102, 606	15, 030	
	Democratic & Republican	342, 845	153, 316	574, 975	146, 208	321, 233	407, 171	193, 673	607, 073	187, 773	136, 170	
	Democratic & Republican & Independent	55, 621	19, 221	115, 898	18, 198	49, 084	69, 258	24, 257	126, 540	23, 831	17, 296	
	Cannot Determine	1, 221	379	4, 372	445	1, 034	2, 095	611	6, 422	639	301	
Gender	Female Only Household	735, 208	316, 800	1, 467, 004	315, 547	667, 871	883, 785	391, 263	1, 621, 335	391, 507	233, 053	
	Male Only Household	433, 081	167, 885	851, 090	164, 380	366, 658	543, 053	228, 530	969, 575	217, 703	162, 661	
	Mixed Gender Household	2, 553, 036	1, 086, 597	4, 270, 155	1, 046, 632	2, 365, 424	3, 193, 583	1, 489, 174	4, 768, 804	1, 444, 585	1, 209, 825	
Family in Household	1	944, 755	395, 213	1, 836, 610	390, 599	834, 744	1, 143, 740	504, 416	2, 036, 903	493, 429	328, 573	
	2	1, 950, 128	828, 885	3, 236, 794	805, 753	1, 816, 594	2, 427, 237	1, 138, 217	3, 613, 969	1, 103, 545	912, 604	
	3	634, 652	267, 566	1, 145, 912	254, 646	574, 207	795, 594	355, 958	1, 282, 544	348, 900	273, 672	
	4+	193, 011	79, 997	373, 305	76, 006	175, 442	255, 945	110, 987	432, 720	108, 560	90, 991	

Table 5.15: Florida: Household Information by Vote History (percent)

		2006			2008			2010			2012		
		General		Primary	General		Primary	Pres. Prim.	General		Primary	Pres. Prim.	
		General	Primary	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.		
Household Party	Democratic	31.11%	33.48%	31.15%	33.81%	31.19%	29.51%	29.85%	30.62%	30.17%	4.52%		
	Democratic &	7.40%	5.11%	8.95%	5.28%	6.68%	7.47%	4.77%	9.25%	4.99%	0.94%		
	Independent												
	Democratic &	9.21%	9.76%	8.72%	9.57%	9.45%	8.81%	9.18%	8.24%	9.14%	8.48%		
	Republican												
	Democratic & Republican	1.49%	1.22%	1.76%	1.19%	1.44%	1.50%	1.15%	1.72%	1.16%	1.08%		
Household Gender	Independent												
	Independent	8.52%	3.81%	11.09%	4.75%	6.71%	9.23%	4.01%	12.23%	4.79%	1.64%		
	Republican	34.76%	40.76%	30.00%	39.54%	37.24%	35.20%	44.41%	29.36%	43.08%	73.66%		
	Republican &	7.50%	5.86%	8.33%	5.85%	7.29%	8.28%	6.63%	8.58%	6.66%	9.69%		
	Independent												
	Cannot Determine	0.03%	0.02%	0.07%	0.03%	0.03%	0.05%	0.03%	0.09%	0.03%	0.02%		
Family in Household	Female Only	19.75%	20.16%	22.25%	20.66%	19.64%	19.12%	18.55%	22.01%	19.06%	14.51%		
	Male Only	11.63%	10.68%	12.91%	10.76%	10.78%	11.75%	10.83%	13.16%	10.60%	10.13%		
	Mixed Gender	68.58%	69.14%	64.77%	68.54%	69.55%	69.09%	70.59%	64.74%	70.32%	75.34%		
	1	25.38%	25.15%	27.86%	25.58%	24.54%	24.74%	23.91%	27.65%	24.02%	20.46%		
	2	52.39%	52.74%	49.10%	52.77%	53.41%	52.51%	53.95%	49.06%	53.72%	56.83%		
	3	17.05%	17.02%	17.38%	16.68%	16.88%	17.21%	16.87%	17.41%	16.98%	17.04%		
Household	4+	5.18%	5.09%	5.66%	4.98%	5.16%	5.54%	5.26%	5.87%	5.28%	5.67%		

Table 5.16: Florida: Household Information by Voter Turnout Rate

	2006			2008			2010			2012		
	General	Primary		General	Primary		General	Primary		General	Primary	Pres. Prim.
Household Party	Democratic	37.69%	&	66.82%	17.12%		44.39%	20.49%		73.41%	20.17%	2.36%
	Democratic	27.64%		59.20%	8.06%		34.65%	10.10%		68.41%	10.30%	1.51%
	Independent											
	Democratic	42.04%	&	70.50%	18.80%		49.93%	23.75%		74.44%	23.02%	16.70%
	Republican											
	Democratic	28.96%	&	60.35%	10.01%		36.06%	12.63%		65.89%	12.41%	9.01%
Household Gender	Republican		&									
	Independent											
	Independent	21.35%		49.21%	4.03%		28.72%	5.69%		60.61%	6.63%	1.77%
	Republican	48.40%		73.98%	23.96%		60.86%	35.05%		80.89%	33.11%	44.25%
	Republican	31.81%	&	62.57%	10.48%		43.60%	15.92%		71.99%	15.59%	17.72%
	Independent											
Household Gender	Cannot Deter-	10.91%		39.07%	3.39%		18.72%	5.46%		57.39%	5.71%	2.69%
	mine											
	Female	30.15%	Only	60.16%	12.99%		36.24%	16.05%		66.49%	16.06%	9.56%
	Household											
	Male	25.88%	Only	50.86%	10.03%		32.45%	13.66%		57.94%	13.01%	9.72%
	Household											
Family in Household	Mixed	42.61%	Gender	71.28%	18.14%		53.31%	24.86%		79.60%	24.11%	20.19%
	Household											
	1	29.23%		56.83%	12.23%		35.39%	15.61%		63.02%	15.27%	10.17%
	2	42.73%		70.93%	18.16%		53.19%	24.94%		79.20%	24.18%	20.00%
	3	36.40%		65.73%	15.35%		45.63%	20.42%		73.56%	20.01%	15.70%
	4+	33.55%		64.88%	13.90%		44.48%	19.29%		75.21%	18.87%	15.81%

Table 5.17: Florida: Gender by Age by Vote History (counts)

Gender	Age	2006		2008		2010		2012			
		General	Primary	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.		
F	18-34	80, 254	22, 364	447, 805	32, 621	84, 626	175, 828	43, 538	646, 875	60, 393	41, 276
	35-54	510, 550	179, 242	1, 150, 400	177, 046	465, 290	670, 197	231, 643	1, 237, 310	230, 554	177, 238
	55+	1, 423, 747	658, 572	2, 053, 934	631, 044	1, 319, 948	1, 636, 594	846, 528	2, 168, 216	819, 128	594, 301
M	18-34	66, 676	17, 755	348, 272	25, 899	66, 799	146, 894	39, 758	497, 405	51, 217	44, 363
	35-54	427, 966	142, 312	918, 134	138, 943	369, 683	573, 720	206, 589	1, 002, 558	194, 659	178, 117
	55+	1, 209, 250	549, 679	1, 666, 934	519, 850	1, 091, 732	1, 415, 572	739, 820	1, 806, 103	697, 034	569, 632
Missing	18-34	95	23	1, 192	54	91	336	66	2, 396	95	25
	35-54	164	43	854	47	147	367	78	1, 269	81	33
	55+	291	81	706	98	233	462	164	970	161	92

Table 5.18: Florida: Gender by Age by Vote History (percent)

Table 5.19: Florida: Gender by Age by Voter Turnout Rate

Gender	Age	2006		2008			2010		2012	
		General	Primary	General	Primary	Pres. Prim.	General	Primary	General	Primary
										Pres. Prim.
F	18-34	7.35%	2.05%	41.02%	2.99%	7.75%	16.11%	3.99%	59.26%	5.53%
	35-54	30.32%	10.64%	68.31%	10.51%	27.63%	39.79%	13.75%	73.47%	13.69%
	55+	53.80%	24.89%	77.62%	23.85%	49.88%	61.85%	31.99%	81.94%	30.95%
M	18-34	6.70%	1.78%	34.99%	2.60%	6.71%	14.76%	3.99%	49.97%	5.14%
	35-54	29.17%	9.70%	62.57%	9.47%	25.19%	39.10%	14.08%	68.32%	13.27%
	55+	54.71%	24.87%	75.42%	23.52%	49.39%	64.05%	33.47%	81.71%	31.54%
Missing	18-34	1.90%	0.46%	23.84%	1.08%	1.82%	6.72%	1.32%	47.92%	1.90%
	35-54	7.39%	1.94%	38.47%	2.12%	6.62%	16.53%	3.51%	57.16%	3.65%
	55+	19.66%	5.47%	47.70%	6.62%	15.74%	31.22%	11.08%	65.54%	10.88%
										6.22%

Part II

Base Opinion Reads on Electorate in Selected States

6 Iowa

6.1 Government's Role in Creating Jobs

From September 4th to October 23rd, we have conducted surveys among likely voters to gauge their sentiment on the government's role in creating jobs and growing the economy. We asked if people feel that the government should do less and get out of the way for businesses to create jobs or if the government should do more to ensure that everyone gets a "fair shake." Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

There is a clear divergence between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. On average, around 39% of Democrats believe that government should get out of the way versus 61% believing in a more activist government. The split among Republicans is much stronger with an average of 87% of respondents believing in a less activist government and 13% believing the government should do more. Surprisingly, those who are labeled as Independents are more willing to support a less active government in job creation, with an average of 68% affirming and 32% dissenting (see Table 6.1).

Among the three age groups, the 18-34 and the 35-54 age cohorts are more willing to advocate less government intervention than their older counterparts. On average 66% and 67% of people in the Age 18-34 and 35-54 cohort believe this versus 57% of people in the 55+. Surprisingly, in each of these age groups, a majority of respondents believe in a less active government and letting businesses create jobs. The sentiment is echoed much stronger in the younger cohorts (see Table 6.2).

What is interesting about this opinion is that there is not much of a difference between men and women — 61% of females and 63% of males believe that the government should stay away from the jobs creation process (see Table 6.3).

A majority of all respondents in all ethnic groups, besides Blacks, reported a belief in a less active government. Strangely enough, the sentiment is strongest among Hispanics with 66% of respondents affirming vs. 62% for Whites and 62% of "Other" ethnicity. Blacks strongly agree with a more active government with 62% answering that the government should do more and 38% responding that the government should do less (see Table 6.4).

In all income groups, more than half of the respondents believe in a less active government. People who make more than \$50,000 hold this belief to a greater extent than those who are in the \$0-49,999 income bracket. There is no discernable difference between the \$50,000-99,999 income group, the \$100,000+ group, and the 'income unknown' group with all three groups holding the same levels of belief in a less active government (around

62-63%; see Table 6.5).

Table 6.1: Iowa: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Party

Party	Response	4-Sep	11-Sep	18-Sep	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Democratic	Less	28.0%	32.8%	35.6%	38.5%	41.9%	42.2%	36.1%	37.0%
	More	72.0%	67.2%	64.4%	61.5%	58.1%	57.8%	63.9%	63.0%
	N	1064	442	295	353	320	379	296	419
Republican	Less	83.4%	83.0%	89.1%	88.9%	87.8%	87.7%	86.3%	91.5%
	More	16.6%	17.0%	10.9%	11.1%	12.2%	12.3%	13.7%	8.5%
	N	761	347	275	316	312	357	358	377
Non-Partisan	Less	61.4%	61.6%	66.7%	67.2%	75.2%	72.6%	71.1%	68.1%
	More	38.6%	38.4%	33.3%	32.8%	24.8%	27.4%	28.9%	31.9%
	N	347	159	177	180	165	197	190	210
Other	Less	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	More	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	N	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 6.2: Iowa: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Age

Age Group	Response	4-Sep	11-Sep	18-Sep	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
18-34	Less	61.1%	58.1%	65.6%	64.3%	73.6%	68.9%	76.5%	65.1%
	More	38.9%	41.9%	34.4%	35.7%	26.4%	31.1%	23.5%	34.9%
	N	252	105	93	115	110	135	136	146
35-54	Less	58.9%	64.8%	67.9%	65.9%	71.0%	71.8%	69.1%	68.3%
	More	41.1%	35.2%	32.1%	34.1%	29.0%	28.2%	30.9%	31.7%
	N	618	284	308	381	334	394	362	372
55+	Less	48.2%	51.2%	57.2%	60.3%	60.6%	59.4%	56.9%	60.2%
	More	51.8%	48.8%	42.8%	39.7%	39.4%	40.6%	43.1%	39.8%
	N	1302	559	346	353	353	404	346	488

Table 6.3: Iowa: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Gender

Gender	Response	4-Sep	11-Sep	18-Sep	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
F	Less	50.4%	58.2%	61.8%	63.7%	66.9%	65.1%	64.7%	62.8%
	More	49.6%	41.8%	38.2%	36.3%	33.1%	34.9%	35.3%	37.2%
	N	1113	469	393	416	390	450	433	511
M	Less	55.2%	53.9%	63.6%	63.0%	66.6%	66.9%	65.9%	65.1%
	More	44.8%	46.1%	36.4%	37.0%	33.4%	33.1%	34.1%	34.9%
	N	1059	479	354	433	407	483	411	495

Table 6.4: Iowa: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	4-Sep	11-Sep	18-Sep	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
White	Less	53.2%	55.3%	63.4%	63.8%	66.9%	65.9%	65.0%	64.6%
	More	46.8%	44.7%	36.6%	36.2%	33.1%	34.1%	35.0%	35.4%
	N	1,826	806	634	696	653	765	695	839
Black	Less	33.3%	50.0%	100.0%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	66.7%	20.0%
	More	66.7%	50.0%	0.0%	66.7%	100.0%	100.0%	33.3%	80.0%
	N	12	6	1	9	3	4	6	5
Hispanic	Less	38.5%	66.7%	70.0%	70.0%	71.4%	70.0%	63.6%	76.2%
	More	61.5%	33.3%	30.0%	30.0%	28.6%	30.0%	36.4%	23.8%
	N	26	12	10	10	7	10	11	21
Other	Less	52.3%	59.7%	56.9%	62.7%	67.2%	68.2%	66.7%	59.6%
	More	47.7%	40.3%	43.1%	37.3%	32.8%	31.8%	33.3%	40.4%
	N	308	124	102	134	134	154	132	141

Table 6.5: Iowa: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Income

Income Bracket	Response	4-Sep	11-Sep	18-Sep	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
\$0-49,999	Less	45.8%	50.3%	56.3%	61.0%	62.6%	62.0%	59.8%	62.5%
	More	54.2%	49.7%	43.7%	39.0%	37.4%	38.0%	40.2%	37.5%
	N	719	320	213	259	227	255	224	285
\$50,000-99,999	Less	55.2%	60.8%	64.6%	68.1%	68.6%	68.8%	68.6%	63.7%
	More	44.8%	39.2%	35.4%	31.9%	31.4%	31.2%	31.4%	36.3%
	N	632	291	240	260	245	282	274	317
\$100,000+	Less	55.6%	60.3%	69.4%	61.6%	64.2%	64.7%	70.6%	67.5%
	More	44.4%	39.7%	30.6%	38.4%	35.8%	35.3%	29.4%	32.5%
	N	396	156	144	159	176	204	163	191
Income Unknown	Less	58.4%	54.7%	62.0%	61.4%	73.2%	68.8%	62.3%	62.9%
	More	41.6%	45.3%	38.0%	38.6%	26.8%	31.3%	37.7%	37.1%
	N	425	181	150	171	149	192	183	213

6.2 Marriage Equality

We asked two different forms of this question. On the weekends of July 27th and August 24th, we asked if people support, oppose, or are unsure about the issue of marriage equality. From the weekends of September 4th and September 11th, we asked people wherein they identify between combinations of pro-gay marriage, anti-gay marriage, pro-choice, and pro-life. This is to ascertain whether or not there is a pattern between these deeply-held beliefs. In the tables that follow, we present the results broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

Unsurprisingly, there is a strong contrast between Republicans and Democrats on gay marriage, with a majority of Democrats supporting gay marriage and Republicans opposing it. For Non-Partisans, a larger share of people support gay marriage with 53% support and 38% oppose, with 9% unsure. For the second part, Democrats are strongly pro-gay marriage and pro-choice. However, the 2nd largest share is anti-gay and pro-life. This may reflect voters who identify with the Democratic Party solely on economic issues. For Republicans, around 62% of respondents are anti-gay and pro-life. The 2nd largest share is the pro-gay and pro-life group, average around 15.8% of the respondents. Pro-gay marriage and pro-choice is the most chosen answer by non-partisans with 43% affirming. Interestingly enough, the 2nd largest share is the anti-gay and pro-life option (see Tables 6.6 and 6.7).

There seems to be a trend between the age groups. Younger people are more likely to support gay marriage and that support goes down as we approach the older age group. Unsurprisingly, the 55+ age cohort has the lowest support of gay marriage with 46% support. However, all age groups support gay marriage than oppose it. For the second segment, the 18-34 cohort are more likely to be pro-gay marriage and pro-choice with 49% affirming. For the 35-54 and 55+ age group, the majority identify with being anti-gay marriage and pro-life. The 2nd largest share of the 18-34 group is being anti-gay marriage and pro-life; while for the 35-54 and 55+ age group, it is being pro-gay marriage and pro-choice (see Table 6.8 and Table 6.9).

Around 52% of females support gay marriage, with only 39% opposing. Gay marriage opinion for males is almost even split, with 48% opposing and 44% supporting. When we look at opinions on gay marriage and reproductive rights, women are even split between being pro-gay marriage and pro-choice (39.9%) and anti-gay marriage and pro-life (39.8%). For men, the majority choice is being anti-gay marriage and pro-life with 41% supporting. (See Table 6.10 and Table 6.11)

Hispanics appear to be the strong proponents of gay marriage with an average support of 57%. White support gay marriage by a smaller margin, 49% support and 43% oppose. Opinions for Other is split almost evenly with 46% support and 47% oppose. Whites are split between being pro-gay marriage and pro-choice (40%) and being anti-gay marriage and pro-life (41%). The Other ethnic group is more anti-gay marriage and pro-life with 37% of the respondent's choices. There was not a big enough sample size for opinion reads on Blacks. (See Table 6.12 and Table 6.13)

An unexpected pattern emerges when we look at income groups. There seems to be a stronger support for gay marriage as income increases. Only 44% of the lowest income group

support gay marriage vs 50% for the \$50-49,999 income group and 52% for the \$100,000+ group. This pattern holds for the 2nd segment. 52% of people in the \$100,000+ group identify as pro-gay marriage and pro-choice. Anti-gay marriage and pro-life views are the most popular among the \$0-49,999 and \$50-99,999 group (38% and 45%, respectively). (See Table 6.14 and Table 6.15)

Table 6.6: Iowa: Gay Marriage by Party, Part A

Party	Response	27-Jul	24-Aug
Democratic	Support	71.4%	71.3%
	Oppose	20.0%	21.8%
	Unsure	8.5%	6.9%
	N	903	963
Republican	Support	23.9%	25.2%
	Oppose	67.0%	66.6%
	Unsure	9.1%	8.2%
	N	989	1,009
Non-Partisan	Support	52.8%	53.0%
	Oppose	37.3%	38.3%
	Unsure	9.8%	8.7%
	N	581	381
Other	Support	0.0%	0.0%
	Oppose	0.0%	0.0%
	Unsure	0.0%	0.0%
	N	0	-

Table 6.7: Iowa: Gay Marriage by Party, Part B

Party	Response	4-Sep	11-Sep
Democratic	Pro-Gay & Pro-Choice	78.0%	67.3%
	Pro-Gay & Pro-Life	7.6%	9.6%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Life	8.5%	17.3%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Choice	5.9%	5.8%
	N	118	52
Republican	Pro-Gay & Pro-Choice	16.4%	12.2%
	Pro-Gay & Pro-Life	12.1%	19.5%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Life	62.4%	62.2%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Choice	9.1%	6.1%
	N	165	82
Non-Partisan	Pro-Gay & Pro-Choice	47.8%	38.5%
	Pro-Gay & Pro-Life	13.4%	26.9%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Life	32.8%	30.8%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Choice	6.0%	3.8%
	N	67	26
Other	Pro-Gay & Pro-Choice	0.0%	0.0%
	Pro-Gay & Pro-Life	0.0%	0.0%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Life	0.0%	0.0%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Choice	0.0%	0.0%
	N	-	-

Table 6.8: Iowa: Gay Marriage by Age, Part A

Age Group	Response	27-Jul	24-Aug
18-34	Support	57.9%	56.3%
	Oppose	35.2%	36.6%
	Unsure	6.8%	7.1%
	N	409	268
35-54	Support	48.2%	49.3%
	Oppose	42.9%	43.8%
	Unsure	9.0%	6.8%
	N	959	687
55+	Support	44.3%	46.7%
	Oppose	45.8%	45.0%
	Unsure	10.0%	8.3%
	N	1105	1398

Table 6.9: Iowa: Gay Marriage by Age, Part B

Age Group	Response	4-Sep	11-Sep
18-34	Pro-Gay & Pro-Choice	60.7%	36.8%
	Pro-Gay & Pro-Life	3.6%	5.3%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Life	32.1%	42.1%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Choice	3.6%	15.8%
	N	56	19
35-54	Pro-Gay & Pro-Choice	44.4%	34.6%
	Pro-Gay & Pro-Life	9.3%	17.3%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Life	40.7%	44.2%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Choice	5.6%	3.8%
	N	108	52
55+	Pro-Gay & Pro-Choice	37.1%	33.7%
	Pro-Gay & Pro-Life	14.0%	20.2%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Life	39.2%	41.6%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Choice	9.7%	4.5%
	N	186	89

Table 6.10: Iowa: Gay Marriage by Gender, Part A

Gender	Response	27-Jul	24-Aug
Female	Support	51.8%	51.7%
	Oppose	38.6%	39.8%
	Unsure	9.6%	8.5%
	N	1215	1,310
Male	Support	44.4%	44.7%
	Oppose	47.1%	48.5%
	Unsure	8.5%	6.8%
	N	1258	1,043

Table 6.11: Iowa: Gay Marriage by Gender, Part B

Gender	Response	4-Sep	11-Sep
Female	Pro-Gay & Pro-Choice	41.8%	38.0%
	Pro-Gay & Pro-Life	10.9%	16.5%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Life	40.3%	39.2%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Choice	7.0%	6.3%
	N	201	79
Male	Pro-Gay & Pro-Choice	45.0%	30.9%
	Pro-Gay & Pro-Life	10.7%	18.5%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Life	36.2%	45.7%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Choice	8.1%	4.9%
	N	149	81

Table 6.12: Iowa: Gay Marriage by Ethnicity, Part A

Ethnicity	Response	27-Jul	24-Aug
White	Support	48.5%	48.8%
	Oppose	42.4%	43.0%
	Unsure	9.1%	8.2%
	N	2,086	1,980
Black	Support	21.4%	85.7%
	Oppose	71.4%	14.3%
	Unsure	7.1%	0.0%
	N	14	7
Hispanic	Support	55.9%	58.8%
	Oppose	35.3%	38.2%
	Unsure	8.8%	2.9%
	N	34	34
Other	Support	45.4%	45.5%
	Oppose	45.4%	49.1%
	Unsure	9.1%	5.4%
	N	339	332

Table 6.13: Iowa: Gay Marriage by Ethnicity, Part B

Ethnicity	Response	4-Sep	11-Sep
White	Pro-Gay & Pro-Choice	46.7%	33.6%
	Pro-Gay & Pro-Life	9.4%	17.2%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Life	37.3%	44.8%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Choice	6.6%	4.5%
	N	287	134
Black	Pro-Gay & Pro-Choice	25.0%	0.0%
	Pro-Gay & Pro-Life	0.0%	0.0%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Life	75.0%	0.0%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Choice	0.0%	0.0%
	N	4	-
Hispanic	Pro-Gay & Pro-Choice	33.3%	100.0%
	Pro-Gay & Pro-Life	0.0%	0.0%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Life	66.7%	0.0%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Choice	0.0%	0.0%
	N	3	1
Other	Pro-Gay & Pro-Choice	26.8%	36.0%
	Pro-Gay & Pro-Life	19.6%	20.0%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Life	41.1%	32.0%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Choice	12.5%	12.0%
	N	56	25

Table 6.14: Iowa: Gay Marriage by Income, Part A

Income Bracket	Response	27-Jul	24-Aug
\$0-49,999	Support	43.1%	44.6%
	Oppose	46.8%	46.8%
	Unsure	10.1%	8.6%
	N	615	799
\$50,000-99,999	Support	47.7%	52.3%
	Oppose	43.7%	41.7%
	Unsure	8.6%	6.1%
	N	917	727
\$100,000+	Support	52.1%	51.0%
	Oppose	39.3%	42.2%
	Unsure	8.6%	6.8%
	N	524	398
Income Unknown	Support	51.1%	47.6%
	Oppose	39.8%	42.7%
	Unsure	9.1%	9.8%
	N	417	429

Table 6.15: Iowa: Gay Marriage by Income, Part B

Income Bracket	Response	4-Sep	11-Sep
\$0-49,999	Pro-Gay & Pro-Choice	40.4%	29.8%
	Pro-Gay & Pro-Life	13.2%	25.5%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Life	36.0%	40.4%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Choice	10.5%	4.3%
	N	114	47
\$50,000-99,999	Pro-Gay & Pro-Choice	40.0%	30.0%
	Pro-Gay & Pro-Life	11.4%	14.0%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Life	41.9%	48.0%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Choice	6.7%	8.0%
	N	105	50
\$100,000+	Pro-Gay & Pro-Choice	45.2%	58.3%
	Pro-Gay & Pro-Life	9.5%	12.5%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Life	35.7%	25.0%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Choice	9.5%	4.2%
	N	42	24
Income Unknown	Pro-Gay & Pro-Choice	49.4%	30.8%
	Pro-Gay & Pro-Life	7.9%	15.4%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Life	39.3%	48.7%
	Anti-Gay & Pro-Choice	3.4%	5.1%
	N	89	39

6.3 Immigration Reform

We approached this topic in two forms. From July 27th to August 24th, we asked for people's support of immigration reform on a scale from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree. After September 4th to October 23rd, we gauged the respondent's policy position to on how to approach immigration reform - either finding a legal pathway for illegals or provide amnesty or to enforce current border laws and deportations. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

Party breakdown on immigration reform is probably the most predictable. An overwhelming amount of Democrats (66%) support or strongly support immigration reform while a majority of Republicans oppose or strongly oppose reform. Non-partisans sided with Democrats in the sense that a majority of them support or strongly support reform. When asked about policies on immigration reform, a majority of Democrats choose to enforce current border and immigration laws. This is much stronger with Republicans and non-partisans (94% and 86% agree, respectively; see Table 6.16 and Table 6.17).

People in the 18-34 age group show slightly stronger support for immigration reform than their older counterparts (56% vs. 51% for the 35-54 group and 53% for the 55+ group). It is important to note that a majority of people in all three age groups support or strongly support immigration reform. When we look at the immigration reform policy, we see that the youngest group only slightly prefers bringing immigrants out over the other groups, with an overwhelming majority support enforcing border security (82%). This pattern holds for the other age groups as well, with the 55+ age group showing the strongest support for enforcing border security (85%; see Table 6.18 and Table 6.19).

A majority in both female and male group support or strongly support immigration reform, with females showing a stronger support over males by approximately 3%. When looking at the 2nd segment of our reads, we see that over 80% of males and females prefer to have our current border laws enforced. Eighty-six percent of males support this policy while 83% of females support it (see Table 6.20 and Table 6.21).

Hispanic support immigration reform overwhelming compared to other groups. Over 70% of Hispanics support or strongly support immigration versus other groups, which are around the 50-60% range. Whites and people labeled as Other Ethnicity overwhelming support enforcing current immigration laws. For Hispanics, their support for either policy is split almost evenly with 51.3% support bringing out immigrants and 49.7% support enforcing current border laws. However, this should be met with skepticism because the sample size is not large enough to determine anything conclusively (see Table 6.22 and Table 6.23).

Across all income groups, a majority support or strongly support immigration reform. The strongest support for immigration reform comes from people in the \$100,000+ income bracket, although by a small margin over the other groups (2-3%). When looking whether respondents would want to bring immigrants out or secure current laws, support for the latter is over 85% across all age groups. There is no discernable difference between each of the income groups (see Table 6.24 and Table 6.25).

Table 6.16: Iowa: Immigration Reform by Party, Part A

Party	Response	27-Jul	24-Aug
Democratic	Strongly Agree	36.2%	35.0%
	Somewhat Agree	29.5%	31.9%
	Somewhat Disagree	11.6%	12.5%
	Strongly Disagree	11.7%	9.9%
	No Opinion	11.0%	10.6%
	N	915	977
Republican	Strongly Agree	17.3%	18.8%
	Somewhat Agree	22.9%	23.8%
	Somewhat Disagree	21.3%	17.6%
	Strongly Disagree	29.3%	29.3%
	No Opinion	9.1%	10.5%
	N	998	1,027
Non-Partisan	Strongly Agree	28.4%	23.8%
	Somewhat Agree	25.0%	32.6%
	Somewhat Disagree	15.0%	17.1%
	Strongly Disagree	20.4%	16.3%
	No Opinion	11.1%	10.3%
	N	592	387
Other	Strongly Agree	0.0%	0.0%
	Somewhat Agree	0.0%	0.0%
	Somewhat Disagree	0.0%	0.0%
	Strongly Disagree	0.0%	0.0%
	No Opinion	0.0%	0.0%
	N	—	—

Table 6.17: Iowa: Immigration Reform by Party, Part B

Party	Response	4-Sep	11-Sep	18-Sep	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Democratic	Brining Immigrants Out	44.9%	34.0%	32.3%	40.4%	37.1%	37.1%	30.6%	41.3%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	55.1%	66.0%	67.7%	59.6%	62.9%	62.9%	69.4%	58.7%
	N	176	100	62	52	70	70	62	63
Republican	Brining Immigrants Out	8.4%	5.4%	3.5%	6.8%	7.7%	7.7%	5.6%	6.4%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	91.6%	94.6%	96.5%	93.2%	92.3%	92.3%	94.4%	93.6%
	N	322	185	170	147	156	156	162	156
Non-Partisan	Brining Immigrants Out	10.6%	13.6%	11.9%	11.4%	22.1%	22.1%	11.6%	7.9%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	89.4%	86.4%	88.1%	88.6%	77.9%	77.9%	88.4%	92.1%
	N	104	44	67	44	77	77	43	63
Other	Brining Immigrants Out	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	N	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

Table 6.18: Iowa: Immigration Reform by Age, Part A

Age Group	Response	27-Jul	24-Aug
18-34	Strongly Agree	32.7%	31.4%
	Somewhat Agree	23.1%	25.2%
	Somewhat Disagree	14.4%	14.6%
	Strongly Disagree	18.8%	17.2%
	No Opinion	11.1%	11.7%
	N	416	274
35-54	Strongly Agree	25.4%	24.2%
	Somewhat Agree	26.3%	29.3%
	Somewhat Disagree	15.9%	16.0%
	Strongly Disagree	21.9%	22.1%
	No Opinion	10.5%	8.4%
	N	977	693
55+	Strongly Agree	25.9%	26.2%
	Somewhat Agree	26.4%	28.8%
	Somewhat Disagree	17.4%	15.3%
	Strongly Disagree	20.5%	18.3%
	No Opinion	9.8%	11.4%
	N	1,112	1,424

Table 6.19: Iowa: Immigration Reform by Age, Part B

Age Group	Response	4-Sep	11-Sep	18-Sep	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
18-34	Bringing Immigrants Out	16.0%	18.5%	8.5%	14.3%	31.9%	31.9%	11.4%	11.4%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	84.0%	81.5%	91.5%	85.7%	68.1%	68.1%	88.6%	88.6%
	N	50	27	47	42	47	47	35	35
35-54	Bringing Immigrants Out	18.2%	20.8%	13.0%	17.4%	15.9%	15.9%	9.6%	14.4%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	81.8%	79.2%	87.0%	82.6%	84.1%	84.1%	90.4%	85.6%
	N	143	77	100	86	126	126	104	104
55+	Bringing Immigrants Out	20.3%	12.9%	11.2%	13.0%	15.4%	15.4%	14.8%	15.4%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	79.7%	87.1%	88.8%	87.0%	84.6%	84.6%	85.2%	84.6%
	N	409	225	152	115	130	130	128	143

Table 6.20: Iowa: Immigration Reform by Gender, Part A

Gender	Response	27-Jul	24-Aug
F	Strongly Agree	27.3%	24.9%
	Somewhat Agree	27.7%	30.2%
	Somewhat Disagree	15.4%	16.3%
	Strongly Disagree	18.0%	16.8%
	No Opinion	11.5%	11.7%
	N	1,231	1,328
M	Strongly Agree	26.4%	27.8%
	Somewhat Agree	24.0%	26.4%
	Somewhat Disagree	17.1%	14.3%
	Strongly Disagree	23.4%	22.4%
	No Opinion	9.1%	9.0%
	N	1,274	1,063

Table 6.21: Iowa: Immigration Reform by Gender, Part B

Gender	Response	4-Sep	11-Sep	18-Sep	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Female	Brining Immigrants Out	21.8%	15.2%	15.5%	19.2%	20.4%	20.4%	11.4%	14.5%
	Enforcing Laws and Se-	78.2%	84.8%	84.5%	80.8%	79.6%	79.6%	88.6%	85.5%
	curing Borders								
	Neither								
Male	N	312	151	155	104	147	147	123	145
	Brining Immigrants Out	16.9%	15.2%	6.9%	11.5%	16.0%	16.00%	13.20%	14.60%
	Enforcing Laws and Se-	83.1%	84.8%	93.1%	88.5%	84.0%	84.0%	86.8%	85.4%
	curing Borders								
Neither									
	N	290	178	144	139	156	156	144	137

Table 6.22: Iowa: Immigration Reform by Ethnicity, Part A

Ethnicity	Response	27-Jul	24-Aug
White	Strongly Agree	26.0%	26.0%
	Somewhat Agree	26.3%	28.9%
	Somewhat Disagree	16.1%	15.5%
	Strongly Disagree	21.2%	19.2%
	No Opinion	10.3%	10.4%
	N		
Black	Strongly Agree	28.6%	14.3%
	Somewhat Agree	21.4%	42.9%
	Somewhat Disagree	14.3%	14.3%
	Strongly Disagree	21.4%	28.6%
	No Opinion	14.3%	0.0%
	N	14	7
Hispanic	Strongly Agree	50.0%	40.0%
	Somewhat Agree	23.5%	34.3%
	Somewhat Disagree	11.8%	5.7%
	Strongly Disagree	11.8%	5.7%
	No Opinion	2.9%	14.3%
	N	34	35
Other	Strongly Agree	29.4%	26.1%
	Somewhat Agree	23.5%	25.5%
	Somewhat Disagree	17.7%	16.3%
	Strongly Disagree	18.6%	20.8%
	No Opinion	10.8%	11.3%
	N	344	35

Table 6.23: Iowa: Immigration Reform by Ethnicity, Part B

Ethnicity	Response	4-Sep	11-Sep	18-Sep	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
White	Bringing Immigrants Out	17.9%	15.5%	10.5%	11.8%	16.7%	16.7%	12.8%	14.8%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	82.1%	84.5%	89.5%	88.2%	83.3%	83.3%	87.2%	85.2%
	N	507	271	237	203	246	246	218	237
Black	Bringing Immigrants Out	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	100.0%	66.7%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	N	1	3	-	2	4	4	-	1
Hispanic	Bringing Immigrants Out	57.1%	66.7%	16.7%	100.0%	50.0%	50.0%	20.0%	50.0%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	42.9%	33.3%	83.3%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	80.0%	50.0%
	N	7	3	6	5	4	4	5	4
Other	Bringing Immigrants Out	25.3%	9.6%	14.3%	18.2%	20.4%	20.4%	9.1%	10.0%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	74.7%	90.4%	85.7%	81.8%	79.6%	79.6%	90.9%	90.0%
	N	87	52	56	33	49	49	44	40

Table 6.24: Iowa: Immigration Reform by Income, Part A

Income Bracket	Response	27-Jul	24-Aug
\$0-49,999	Strongly Agree	26.2%	22.1%
	Somewhat Agree	28.0%	28.6%
	Somewhat Disagree	15.4%	16.0%
	Strongly Disagree	18.5%	18.7%
	No Opinion	11.9%	14.6%
	N	622	814
\$50,000-99,999	Strongly Agree	25.1%	27.9%
	Somewhat Agree	24.9%	28.3%
	Somewhat Disagree	17.2%	16.3%
	Strongly Disagree	23.1%	19.1%
	No Opinion	9.7%	8.4%
	N	927	738
\$100,000+	Strongly Agree	28.2%	29.1%
	Somewhat Agree	26.9%	28.1%
	Somewhat Disagree	16.5%	13.1%
	Strongly Disagree	20.1%	21.2%
	No Opinion	8.3%	8.4%
	N	532	405
Income Unknown	Strongly Agree	29.7%	28.3%
	Somewhat Agree	23.3%	29.0%
	Somewhat Disagree	15.3%	15.2%
	Strongly Disagree	19.8%	18.9%
	No Opinion	11.8%	8.5%
	N	424	434

Table 6.25: Iowa: Immigration Reform by Income, Part B

Income Bracket	Response	4-Sep	11-Sep	18-Sep	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
\$0-49,999	Brining Immigrants Out	15.2%	13.3%	12.6%	10.0%	13.8%	13.8%	10.3%	16.2%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	84.8%	86.7%	87.4%	90.0%	86.2%	86.2%	89.7%	83.8%
	N	184	113	87	70	87	87	87	74
\$50,000-99,999	Brining Immigrants Out	18.4%	17.0%	9.2%	12.3%	17.6%	17.6%	8.5%	15.7%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	81.6%	83.0%	90.8%	87.7%	82.4%	82.4%	91.5%	84.3%
	N	217	100	87	65	102	102	82	102
\$100,000+	Brining Immigrants Out	21.8%	13.0%	10.5%	15.6%	16.7%	16.7%	16.3%	10.6%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	78.2%	87.0%	89.5%	84.4%	83.3%	83.3%	83.7%	89.4%
	N	110	54	57	45	54	54	43	47
Income Unknown	Brining Immigrants Out	27.5%	17.7%	13.2%	22.2%	26.7%	26.7%	18.2%	13.6%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	72.5%	82.3%	86.8%	77.8%	73.3%	73.3%	81.8%	86.4%
	N	91	62	68	63	60	60	55	59

6.4 Television Viewership

On the weekends of October 16th and October 23rd, we have conducted surveys among likely voters to determine television viewership modes in Florida. We asked the respondent to pick their primary source of television in their household. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

Across all party affiliations, cable television has the highest rate of viewership with Democrats taking the lead. Patterns for television viewership is pretty consistent across parties, with cable as the top followed by satellite, then broadcast, and finally TV over internet. Non-partisans have the most respondents who watch TV over internet, however it is only around 2% compared to 1% in other parties (see Table 6.26).

Cable television still reigns across age groups with the 55+ age group taking the lead. The 35-54 age group have the highest number of satellite subscriptions out of any other group (35%). Respondents in the 18-34 age group have the highest number of TV over Internet, at 3% compared to 2% for group 35-54 and 1% for 55+. This isn't surprising as we know that younger people are seeking alternative ways to watch television (see Table 6.27).

An overwhelming amount of females and males prefer cable television. What we see here is that females strongly gravitate towards cable subscription and while cable is the top choice for males, there are more males who view their television through satellite (33% for males and 27% for females). Both genders have the same amount of TV over the internet viewership, approximately at 1.9% (see Table 6.28).

Cable is the preferred method of television viewership out of all the ethnic groups. Blacks have the highest rate of cable viewership at 53%. Viewership for Hispanics is interesting as we see an almost even split between cable and satellite viewership (47%-43%). We cannot conclusively draw any determinations on TV over the internet because the sample sizes and the baseline response rates are too small (see Table 6.29).

There is nothing remarkable about television viewership habits between income groups. Each of these income groups exhibit the same patterns with cable viewership being the top, followed by satellite, broadcast, and TV over internet. We see that cable television is universal, given that people in the lowest income bracket would invest money in cable television (see Table 6.30).

Table 6.26: Iowa: Television Viewership by Party

Party	Response	16-Oct	23-Oct
Democratic	Cable Subscription	54.5%	52.7%
	Satellite Subscription	25.7%	27.6%
	Broadcast TV	12.8%	13.8%
	TV over Internet	2.3%	1.5%
	No TV in Home	4.7%	4.4%
	N	728	956
Republican	Cable Subscription	42.8%	46.5%
	Satellite Subscription	35.8%	30.8%
	Broadcast TV	14.5%	15.7%
	TV over Internet	1.7%	1.4%
	No TV in Home	5.1%	5.5%
	N	936	992
Non-Partisan	Cable Subscription	48.8%	48.9%
	Satellite Subscription	29.8%	28.9%
	Broadcast TV	12.6%	13.7%
	TV over Internet	2.3%	2.1%
	No TV in Home	6.6%	6.4%
	N	484	532

Table 6.27: Iowa: Television Viewership by Age

Age Group	Response	16-Oct	23-Oct
18-34	Cable Subscription	49.8%	41.6%
	Satellite Subscription	29.5%	29.5%
	Broadcast TV	10.0%	15.9%
	TV over Internet	3.0%	3.8%
	No TV in Home	7.6%	9.2%
	N	329	346
35-54	Cable Subscription	43.2%	43.6%
	Satellite Subscription	35.6%	35.2%
	Broadcast TV	12.5%	14.4%
	TV over Internet	2.7%	1.3%
	No TV in Home	6.0%	5.5%
	N	880	917
55+	Cable Subscription	52.2%	56.0%
	Satellite Subscription	27.3%	24.6%
	Broadcast TV	15.7%	14.3%
	TV over Internet	1.1%	1.2%
	No TV in Home	3.8%	4.0%
	N	939	1,217

Table 6.28: Iowa: Television Viewership by Gender

Gender	Response	16-Oct	23-Oct
F	Cable Subscription	49.4%	51.9%
	Satellite Subscription	27.8%	27.0%
	Broadcast TV	15.3%	15.1%
	TV over Internet	2.3%	1.3%
	No TV in Home	5.2%	4.6%
	N	1,124	1,315
M	Cable Subscription	46.8%	46.5%
	Satellite Subscription	34.6%	31.7%
	Broadcast TV	11.5%	13.9%
	TV over Internet	1.8%	1.9%
	No TV in Home	5.4%	6.0%
	N	1,024	1,165

Table 6.29: Iowa: Television Viewership by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	16-Oct	23-Oct
White	Cable Subscription	47.8%	49.9%
	Satellite Subscription	31.0%	28.6%
	Broadcast TV	13.5%	14.6%
	TV over Internet	2.0%	1.6%
	No TV in Home	5.6%	5.2%
	N	1,773	2,085
Black	Cable Subscription	52.6%	53.8%
	Satellite Subscription	21.1%	30.8%
	Broadcast TV	21.1%	15.4%
	TV over Internet	5.3%	0.0%
	No TV in Home	4.6%	6.4%
	N	19	13
Hispanic	Cable Subscription	32.3%	42.5%
	Satellite Subscription	35.5%	35.0%
	Broadcast TV	19.4%	12.5%
	TV over Internet	0.0%	2.5%
	No TV in Home	12.9%	7.5%
	N	31	40
Other	Cable Subscription	51.1%	46.8%
	Satellite Subscription	31.4%	32.2%
	Broadcast TV	12.3%	14.3%
	TV over Internet	2.2%	1.2%
	No TV in Home	3.1%	5.6%
	N	325	342

Table 6.30: Iowa: Television Viewership by Income

Income Bracket	Response	16-Oct	23-Oct
\$0-49,999	Cable Subscription	46.5%	54.2%
	Satellite Subscription	28.6%	24.1%
	Broadcast TV	17.7%	16.0%
	TV over Internet	1.8%	1.2%
	No TV in Home	5.3%	4.4%
	N	604	721
\$50,000-99,999	Cable Subscription	50.0%	48.9%
	Satellite Subscription	31.7%	31.1%
	Broadcast TV	11.7%	13.6%
	TV over Internet	1.7%	1.4%
	No TV in Home	4.9%	5.0%
	N	716	763
\$100,000+	Cable Subscription	47.4%	44.3%
	Satellite Subscription	35.4%	35.0%
	Broadcast TV	10.6%	13.0%
	TV over Internet	2.1%	1.3%
	No TV in Home	4.5%	6.4%
	N	378	469
Income Unknown	Cable Subscription	48.0%	48.0%
	Satellite Subscription	29.3%	28.3%
	Broadcast TV	13.1%	15.4%
	TV over Internet	2.9%	2.5%
	N	450	527

7 New Hampshire

7.1 Government's Role in Creating Jobs

On the weekend of November 16th, we conducted a survey among likely Republican voters to gauge their sentiment on government and the economy. We asked if people feel that the government should do less and get out of the way for businesses to create jobs or if the government should do more and ensure that everyone gets their fair share of the economy. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

A vast majority of our sample would prefer a less activist government when it comes to job creation. Around 88% of our sample agree with this sentiment with 12% disagreeing. This is consistent across all gender, age groups, ethnicities, and income groups. Surprisingly, people who make over \$100,000 a year have the highest support for an activist government, at 17% (see Tables 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5).

Table 7.1: New Hampshire: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Party

Party	Reponse	16-Nov
Republican	More	87.6%
	Less	12.4%
	N	3,084

Table 7.2: New Hampshire: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Age

Age Group	Reponse	16-Nov
18-34	More	85.5%
	Less	14.5%
	N	55
35-54	More	87.8%
	Less	12.2%
	N	444
55+	More	89.3%
	Less	10.7%
	N	1,358

Table 7.3: New Hampshire: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Gender

Gender	Reponse	16-Nov
Female	More	89.0%
	Less	11.0%
	N	1,597
Male	More	86.1%
	Less	13.9%
	N	1,487

Table 7.4: New Hampshire: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Reponse	16-Nov
White	More	87.5%
	Less	12.5%
	N	3,045
Black	More	0.0%
	Less	0.0%
	N	-
Hispanic	More	100.0%
	Less	0.0%
	N	28
Other	More	100.0%
	Less	0.0%
	N	11

Table 7.5: New Hampshire: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Income

Income Bracket	Reponse	16-Nov
\$0-49,999	More	86.6%
	Less	13.4%
	N	543
\$50,000-99,999	More	89.6%
	Less	10.4%
	N	1,023
\$100,000+	More	88.6%
	Less	11.4%
	N	990
Income Unknown	More	83.0%
	Less	17.0%
	N	528

7.2 Is the Country on the Right Track

On the weekend of November 16th we conducted a phone survey among likely Republican voters to measure their opinions on the direction of the country. We asked respondents whether or not they think the country is heading in the right or wrong direction. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

The same proportion of people who disagree with a more activist government also believe the country is on the wrong track — 88% of respondents believe the country is on the wrong track, with 12% of people disagreeing. This sentiment is shared across all gender, age, ethnicity, and income groups. The demographic group that believes that the country is heading in the wrong direction the most are people in the 18-34 group with 93% (see Tables 7.6, 7.7, 7.8, 7.9, and 7.10).

Table 7.6: New Hampshire: Country on the Right Track by Party

Party	Reponse	16-Nov
Republican	Right	12.2%
	Wrong	87.8%
	N	3,152

Table 7.7: New Hampshire: Country on the Right Track by Age

Age Group	Reponse	16-Nov
18-34	Right	7.1%
	Wrong	92.9%
	N	56
35-54	Right	9.9%
	Wrong	90.1%
	N	455
55+	Right	13.6%
	Wrong	86.4%
	N	1,383

Table 7.8: New Hampshire: Country on the Right Track by Gender

Gender	Reponse	16-Nov
Female	Right	10.7%
	Wrong	89.3%
	N	1,624
Male	Right	13.9%
	Wrong	86.1%
	N	1,528

Table 7.9: New Hampshire: Country on the Right Track by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Reponse	16-Nov
White	Right	12.3%
	Wrong	87.7%
	N	3,112
Black	Right	0.0%
	Wrong	0.0%
	N	-
Hispanic	Right	3.4%
	Wrong	96.6%
	N	29
Other	Right	9.1%
	Wrong	90.9%
	N	11

Table 7.10: New Hampshire: Country on the Right Track by Income

Income Bracket	Reponse	16-Nov
\$0-49,999	Right	12.4%
	Wrong	87.6%
	N	555
\$50,000-99,999	Right	11.4%
	Wrong	88.6%
	N	1,045
\$100,000+	Right	12.7%
	Wrong	87.3%
	N	1,008
Income Unknown	Right	12.9%
	Wrong	87.1%
	N	544

7.3 Net Neutrality

On the weekend of November 16th, we conducted surveys among likely Republican voters to determine their opinion on net neutrality. We asked if they support, oppose, or are unfamiliar with the FCC's proposed rules for net neutrality. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

Approximately, 12% of Republicans support net neutrality, with 22% supporting and 67% unsure. It appears that much of the attitudes towards net neutrality are that most people are unsure. The youngest age group and males have the strongest support for net neutrality, at 15%. Interestingly, people who are in the lowest income group, making less than \$50,000, have the lowest support for net neutrality (9%) (see Tables 7.11, 7.12, 7.13, 7.14, and 7.15)

Table 7.11: New Hampshire: Net Neutrality by Party

Party	Reponse	16-Nov
Republican	Support	11.8%
	Oppose	22.4%
	Unknown/Don't Know	65.8%
	N	3,027

Table 7.12: New Hampshire: Net Neutrality by Age

Age Group	Reponse	16-Nov
18-34	Support	14.8%
	Oppose	33.3%
	Unknown/Don't Know	51.9%
	N	54
35-54	Support	13.9%
	Oppose	30.3%
	Unknown/Don't Know	55.9%
	N	433
55+	Support	10.8%
	Oppose	19.4%
	Unknown/Don't Know	69.8%
	N	1,337

Table 7.13: New Hampshire: Net Neutrality by Gender

Gender	Reponse	16-Nov
Female	Support	9.3%
	Oppose	18.5%
	Unknown/Don't Know	72.2%
	N	1,561
Male	Support	14.5%
	Oppose	26.5%
	Unknown/Don't Know	59.1%
	N	1,466

Table 7.14: New Hampshire: Net Neutrality by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Reponse	16-Nov
White	Support	11.9%
	Oppose	22.3%
	Unknown/Don't Know	65.8%
	N	2,989
Black	Support	0.0%
	Oppose	0.0%
	Unknown/Don't Know	0.0%
	N	-
Hispanic	Support	0.0%
	Oppose	14.3%
	Unknown/Don't Know	85.7%
	N	28
Other	Support	20.0%
	Oppose	60.0%
	Unknown/Don't Know	20.0%
	N	10

Table 7.15: New Hampshire: Net Neutrality by Income

Income Bracket	Reponse	16-Nov
\$0-49,999	Support	9.0%
	Oppose	13.5%
	Unknown/Don't Know	77.5%
	N	533
\$50,000-99,999	Support	12.5%
	Oppose	22.6%
	Unknown/Don't Know	65.0%
	N	1,002
\$100,000+	Support	12.3%
	Oppose	25.8%
	Unknown/Don't Know	61.9%
	N	973
Income Unknown	Support	12.3%
	Oppose	24.7%
	Unknown/Don't Know	63.0%
	N	519

7.4 US Foreign Intervention

In the same time frame as the previous reads, we surveyed likely Republican voters to determine their opinion on US foreign interventions. They were asked if they agree with the statements that we should play a strong leadership role when it comes to international security or if they agree that the US should avoid getting involved in foreign conflicts. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

Generally, a majority of our respondents support more US foreign intervention. We saw that younger cohorts have lower levels of support, with the 18-34 cohort polling at 43% and the 35-54 cohort at 47%. Males have a stronger level of support for intervention than females (50% vs 47%). Whites have the strongest level of support for intervention out of all the ethnic groups, at 49%. For income groups, the oldest generation have the strongest level of support for intervention and it decreases as we go down the income ladder. The lowest income group's support is at 46% (see Table 7.16, Table 7.17, Table 7.18, Table 7.19, and Table 7.20).

Table 7.16: New Hampshire: US Foreign Intervention by Party

Party	Reponse	16-Nov
Republican	Support	48.6%
	Oppose	39.2%
	Unknown/Don't Know	12.1%
	N	2,872

Table 7.17: New Hampshire: US Foreign Intervention by Age

Age Group	Reponse	16-Nov
18-34	Support	42.9%
	Oppose	51.0%
	Unknown/Don't Know	6.1%
	N	49
35-54	Support	46.5%
	Oppose	44.3%
	Unknown/Don't Know	9.2%
	N	413
55+	Support	48.5%
	Oppose	38.2%
	Unknown/Don't Know	13.3%
	N	1,271

Table 7.18: New Hampshire: US Foreign Intervention by Gender

Gender	Reponse	16-Nov
Female	Support	47.2%
	Oppose	38.1%
	Unknown/Don't Know	14.7%
	N	1,474
Male	Support	50.2%
	Oppose	40.40%
	Unknown/Don't Know	9.40%
	N	1,398

Table 7.19: New Hampshire: US Foreign Intervention by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Reponse	16-Nov
White	Support	48.7%
	Oppose	39.3%
	Unknown/Don't Know	12.0%
	N	2,836
Black	Support	0.0%
	Oppose	0.0%
	Unknown/Don't Know	0.0%
	N	-
Hispanic	Support	48.1%
	Oppose	25.9%
	Unknown/Don't Know	25.9%
	N	27
Other	Support	44.4%
	Oppose	55.6%
	Unknown/Don't Know	0.0%
	N	9

Table 7.20: New Hampshire: US Foreign Intervention by Income

Income Bracket	Reponse	16-Nov
\$0-49,999	Support	45.6%
	Oppose	38.7%
	Unknown/Don't Know	15.7%
	N	511
\$50,000-99,999	Support	48.8%
	Oppose	39.9%
	Unknown/Don't Know	11.3%
	N	943
\$100,000+	Support	51.2%
	Oppose	38.0%
	Unknown/Don't Know	10.8%
	N	935
Income Unknown	Support	46.6%
	Oppose	41.0%
	Unknown/Don't Know	12.4%
	N	483

7.5 Marriage Equality

We asked likely Republican voters on the weekend of November 16th if they would support or oppose gay marriage. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

An overwhelming majority of respondents oppose gay marriage. The 18-34 age group is almost split 50-50 on marriage equality, with a 49% support and 51% oppose. Approximately, 42% of people in the 35-54 age group support marriage and 40% of people in the 55+ support it as well. For gender, females and males support marriage equality at equal levels (39%). For income groups, people who make over \$100,000 have the strongest level of support (45%) and people who make between \$50-99,999 have the lowest support for marriage equality, almost 10 points lower (35%) (see Tables 7.21, 7.22, 7.23, 7.24, and 7.25).

Table 7.21: New Hampshire: Marriage Equality by Party

Party	Reponse	16-Nov
Republican	Support	38.9%
	Oppose	61.1%
	N	2,749

Table 7.22: New Hampshire: Marriage Equality by Age

Age Group	Reponse	16-Nov
18-34	Support	48.9%
	Oppose	51.1%
	N	45
35-54	Support	42.2%
	Oppose	57.8%
	N	398
55+	Support	39.2%
	Oppose	60.8%
	N	1,226

Table 7.23: New Hampshire: Marriage Equality by Gender

Female	Support	39.2%
	Oppose	60.8%
	N	1,411
Male	Support	38.6%
	Oppose	61.4%
	N	1,338

Table 7.24: New Hampshire: Marriage Equality by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Reponse	16-Nov
White	Support	38.8%
	Oppose	61.2%
	N	2,714
Black	Support	0.0%
	Oppose	0.0%
	N	-
Hispanic	Support	44.4%
	Oppose	55.6%
	N	27
Other	Support	62.5%
	Oppose	37.5%
	N	8

Table 7.25: New Hampshire: Marriage Equality by Income

Income Bracket	Reponse	16-Nov
\$0-49,999	Support	37.3%
	Oppose	62.7%
	N	490
\$50,000-99,999	Support	35.2%
	Oppose	64.8%
	N	903
\$100,000+	Support	44.5%
	Oppose	55.5%
	N	897
Income Unknown	Support	36.8%
	Oppose	63.2%
	N	459

7.6 US Domestic Spying

For this read, we asked likely Republican voters on their thoughts on domestic spying. On the weekend of November 16th, we asked if they agree that government surveillance programs are necessary to keep us safe or if they go too far and undermine the right to privacy. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

More respondents oppose US domestic spying than not. Generally, 56% of Republicans oppose increased domestic spying. This is stronger within the 18-34 and 35-54 age cohorts where their opposition is at 60%. Otherwise, it appears that all the other demographic groups have the same proportion of people opposing and supporting nonviolence as Republicans in our sample (see Tables 7.26, 7.27, 7.28, 7.29, and 7.30).

Table 7.26: New Hampshire: US Domestic Spying by Party

Party	Reponse	16-Nov
Republican	Support	44.1%
	Oppose	55.9%
	N	2,923

Table 7.27: New Hampshire: US Domestic Spying by Age

Age Group	Reponse	16-Nov
18-34	Support	40.8%
	Oppose	59.2%
	N	49
35-54	Support	39.7%
	Oppose	60.3%
	N	421
55+	Support	45.4%
	Oppose	54.6%
	N	1,291

Table 7.28: New Hampshire: US Domestic Spying by Gender

Gender	Reponse	16-Nov
Female	Support	44.1%
	Oppose	55.9%
	N	1,504
Male	Support	44.0%
	Oppose	56.0%
	N	1,419

Table 7.29: New Hampshire: US Domestic Spying by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Reponse	16-Nov
White	Support	44.0%
	Oppose	56.0%
	N	2,887
Black	Support	0.0%
	Oppose	0.0%
	N	-
Hispanic	Support	48.1%
	Oppose	51.9%
	N	27
Other	Support	44.4%
	Oppose	55.6%
	N	9

Table 7.30: New Hampshire: US Domestic Spying by Income

Income Bracket	Reponse	16-Nov
\$0-49,999	Support	45.6%
	Oppose	54.4%
	N	520
\$50,000-99,999	Support	43.9%
	Oppose	56.1%
	N	961
\$100,000+	Support	44.6%
	Oppose	55.4%
	N	946
Income Unknown	Support	41.7%
	Oppose	58.3%
	N	496

7.7 Immigration Reform

From the same time frame as the previous questions, we looked at respondent's sentiments on immigration reform. Respondents were offered a choice between allowing immigrants to be legal or prioritize stopping the flow of illegal immigrants. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

The baseline rate for this opinion is that 80% of respondents would prefer to enforce border security rather than provide amnesty (support for this option is around 20%). This proportion is almost the same across all the demographic cuts - age, gender, ethnicity, and income. The only exception is Hispanics with 89% picking enforcing border security and 11% picking amnesty, but the sample size is too low to make an accurate determination (see Tables 7.31, 7.32, 7.33, 7.34, and 7.35).

Table 7.31: New Hampshire: Immigration Reform by Party

Party	Reponse	16-Nov
Republican	Develop Pathway	20.0%
	Stop flow of Illegals	80.0%
	N	2,815

Table 7.32: New Hampshire: Immigration Reform by Age

Age Group	Reponse	16-Nov
18-34	Develop Pathway	20.4%
	Stop flow of Illegals	79.6%
	N	49
35-54	Develop Pathway	19.0%
	Stop flow of Illegals	81.0%
	N	405
55+	Develop Pathway	18.9%
	Stop flow of Illegals	81.1%
	N	1,246

Table 7.33: New Hampshire: Immigration Reform by Gender

Gender	Reponse	16-Nov
Female	Develop Pathway	18.3%
	Stop flow of Illegals	81.7%
	N	1,444
Male	Develop Pathway	21.7%
	Stop flow of Illegals	78.3%
	N	1,371

Table 7.34: New Hampshire: Immigration Reform by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Reponse	16-Nov
White	Develop Pathway	20.0%
	Stop flow of Illegals	80.0%
	N	2,780
Black	Develop Pathway	0.0%
	Stop flow of Illegals	0.0%
	N	-
Hispanic	Develop Pathway	11.1%
	Stop flow of Illegals	88.9%
	N	27
Other	Develop Pathway	37.5%
	Stop flow of Illegals	62.5%
	N	8

Table 7.35: New Hampshire: Immigration Reform by Income

Income Bracket	Reponse	16-Nov
\$0-49,999	Develop Pathway	21.0%
	Stop flow of Illegals	79.0%
	N	500
\$50,000-99,999	Develop Pathway	17.7%
	Stop flow of Illegals	82.3%
	N	925
\$100,000+	Develop Pathway	21.3%
	Stop flow of Illegals	78.7%
	N	917
Income Unknown	Develop Pathway	20.7%
	Stop flow of Illegals	79.3%
	N	473

7.8 Television Viewership

On the weekend of November 16th, we conducted surveys among likely voters to determine television viewership modes in New Hampshire. We asked the respondent to pick their primary source of television in their household. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

Cable television is the most popular form of television viewership with 33%, followed by broadcast and TV over the internet, which each having 23% each. Surprisingly, people in the 18-34 age cohort watch cable TV and broadcast TV at a slightly higher rate than the general sample (see Tables 7.36 and 7.37).

Males watch more cable TV and TV over the internet than their female counterparts. 34% of males watch cable TV and 24% watch TV over the internet versus 32% for females cable TV and 23% for TV over the internet. For ethnicity, Whites have the same proportion as the baseline Republican read; all other ethnicities have too little of a sample size to make any analysis deterministic. Across all income groups, their TV viewing patterns are the same as the baseline Republican read (see Tables 7.38, 7.39, and 7.40).

Table 7.36: New Hampshire: Television Viewership by Party

Party	Reponse	16-Nov
Republican	Cable Subscription	33.1%
	Satellite Subscription	11.9%
	Broadcast TV	23.8%
	TV over Internet	23.2%
	No TV in Home	8.0%
	N	3,491

Table 7.37: New Hampshire: Television Viewership by Age

Age Group	Reponse	16-Nov
18-34	Cable Subscription	34.4%
	Satellite Subscription	13.1%
	Broadcast TV	24.6%
	TV over Internet	23.0%
	No TV in Home	4.9%
	N	61
35-54	Cable Subscription	31.6%
	Satellite Subscription	10.9%
	Broadcast TV	23.5%
	TV over Internet	23.9%
	No TV in Home	10.1%
	N	497
55+	Cable Subscription	33.9%
	Satellite Subscription	11.3%
	Broadcast TV	24.1%
	TV over Internet	23.7%
	No TV in Home	7.0%
	N	1,550

Table 7.38: New Hampshire: Television Viewership by Gender

Gender	Reponse	16-Nov
Female	Cable Subscription	32.3%
	Satellite Subscription	12.4%
	Broadcast TV	24.8%
	TV over Internet	22.9%
	No TV in Home	7.6%
	N	1,807
Male	Cable Subscription	34.1%
	Satellite Subscription	11.3%
	Broadcast TV	22.6%
	TV over Internet	23.6%
	No TV in Home	8.4%
	N	1,684

Table 7.39: New Hampshire: Television Viewership by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Reponse	16-Nov
White	Cable Subscription	33.1%
	Satellite Subscription	11.9%
	Broadcast TV	23.6%
	TV over Internet	23.5%
	No TV in Home	8.0%
	N	3,449
Black	Cable Subscription	0.0%
	Satellite Subscription	0.0%
	Broadcast TV	0.0%
	TV over Internet	0.0%
	No TV in Home	0.0%
	N	0
Hispanic	Cable Subscription	44.8%
	Satellite Subscription	10.3%
	Broadcast TV	37.9%
	TV over Internet	3.4%
	No TV in Home	3.4%
	N	29
Other	Cable Subscription	30.8%
	Satellite Subscription	15.4%
	Broadcast TV	30.8%
	TV over Internet	0.0%
	No TV in Home	23.1%
	N	13

Table 7.40: New Hampshire: Television Viewership by Income

Income Bracket	Reponse	16-Nov
\$0-49,999	Cable Subscription	32.7%
	Satellite Subscription	13.2%
	Broadcast TV	25.5%
	TV over Internet	21.2%
	No TV in Home	7.4%
	N	623
\$50,000-99,999	Cable Subscription	32.6%
	Satellite Subscription	12.2%
	Broadcast TV	22.9%
	TV over Internet	23.8%
	No TV in Home	8.4%
	N	1,160
\$100,000+	Cable Subscription	33.2%
	Satellite Subscription	10.3%
	Broadcast TV	25.4%
	TV over Internet	24.0%
	No TV in Home	7.2%
	N	1,110
Income Unknown	Cable Subscription	34.6%
	Satellite Subscription	12.7%
	Broadcast TV	20.6%
	TV over Internet	22.7%
	No TV in Home	9.4%
	N	598

8 Nevada

8.1 Government's Role in Creating Jobs

From September 25th to October 23rd, we have conducted surveys among likely Republican voters to gauge their sentiment on government and the economy. We asked if people feel that the government should do less and get out of the way for businesses to create jobs or if the government should do more and ensure that everyone gets their fair share of the economy. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

Since the sample size only included likely Republican voters, the results of this read should not be surprising. Throughout the segment read process, support for a less activist government has been around 90%. This is consistent across all ages and gender as well. When it comes to ethnicity, the support for a less activist government is still pretty high (around 90%), however, Blacks seem to show a slightly higher support for less government involvement, around 92%. For income groups, the support for less government hovers around 88% (see Tables 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, and 8.5).

Table 8.1: Nevada: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Party

Party	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Republican	More	89.0%	89.0%	88.9%	88.3%	89.7%
	Less	11.0%	11.0%	11.1%	11.7%	10.3%
	N	3,162	2,065	1,941	1,638	1,646

Table 8.2: Nevada: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Age

Age Group	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
18-34	More	90.5%	84.2%	82.7%	89.5%	87.6%
	Less	9.5%	15.8%	17.3%	10.5%	12.4%
	N	116	76	110	19	113
35-54	More	90.0%	88.3%	85.6%	85.1%	87.6%
	Less	10.0%	11.7%	14.4%	14.9%	12.4%
	N	811	532	630	518	547
55+	More	88.5%	89.5%	91.2%	89.7%	91.2%
	Less	11.5%	10.5%	8.8%	10.3%	8.8%
	N	2,235	1,457	1,201	1,101	986

Table 8.3: Nevada: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Gender

Gender	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Female	More	89.9%	88.7%	90.0%	88.2%	91.0%
	Less	10.1%	11.3%	10.0%	11.8%	9.0%
	N	1,619	953	1049	885	787
Male	More	87.9%	89.3%	87.6%	88.3%	88.6%
	Less	12.1%	10.7%	12.4%	11.7%	11.4%
	N	1,543	1,112	892	753	859

Table 8.4: Nevada: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
White	More	89.3%	88.1%	89.0%	88.3%	89.6%
	Less	10.7%	11.9%	11.0%	11.7%	10.4%
	N	2,645	1,719	1,619	1,356	1,365
Black	More	92.3%	100.0%	87.5%	80.0%	100.0%
	Less	7.7%	0.0%	12.5%	20.0%	0.0%
	N	13	11	8	5	6
Hispanic	More	87.2%	94.4%	90.0%	88.5%	88.5%
	Less	12.8%	5.6%	10.0%	11.5%	11.5%
	N	109	72	80	78	61
Other	More	87.1%	93.2%	87.6%	88.4%	90.7%
	Less	12.9%	6.8%	12.4%	11.6%	9.3%
	N	395	263	234	199	214

Table 8.5: Nevada: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Income

Income Bracket	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
\$0-49,999	More	91.4%	87.6%	89.1%	87.3%	89.2%
	Less	8.6%	12.4%	10.9%	12.7%	10.8%
	N	640	346	368	300	279
\$50,000-99,999	More	89.7%	88.8%	88.2%	88.1%	89.6%
	Less	10.3%	11.2%	11.8%	11.9%	10.4%
	N	1,050	706	638	598	586
\$100,000+	More	87.1%	88.5%	89.0%	89.4%	88.6%
	Less	12.9%	11.5%	11.0%	10.6%	11.4%
	N	922	624	620	461	500
Income Unknown	More	87.8%	91.5%	89.5%	87.8%	92.5%
	Less	12.2%	8.5%	10.5%	12.2%	7.5%
	N	550	389	315	279	281

8.2 Is the Country on the Right Track

From September 25th to October 23rd, we have conducted surveys among likely Republican voters to measure their opinions on the direction of the country. We asked respondents whether or not they think the country is heading in the right or wrong direction. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

A vast majority of our sample population (91%) believes that the country is heading in the wrong direction. Across age groups, 88% of the 18-34 cohort believes that we are heading in the wrong direction. This sentiment is exacerbated in older cohorts with 92% of people in the 55+ group affirming. Across all races and income groups, we see that the idea that the country is heading in the wrong direction has around 90% support, with around 10% dissenting (see Tables 8.6, 8.7, 8.8, 8.9, and 8.10).

Table 8.6: Nevada: Country on the Right Track by Party

Party	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Republican	Right	8.5%	9.3%	8.6%	8.7%	9.1%
	Wrong	91.5%	90.7%	91.4%	91.3%	90.9%
	N	3,248	2,112	1,969	1,677	1,679

Table 8.7: Nevada: Country on the Right Track by Age

Age Group	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
18-34	Right	12.4%	12.7%	12.5%	5.3%	13.3%
	Wrong	87.6%	87.3%	87.5%	94.7%	86.7%
	N	121	79	112	19	120
35-54	Right	9.8%	9.5%	10.7%	11.6%	11.5%
	Wrong	90.2%	90.5%	89.3%	88.4%	88.5%
	N	834	549	638	535	555
55+	Right	7.8%	9.0%	7.2%	7.4%	7.3%
	Wrong	92.2%	91.0%	92.8%	92.6%	92.7%
	N	2,293	1,484	1,219	1,123	1,004

Table 8.8: Nevada: Country on the Right Track by Gender

Gender	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Female	Right	7.0%	9.1%	8.0%	7.7%	7.3%
	Wrong	93.0%	90.9%	92.0%	92.3%	92.7%
	N	1,667	975	1,062	904	804
Male	Right	10.1%	9.4%	9.4%	9.8%	10.7%
	Wrong	89.9%	90.6%	90.6%	90.2%	89.3%
	N	1,581	1,137	907	773	875

Table 8.9: Nevada: Country on the Right Track by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
White	Right	8.2%	9.4%	8.5%	8.7%	8.6%
	Wrong	91.8%	90.6%	91.5%	91.3%	91.4%
	N	2,715	1,753	1,643	1,391	1,396
Black	Right	15.4%	25.0%	12.5%	0.0%	16.7%
	Wrong	84.6%	75.0%	87.5%	100.0%	83.3%
	N	13	12	8	5	6
Hispanic	Right	8.8%	6.8%	8.8%	2.5%	9.7%
	Wrong	91.2%	93.2%	91.3%	97.5%	90.3%
	N	113	74	80	79	62
Other	Right	10.3%	8.4%	9.2%	11.4%	12.1%
	Wrong	89.7%	91.6%	90.8%	88.6%	87.9%
	N	407	273	238	202	215

Table 8.10: Nevada: Country on the Right Track by Income

Income Bracket	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
\$0-49,999	Right	6.9%	8.7%	6.4%	7.3%	9.2%
	Wrong	93.1%	91.3%	93.6%	92.7%	90.8%
	N	650	356	374	303	284
\$50,000-99,999	Right	7.8%	9.0%	8.2%	9.4%	8.2%
	Wrong	92.2%	91.0%	91.8%	90.6%	91.8%
	N	1,078	723	648	614	596
\$100,000+	Right	11.1%	9.9%	10.2%	10.0%	10.7%
	Wrong	88.9%	90.1%	89.8%	90.0%	89.3%
	N	960	638	630	478	512
Income Unknown	Right	7.1%	9.4%	9.1%	6.4%	8.0%
	Wrong	92.9%	90.6%	90.9%	93.6%	92.0%
	N	560	395	317	282	287

8.3 Net Neutrality

From September 25th to October 23rd, we conducted surveys among likely Republican voters to determine their opinion on net neutrality. We asked if they support, oppose, or are unfamiliar with the FCC's proposed rules for net neutrality. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

From our segment reads, it appears that most likely voters in Nevada are unaware of net neutrality. Among Republicans, around 73% of respondents are unsure or don't know about net neutrality, with 9% support and 18% oppose (see Table 8.11).

However, when we look at the age breakdown, we see a clear division. Only 60% of respondents in the 18-34 cohorts do not know about net neutrality; this is lower than the 67% unawareness in the 35-54 group and the 76% in the 55+ group. It appears that people in the 18-34 have stronger support for and opposition against net neutrality. Support for net neutrality among this group is 12% vs. 11% for the 35-54 group and 7% in the 55+ group. Opposition against net neutrality is at 29% for the 18-34 cohort, 21% for the 35-54 cohort, and 16% for the 55+ cohort (see Table 8.12).

Males are more aware of net neutrality with 68% unsure of net neutrality vs. 78% for females. Males also have stronger levels of support and opposition towards net neutrality. 11% of males support net neutrality while 7% of women support that policy. 21% of males oppose net neutrality versus 15% for females (see Table 8.13).

People who are in the Other ethnicity group have the highest support for net neutrality, at 11%. Hispanics have the highest opposition to net neutrality at 20%, although the margin of error is quite high. (See Table 8.14)

It appears that at higher income levels, the level of support for net neutrality increases. It is also the case that awareness of the net neutrality increases as one moves up the income bracket, with the \$0-49,999 group having the highest unawareness of net neutrality (79%). People who make more than \$50,000 have roughly the same level of support for net neutrality, approximately 19% (see Table 8.15).

Table 8.11: Nevada: Net Neutrality by Party

Party	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Republican	Support	8.8%	8.2%	9.1%	8.8%	9.6%
	Oppose	15.9%	17.0%	17.8%	18.1%	21.4%
	Unknown/Don't Know	75.4%	74.9%	73.1%	73.0%	69.0%
	N	3,108	2,034	1,913	1,616	1,629

Table 8.12: Nevada: Net Neutrality by Age

Age Group	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
18-34	Support	17.5%	12.2%	13.8%	5.6%	11.7%
	Oppose	23.7%	21.6%	27.5%	50.0%	19.8%
	Unknown/Don't Know	58.8%	66.2%	58.7%	44.4%	68.5%
	N	114	74	109	18	111
35-54	Support	11.3%	10.7%	12.2%	12.0%	12.9%
	Oppose	18.5%	19.7%	21.1%	20.8%	24.0%
	Unknown/Don't Know	70.2%	69.7%	66.7%	67.2%	63.1%
	N	788	524	621	509	542
55+	Support	7.4%	7.0%	7.1%	7.4%	7.6%
	Oppose	14.5%	15.7%	15.1%	16.3%	20.1%
	Unknown/Don't Know	78.1%	77.2%	77.8%	76.2%	72.3%
	N	2,206	1,436	1,183	1,089	976

Table 8.13: Nevada: Net Neutrality by Gender

Gender	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Female	Support	6.5%	5.9%	8.6%	7.4%	7.7%
	Oppose	12.6%	12.3%	14.5%	16.1%	18.6%
	Unknown/Don't Know	80.8%	81.8%	76.9%	76.6%	73.7%
	N	1,590	940	1,035	870	779
Male	Support	11.1%	10.1%	9.8%	10.6%	11.4%
	Oppose	19.2%	20.9%	21.6%	20.50%	23.90%
	Unknown/Don't Know	69.6%	68.9%	68.6%	68.90%	64.70%
	N	1,518	1,094	878	746	850

Table 8.14: Nevada: Net Neutrality by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
White	Support	8.6%	8.3%	9.3%	8.4%	9.7%
	Oppose	15.6%	16.3%	18.0%	18.8%	20.4%
	Unknown/Don't Know	75.8%	75.4%	72.7%	72.8%	69.9%
	N	2,597	1,691	1,595	1,340	1,353
Black	Support	0.0%	9.1%	0.0%	20.0%	0.0%
	Oppose	0.0%	27.3%	50.0%	20.0%	33.3%
	Unknown/Don't Know	100.0%	63.6%	50.0%	60.0%	66.7%
	N	13	11	8	5	6
Hispanic	Support	3.7%	5.6%	10.3%	5.1%	5.0%
	Oppose	22.2%	20.8%	15.4%	19.2%	21.7%
	Unknown/Don't Know	74.1%	73.6%	74.4%	75.6%	73.3%
	N	108	72	78	78	60
Other	Support	11.8%	8.1%	8.2%	13.5%	11.0%
	Oppose	16.4%	19.6%	15.9%	13.0%	27.1%
	Unknown/Don't Know	71.8%	72.3%	75.9%	73.6%	61.9%
	N	390	260	232	193	210

Table 8.15: Nevada: Net Neutrality by Income

Income Bracket	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
\$0-49,999	Support	7.0%	4.7%	5.5%	6.4%	9.0%
	Oppose	13.3%	18.6%	16.5%	12.8%	13.7%
	Unknown/Don't Know	79.8%	76.7%	78.0%	80.9%	77.3%
	N	633	339	364	298	277
\$50,000-99,999	Support	8.9%	7.3%	10.0%	9.9%	10.3%
	Oppose	16.8%	18.3%	15.6%	20.7%	24.2%
	Unknown/Don't Know	74.3%	74.4%	74.4%	69.4%	65.5%
	N	1,031	698	629	588	583
\$100,000+	Support	9.1%	11.1%	9.6%	9.2%	10.5%
	Oppose	17.3%	15.9%	19.3%	18.2%	20.6%
	Unknown/Don't Know	73.7%	73.0%	71.2%	72.5%	68.8%
	N	904	615	607	455	494
Income Unknown	Support	10.2%	8.1%	10.9%	8.7%	7.3%
	Oppose	14.8%	14.7%	20.8%	18.2%	24.4%
	Unknown/Don't Know	75.0%	77.2%	68.4%	73.1%	68.4%
	N	540	382	313	275	275

8.4 US Foreign Intervention

In the same time frame as the previous reads, we surveyed likely Republican voters to determine their opinion on US foreign interventions. They were asked if they agree with the statements that we should play a strong leadership role when it comes to international security or the US should avoid getting involved in foreign conflicts. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

For the most part, respondents in our segment reads support US involvement. Republicans overwhelmingly support US foreign involvement, with 57% affirming. Across all age and gender groups, the pattern is still the same with around 50-60% supporting, 30-40% opposing, and 10% unsure. Although, it is important to note that awareness and support of US foreign involvement among men is a couple of points higher than women. Respondents in the Other ethnic group and Hispanics have much higher level of support for US foreign involvement than Whites (61% for Others and Hispanics vs 56% for Whites). For income groups, people who are in the highest income bracket support US foreign involvement by a couple percentages over their less affluent income groups. People in the \$0-49,999 have the highest opposition to US foreign involvement. This is unclear why because they are the least unsure about this policy issue compared to other income groups (see Tables 8.16, 8.17, 8.18, 8.19, and 8.20).

Table 8.16: Nevada: US Foreign Intervention by Party

Party	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Republican	Support	8.8%	8.2%	9.1%	8.8%	9.6%
	Oppose	15.9%	17.0%	17.8%	18.1%	21.4%
	Unknown/Don't Know	75.4%	74.9%	73.1%	73.0%	69.0%
	N	3,108	2,034	1,913	1,616	1,629

Table 8.17: Nevada: US Foreign Intervention by Age

Age Group	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
18-34	Support	56.6%	62.9%	58.1%	47.1%	56.3%
	Oppose	30.2%	32.9%	33.3%	47.1%	31.1%
	Unknown/Don't Know	13.2%	4.3%	8.6%	5.9%	12.6%
	N	106	70	105	17	103
35-54	Support	54.3%	54.5%	52.2%	51.8%	50.9%
	Oppose	34.7%	33.8%	36.1%	38.0%	39.3%
	Unknown/Don't Know	10.9%	11.7%	11.6%	10.2%	9.8%
	N	740	497	584	490	521
55+	Support	57.8%	58.8%	57.2%	59.5%	61.8%
	Oppose	30.2%	30.8%	32.7%	31.7%	28.9%
	Unknown/Don't Know	12.0%	10.3%	10.1%	8.8%	9.3%
	N	2,103	1,363	1,132	1,044	937

Table 8.18: Nevada: US Foreign Intervention by Gender

Gender	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Female	Support	57.7%	55.7%	53.8%	58.0%	55.9%
	Oppose	28.5%	32.6%	34.7%	32.4%	33.8%
	Unknown/Don't Know	13.8%	11.7%	11.6%	9.6%	10.2%
	N	1,500	887	986	826	742
Male	Support	56.0%	59.7%	58.0%	55.7%	59.5%
	Oppose	34.4%	30.9%	32.8%	35.40%	31.40%
	Unknown/Don't Know	9.7%	9.4%	9.2%	8.80%	9.20%
	N	1,449	1,043	835	725	819

Table 8.19: Nevada: US Foreign Intervention by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
White	Support	56.1%	57.3%	54.6%	56.4%	57.1%
	Oppose	32.2%	31.9%	34.9%	34.0%	32.8%
	Unknown/Don't Know	11.7%	10.8%	10.5%	9.6%	10.0%
	N	2,469	1,606	1,524	1,283	1,294
Black	Support	66.7%	63.6%	37.5%	40.0%	50.0%
	Oppose	25.0%	36.4%	62.5%	60.0%	50.0%
	Unknown/Don't Know	8.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	N	12	11	8	5	6
Hispanic	Support	63.1%	60.3%	59.7%	55.8%	66.1%
	Oppose	23.3%	27.9%	37.5%	35.1%	28.8%
	Unknown/Don't Know	13.6%	11.8%	2.8%	9.1%	5.1%
	N	103	68	72	77	59
Other	Support	60.0%	60.4%	62.7%	61.3%	59.9%
	Oppose	28.2%	31.0%	24.0%	31.7%	31.2%
	Unknown/Don't Know	11.8%	8.6%	13.4%	7.0%	8.9%
	N	365	245	217	186	202

Table 8.20: Nevada: US Foreign Intervention by Income

Income Bracket	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
\$0-49,999	Support	55.1%	56.0%	53.1%	54.8%	58.5%
	Oppose	33.6%	35.2%	39.5%	36.6%	32.8%
	Unknown/Don't Know	11.3%	8.8%	7.4%	8.6%	8.7%
	N	604	318	352	279	265
\$50,000-99,999	Support	56.3%	57.6%	54.3%	55.5%	55.4%
	Oppose	32.1%	31.6%	33.9%	35.7%	35.1%
	Unknown/Don't Know	11.6%	10.8%	11.8%	8.8%	9.5%
	N	991	665	608	569	558
\$100,000+	Support	59.0%	57.7%	58.7%	61.7%	58.3%
	Oppose	28.6%	29.9%	29.7%	28.7%	30.1%
	Unknown/Don't Know	12.4%	12.4%	11.6%	9.6%	11.6%
	N	847	589	569	439	475
Income Unknown	Support	56.4%	60.3%	55.8%	54.2%	61.2%
	Oppose	32.0%	31.6%	34.9%	35.6%	31.2%
	Unknown/Don't Know	11.6%	8.1%	9.2%	10.2%	7.6%
	N	507	358	292	264	263

8.5 Marriage Equality

We asked likely Republican voters from September 25th to October 23rd if they would support or oppose gay marriage. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

Approximately 70% of our Republican respondents oppose marriage equality. This sentiment is actually the same across all gender and age groups. Surprisingly people in the 35-54 age group have the strongest support for gay marriage. Hispanics have the lowest support for gay marriage with 29% supporting, while people who identify as Other ethnicity have the highest at 32%. Interestingly, among Republicans, support for gay marriage rises as we go higher in the income brackets. Approximately 32% of people who make more than \$100,000 support gay marriage versus 23% for people making under \$50,000 and 29% for people making \$50-99,999 (see Tables 8.21, 8.22, 8.23, 8.24, and 8.25)

Table 8.21: Nevada: Marriage Equality by Party

Party	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Republican	Support	29.0%	27.0%	31.9%	28.5%	28.6%
	Oppose	71.0%	73.0%	68.1%	71.5%	71.4%
	N	2,846	1,869	1,772	1,506	1,515

Table 8.22: Nevada: Marriage Equality by Age

Age Group	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
18-34	Support	31.3%	27.9%	35.6%	11.8%	30.7%
	Oppose	68.7%	72.1%	64.4%	88.2%	69.3%
	N	99	68	104	17	101
35-54	Support	33.9%	28.2%	38.6%	33.1%	37.7%
	Oppose	66.1%	71.8%	61.4%	66.9%	62.3%
	N	717	482	568	478	506
55+	Support	27.2%	26.5%	28.2%	26.6%	23.2%
	Oppose	72.8%	73.5%	71.8%	73.4%	76.8%
	N	2,030	1,319	1,100	1,011	908

Table 8.23: Nevada: Marriage Equality by Gender

Gender	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Female	Support	27.8%	29.9%	31.2%	28.9%	27.8%
	Oppose	72.2%	70.1%	68.8%	71.1%	72.2%
	N	1,445	856	962	800	726
Male	Support	30.3%	24.5%	32.8%	28.0%	29.3%
	Oppose	69.7%	75.5%	67.2%	72.0%	70.7%
	N	1,401	1,013	810	706	789

Table 8.24: Nevada: Marriage Equality by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
White	Support	29.1%	26.5%	31.4%	27.8%	28.4%
	Oppose	70.9%	73.5%	68.6%	72.2%	71.6%
	N	2,381	1,558	1,487	1,246	1,253
Black	Support	25.0%	40.0%	25.0%	20.0%	33.3%
	Oppose	75.0%	60.0%	75.0%	80.0%	66.7%
	N	12	10	8	5	6
Hispanic	Support	28.3%	28.8%	28.2%	26.7%	21.1%
	Oppose	71.7%	71.2%	71.8%	73.3%	78.9%
	N	99	66	71	75	57
Other	Support	28.8%	28.9%	37.4%	34.4%	31.7%
	Oppose	71.2%	71.1%	62.6%	65.6%	68.3%
	N	354	235	206	180	199

Table 8.25: Nevada: Marriage Equality by Income

Income Bracket	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
\$0-49,999	Support	19.3%	25.9%	22.4%	25.3%	23.5%
	Oppose	80.7%	74.1%	77.6%	74.7%	76.5%
	N	590	309	339	269	255
\$50,000-99,999	Support	28.6%	25.3%	33.2%	28.0%	31.5%
	Oppose	71.4%	74.7%	66.8%	72.0%	68.5%
	N	962	643	591	554	543
\$100,000+	Support	35.6%	30.1%	37.2%	28.5%	29.4%
	Oppose	64.4%	69.9%	62.8%	71.5%	70.6%
	N	814	569	556	431	462
Income Unknown	Support	30.6%	25.9%	30.4%	32.9%	25.9%
	Oppose	69.4%	74.1%	69.6%	67.1%	74.1%
	N	480	348	286	252	255

8.6 US Domestic Spying

For this read, we asked likely Republican voters on their thoughts on domestic spying. From September 25th to October 23rd, we asked if they agree that government surveillance programs are necessary to keep us safe or if they go too far and undermine the right to privacy. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

A surprising majority of Republicans oppose US domestic spying, even if there are implications of softening security and anti-terrorist measures— 56% of Republicans oppose US domestic spying, with 44% supporting increased surveillance. People who are younger seem less likely to support domestic spying efforts when compared to their older cohorts (40% for the 18-34 cohorts, 41% for 35-54 cohort, and 46% for 55+ cohort). Among the gender groups, there appears to be no real difference between their opinions. Hispanics have the strongest level of opposition to US domestic spying, followed by Whites and people in the Other ethnicity group (60%, 56%, and 54% respectively). People who make over \$100,000 have the lowest opposition to US domestic spying when compared to other income groups (see Tables 8.26, 8.27, 8.28, 8.29, and 8.30).

Table 8.26: Nevada: US Domestic Spying by Party

Party	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Republican	Support	44.0%	43.4%	44.8%	42.4%	46.1%
	Oppose	56.0%	56.6%	55.2%	57.6%	53.9%
	N	2,992	1,961	1,849	1,570	1,579

Table 8.27: Nevada: US Domestic Spying by Age

Age Group	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
18-34	Support	44.4%	35.2%	35.5%	35.3%	46.2%
	Oppose	55.6%	64.8%	64.5%	64.7%	53.8%
	N	108	71	107	17	106
35-54	Support	42.4%	39.7%	45.2%	40.1%	41.4%
	Oppose	57.6%	60.3%	54.8%	59.9%	58.6%
	N	754	506	599	496	529
55+	Support	44.5%	45.2%	45.5%	43.6%	48.7%
	Oppose	55.5%	54.8%	54.5%	56.4%	51.3%
	N	2,130	1,384	1,143	1,057	944

Table 8.28: Nevada: US Domestic Spying by Gender

Gender	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Female	Support	42.8%	41.8%	44.8%	43.7%	43.2%
	Oppose	57.2%	58.2%	55.2%	56.3%	56.8%
	N	1,525	904	1,003	835	752
Male	Support	45.2%	44.8%	44.9%	41.0%	48.7%
	Oppose	54.8%	55.2%	55.1%	59.0%	51.3%
	N	1,467	1,057	846	735	827

Table 8.29: Nevada: US Domestic Spying by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
White	Support	44.1%	43.8%	44.8%	41.6%	46.4%
	Oppose	55.9%	56.3%	55.2%	58.4%	53.6%
	N	2,508	1,632	1,545	1,301	1,311
Black	Support	41.7%	18.2%	50.0%	20.0%	33.3%
	Oppose	58.3%	81.8%	50.0%	80.0%	66.7%
	N	12	11	8	5	6
Hispanic	Support	39.4%	44.9%	41.3%	39.0%	37.3%
	Oppose	60.6%	55.1%	58.7%	61.0%	62.7%
	N	104	69	75	77	59
Other	Support	44.3%	42.2%	46.2%	50.3%	47.3%
	Oppose	55.7%	57.8%	53.8%	49.7%	52.7%
	N	368	249	221	187	203

Table 8.30: Nevada: US Domestic Spying by Income

\$0-49,999	Support	47.0%	43.3%	44.0%	42.9%	49.3%
	Oppose	53.0%	56.7%	56.0%	57.1%	50.7%
	N	611	326	357	287	268
\$50,000-99,999	Support	43.4%	42.3%	45.1%	40.5%	45.2%
	Oppose	56.6%	57.7%	54.9%	59.5%	54.8%
	N	1,004	676	614	573	566
\$100,000+	Support	45.8%	46.9%	46.7%	47.3%	49.4%
	Oppose	54.2%	53.1%	53.3%	52.7%	50.6%
	N	860	595	582	446	478
Income Unknown	Support	38.3%	40.1%	41.6%	37.9%	39.0%
	Oppose	61.7%	59.9%	58.4%	62.1%	61.0%
	N	517	364	296	264	267

8.7 Immigration Reform

From the same time frame as the previous questions, we looked at respondents' sentiments on immigration reform. Respondents were offered a choice between allowing immigrants to be legal or prioritize stopping the flow of illegal immigrants. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

An overwhelming majority of Republicans support stopping the flow of immigrants vs. providing amnesty by a 4-to-1 margin. This level of support is echoed with the 55+ age cohort. However, people who are in the 18-34 and 35-54 age groups support stopping the flow of immigrants as well, but at a lower level. For these two groups, 25% support amnesty with 75% supporting enforcing border security. For males and females, they both support stopping the flow of immigrants over amnesty by almost a 4-to-1 margin. This is the same across all ethnic groups except for Hispanics. Approximately 25% of Hispanics polled support amnesty, which is higher than the average. Respondents in the \$100,000+ income bracket have the highest support for amnesty (approximately 25%), while people who make less than \$50,000 have the least support for amnesty (16%; see Tables 8.31, 8.32, 8.33, 8.34, and 8.35).

Table 8.31: Nevada: Immigration Reform by Party

Party	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Republican	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	19.7%	18.0%	20.8%	21.1%	20.4%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	80.3%	82.0%	79.2%	78.9%	79.6%
	N	2,891	1,903	1,798	1,529	1,539

Table 8.32: Nevada: Immigration Reform by Age

Age Group	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
18-34	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	26.5%	20.0%	32.4%	23.5%	26.7%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	73.5%	80.0%	67.6%	76.5%	73.3%
	N	102	70	105	17	101
35-54	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	25.2%	18.4%	25.5%	24.7%	25.0%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	74.8%	81.6%	74.5%	75.3%	75.0%
	N	727	490	577	486	512
55+	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	17.4%	17.8%	17.3%	19.4%	17.2%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	82.6%	82.2%	82.7%	80.6%	82.8%
	N	2,062	1,343	1,116	1,026	926

Table 8.33: Nevada: Immigration Reform by Gender

Female	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	18.5%	18.7%	20.1%	21.0%	19.9%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	81.5%	81.3%	79.9%	79.0%	80.1%
	N	1,469	872	976	814	735
Male	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	20.9%	17.5%	21.7%	21.3%	20.9%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	79.1%	82.5%	78.3%	78.7%	79.1%
	N	1,422	1,031	822	715	804

Table 8.34: Nevada: Immigration Reform by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
White	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	19.4%	18.2%	20.1%	20.7%	20.1%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	80.6%	81.8%	79.9%	79.3%	79.9%
	N	2,419	1,586	1,505	1,265	1,272
Black	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	16.7%	18.2%	25.0%	20.0%	16.7%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	83.3%	81.8%	75.0%	80.0%	83.3%
	N	12	11	8	5	6
Hispanic	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	25.7%	20.9%	31.9%	19.7%	22.0%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	74.3%	79.1%	68.1%	80.3%	78.0%
	N	101	67	72	76	59
Other	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	20.1%	15.9%	22.1%	24.6%	21.8%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	79.9%	84.1%	77.9%	75.4%	78.2%
	N	359	239	213	183	202

Table 8.35: Nevada: Immigration Reform by Income

Income Bracket	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
\$0-49,999	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	12.7%	14.2%	16.7%	19.2%	17.5%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	87.3%	85.8%	83.3%	80.8%	82.5%
	N	599	317	347	271	263
\$50,000-99,999	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	18.9%	16.3%	20.7%	19.3%	18.2%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	81.1%	83.7%	79.3%	80.7%	81.8%
	N	973	657	600	564	550
\$100,000+	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	25.7%	20.1%	25.0%	23.3%	24.5%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	74.3%	79.9%	75.0%	76.7%	75.5%
	N	829	578	561	437	470
Income Unknown	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	19.6%	21.4%	17.9%	23.3%	20.7%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	80.4%	78.6%	82.1%	76.7%	79.3%
	N	490	351	290	257	256

8.8 Television Viewership

On the weekends of October 16th and October 23rd, we conducted surveys among likely voters to determine television viewership modes in Nevada. We asked the respondent to pick their primary source of television in their household. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

Around 33% of Republicans watch cable, with 20% watching broadcast TV and TV over the internet. This pattern is seen throughout all age, gender, ethnic, and income groups. People in the highest income group have the highest rate of cable subscription. Respondents in the \$100,000 income groups also have the highest rate of people who watch TV over television, followed by people who identify themselves with an Other ethnicity (approximately 24%; see Tables 8.36, 8.37, 8.38, 8.39, and 8.40).

Table 8.36: Nevada: Television Viewership by Party

Party	Response	16-Oct	23-Oct
Republican	Cable Subscription	33.9%	34.5%
	Satellite Subscription	17.3%	16.0%
	Broadcast TV	19.9%	19.9%
	TV over Internet	21.7%	23.2%
	No TV in Home	7.2%	6.4%
	N	1,817	1,825

Table 8.37: Nevada: Television Viewership by Age

Age Group	Response	16-Oct	23-Oct
18-34	Cable Subscription	35.0%	31.3%
	Satellite Subscription	15.0%	10.7%
	Broadcast TV	30.0%	20.6%
	TV over Internet	20.0%	23.7%
	No TV in Home		13.7%
	N	20	131
35-54	Cable Subscription	32.3%	30.8%
	Satellite Subscription	16.6%	17.5%
	Broadcast TV	19.6%	20.4%
	TV over Internet	22.7%	22.7%
	No TV in Home	8.9%	8.6%
	N	586	594
55+	Cable Subscription	34.7%	36.8%
	Satellite Subscription	17.7%	15.8%
	Broadcast TV	19.9%	19.6%
	TV over Internet	21.2%	23.5%
	No TV in Home	6.5%	4.3%
	N	1,211	1,100

Table 8.38: Nevada: Television Viewership by Gender

Gender	Response	16-Oct	23-Oct
Female	Cable Subscription	35.3%	34.9%
	Satellite Subscription	17.6%	16.1%
	Broadcast TV	19.7%	20.9%
	TV over Internet	21.5%	21.7%
	No TV in Home	5.8%	6.4%
	N	975	886
Male	Cable Subscription	32.3%	34.1%
	Satellite Subscription	16.9%	15.9%
	Broadcast TV	20.2%	19.1%
	TV over Internet	21.9%	24.7%
	No TV in Home	8.8%	6.3%
	N	842	939

Table 8.39: Nevada: Television Viewership by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	16-Oct	23-Oct
White	Cable Subscription	33.6%	34.3%
	Satellite Subscription	18.0%	16.7%
	Broadcast TV	19.6%	19.2%
	TV over Internet	21.2%	23.6%
	No TV in Home	7.50%	6.30%
	N	1,502	1,518
Black	Cable Subscription	60.0%	33.3%
	Satellite Subscription	20.0%	16.7%
	Broadcast TV	20.0%	33.3%
	TV over Internet	0.0%	16.7%
	No TV in Home	0.0%	0.0%
	N	5	6
Hispanic	Cable Subscription	26.4%	43.3%
	Satellite Subscription	16.1%	13.4%
	Broadcast TV	26.4%	17.9%
	TV over Internet	27.6%	17.9%
	No TV in Home	3.4%	7.5%
	N	87	67
Other	Cable Subscription	38.1%	33.3%
	Satellite Subscription	12.6%	12.4%
	Broadcast TV	19.3%	25.2%
	TV over Internet	23.3%	23.1%
	No TV in Home	6.7%	6.0%
	N	223	234

Table 8.40: Nevada: Television Viewership by Income

Income Bracket	Response	16-Oct	23-Oct
\$0-49,999	Cable Subscription	32.7%	34.7%
	Satellite Subscription	21.3%	14.7%
	Broadcast TV	14.7%	20.9%
	TV over Internet	24.3%	23.8%
	No TV in Home	6.9%	5.9%
	N	333	320
\$50,000-99,999	Cable Subscription	33.1%	34.9%
	Satellite Subscription	16.9%	17.7%
	Broadcast TV	21.5%	19.5%
	TV over Internet	21.2%	21.5%
	No TV in Home	7.3%	6.4%
	N	656	637
\$100,000+	Cable Subscription	36.4%	35.5%
	Satellite Subscription	13.6%	12.5%
	Broadcast TV	21.4%	20.7%
	TV over Internet	21.4%	25.5%
	No TV in Home	7.2%	5.8%
	N	528	552
Income Unknown	Cable Subscription	32.7%	31.6%
	Satellite Subscription	20.0%	19.9%
	Broadcast TV	19.7%	18.7%
	TV over Internet	20.3%	22.2%
	No TV in Home	7.3%	7.6%
	N	300	316

9

South Carolina

9.1 Government's Role in Creating Jobs

From September 25th to October 23rd, we conducted surveys among likely Republican voters to gauge their sentiment on government and the economy. We asked if people feel that the government should do less and get out of the way for businesses to create jobs or if the government should do more and ensure that everyone get their fair share of the economy. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

Since we only surveyed Republicans, it is no surprise that a vast majority believe that the government should do less. Approximately 85% of people believe that the government should do less and 15% disagree. This is consistent across all age, gender, ethnic, and income groups (see Tables 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5).

Table 9.1: South Carolina: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Party

Party	Response	25-Sep	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Republican	More	89.0%	89.0%	88.9%	88.3%	89.7%
	Less	11.0%	11.0%	11.1%	11.7%	10.3%
	N	3,162	2,065	1,941	1,638	1,646

Table 9.2: South Carolina: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Age

Age Group	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
18-34	More	82.1%	89.1%	84.7%	78.6%
	Less	17.9%	10.9%	15.3%	21.4%
	N	235	138	177	159
35-54	More	85.1%	86.7%	82.2%	83.7%
	Less	14.9%	13.3%	17.8%	16.3%
	N	877	761	720	627
55+	More	87.3%	87.2%	88.4%	89.4%
	Less	12.7%	12.8%	11.6%	10.6%
	N	1,886	1,820	1,383	985

Table 9.3: South Carolina: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Gender

Gender	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Female	More	85.7%	85.5%	85.7%	86.1%
	Less	14.3%	14.5%	14.3%	13.9%
	N	1,497	1,315	1,129	836
Male	More	86.8%	88.7%	86.6%	86.7%
	Less	13.2%	11.3%	13.4%	13.3%
	N	1,501	1,404	1,151	935

Table 9.4: South Carolina: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
White	More	86.9%	87.4%	86.6%	87.5%
	Less	13.1%	12.6%	13.4%	12.5%
	N	2,709	2,463	2,024	1,579
Black	More	48.5%	64.3%	65.5%	55.6%
	Less	51.5%	35.7%	34.5%	44.4%
	N	33	28	29	18
Hispanic	More	86.4%	88.9%	72.0%	69.6%
	Less	13.6%	11.1%	28.0%	30.4%
	N	22	27	25	23
Other	More	84.2%	87.1%	86.1%	81.5%
	Less	15.8%	12.9%	13.9%	18.5%
	N	234	201	202	151

Table 9.5: South Carolina: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Income

Income Bracket	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
\$0-49,999	More	85.9%	86.2%	87.9%	87.6%
	Less	14.1%	13.8%	12.1%	12.4%
	N	864	747	593	467
\$50,000-99,999	More	86.0%	87.0%	85.0%	86.1%
	Less	14.0%	13.0%	15.0%	13.9%
	N	979	884	771	582
\$100,000+	More	86.2%	87.8%	83.8%	87.5%
	Less	13.8%	12.2%	16.2%	12.5%
	N	709	648	530	415
Income Unknown	More	87.7%	88.2%	89.1%	84.0%
	Less	12.3%	11.8%	10.9%	16.0%
	N	446	440	386	307

9.2 Is the Country on the Right Track

From September 25th to October 23rd, we conducted surveys among likely Republican voters to measure their opinions on the direction of the country. We asked respondents whether or not they think the country is heading in the right or wrong direction. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

Again, since our sample population includes only Republicans, an overwhelming amount of people believe that the country is on the wrong track. Around 90% of respondents believe this and this is consistent across all age, gender, ethnic, and income groups. The only interesting finding is that Blacks are the only group that break this pattern. An average of 39% of Blacks believe that the country is heading in the right path, with 70% believing it is on the wrong path (see Tables 9.6, 9.7, 9.8, 9.9, and 9.10).

Table 9.6: South Carolina: Country on the Right Track by Party

Party	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Republican	Right	10.0%	7.8%	10.3%	9.1%
	Wrong	90.0%	92.2%	89.7%	90.9%
	N	3,108	2,779	2,331	1,813

Table 9.7: South Carolina: Country on the Right Track by Age

Age Group	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
18-34	Right	14.1%	12.0%	14.9%	11.0%
	Wrong	85.9%	88.0%	85.1%	89.0%
	N	248	142	188	163
35-54	Right	11.2%	9.6%	12.0%	11.2%
	Wrong	88.8%	90.4%	88.0%	88.8%
	N	912	778	734	652
55+	Right	8.9%	6.7%	8.7%	7.4%
	Wrong	91.1%	93.3%	91.3%	92.6%
	N	1,948	1,859	1,409	998

Table 9.8: South Carolina: Country on the Right Track by Gender

Gender	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Female	Right	9.4%	7.7%	10.6%	8.8%
	Wrong	90.6%	92.3%	89.4%	91.2%
	N	1,554	1,344	1,153	854
Male	Right	10.6%	7.9%	9.9%	9.4%
	Wrong	89.4%	92.1%	90.1%	90.6%
	N	1,554	1,435	1,178	959

Table 9.9: South Carolina: Country on the Right Track by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
White	Right	9.3%	7.1%	10.2%	8.4%
	Wrong	90.7%	92.9%	89.8%	91.6%
	N	2,804	2,514	2,069	1,618
Black	Right	61.1%	35.7%	30.0%	27.8%
	Wrong	38.9%	64.3%	70.0%	72.2%
	N	36	28	30	18
Hispanic	Right	4.2%	17.9%	12.0%	20.8%
	Wrong	95.8%	82.1%	88.0%	79.2%
	N	24	28	25	24
Other	Right	10.7%	11.5%	7.2%	12.4%
	Wrong	89.3%	88.5%	92.8%	87.6%
	N	244	209	207	153

Table 9.10: South Carolina: Country on the Right Track by Income

Income Bracket	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
\$0-49,999	Right	8.7%	5.1%	8.3%	7.8%
	Wrong	91.3%	94.9%	91.7%	92.2%
	N	883	760	603	473
\$50,000-99,999	Right	9.4%	8.4%	11.4%	8.7%
	Wrong	90.6%	91.6%	88.6%	91.3%
	N	1,022	903	789	598
\$100,000+	Right	12.6%	9.3%	13.4%	10.3%
	Wrong	87.4%	90.7%	86.6%	89.7%
	N	739	668	543	429
Income Unknown	Right	9.7%	8.9%	6.6%	10.2%
	Wrong	90.3%	91.1%	93.4%	89.8%
	N	464	448	396	313

9.3 Net Neutrality

From September 25th to October 23rd, we conducted surveys among likely Republican voters to determine their opinion on net neutrality. We asked if they support, oppose, or are unfamiliar with the FCC's proposed rules for net neutrality. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

From the segment reads, it appears that a vast majority are unaware with net neutrality. Among Republicans, around 9% of respondents support it with 15% opposition and 77% unsure about their stance (see Table 9.11).

Regarding age groups, young people support net neutrality at a higher level than older people. Approximately 13% of people in the 18-34 age group support net neutrality vs. 12% for the 35-54 group and 7% for the 55+ group. Strangely enough, people in the 18-34 group have the strongest opposition towards net neutrality at 19%. People in the 55+ age group have the least opposition to net neutrality, at 13%. It appears that the low level of support and opposition from the 55+ group comes from the fact that they're unaware of this policy issue since they have the highest level of unsureness out of any group, at 80% (see Table 9.12).

Females are generally less aware of net neutrality than their male counterparts. Males showed stronger support and opposition to net neutrality than females—11% of males support net neutrality and 18% of males oppose, compared with 7% of female supporting and 11% opposing (see Table 9.13).

Across all ethnic groups, the level of support for net neutrality is similar, ranging from 8-10%, and opposition around 15%. Around 75% of people are unaware or unsure about net neutrality to make a decision. Blacks and Hispanics have too little of a sample size to make any real determination (see Table 9.14).

Support for net neutrality increases as we jump up the income brackets. People in the highest income bracket showed the strongest support for net neutrality (11%), with people in the lowest income bracket showing the lowest support (6%). Similarly, people in the highest income group have the highest level of opposition to net neutrality (17%) and people in the lowest income group have the lowest opposition to net neutrality (12%). This is due to the level of awareness, since the \$100,000+ group have the lowest level of unsureness. This may be because they are more likely to be educated about net neutrality and form an opinion on it (see Table 9.15).

Table 9.11: South Carolina: Net Neutrality by Party

Party	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Republican	Support	8.3%	8.3%	9.2%	9.3%
	Oppose	13.2%	14.9%	14.5%	16.3%
	Unknown/Don't Know	78.5%	76.7%	76.3%	74.4%
	N	2,929	2,673	2,236	1,732

Table 9.12: South Carolina: Net Neutrality by Age

Age Group	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
18-34	Support	16.8%	12.5%	11.1%	12.5%
	Oppose	12.8%	20.6%	21.6%	22.4%
	Unknown/Don't Know	70.4%	66.9%	67.3%	65.1%
	N	226	136	171	152
35-54	Support	10.2%	9.7%	13.4%	12.6%
	Oppose	15.5%	17.2%	18.0%	17.0%
	Unknown/Don't Know	74.4%	73.2%	68.6%	70.5%
	N	854	745	701	613
55+	Support	6.4%	7.5%	6.8%	6.7%
	Oppose	12.2%	13.6%	11.8%	14.9%
	Unknown/Don't Know	81.4%	79.0%	81.4%	78.4%
	N	1,849	1,792	1,364	967

Table 9.13: South Carolina: Net Neutrality by Gender

Gender	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Female	Support	6.1%	5.7%	8.0%	7.2%
	Oppose	9.5%	10.4%	11.0%	12.3%
	Unknown/Don't Know	84.4%	83.9%	81.0%	80.5%
	N	1,463	1,292	1,102	815
Male	Support	10.5%	10.9%	10.4%	11.1%
	Oppose	16.8%	19.1%	17.90%	19.80%
	Unknown/Don't Know	72.6%	70.0%	71.70%	69.00%
	N	1,466	1,381	1,134	917

Table 9.14: South Carolina: Net Neutrality by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
White	Support	8.1%	8.3%	9.3%	9.1%
	Oppose	13.0%	14.7%	14.6%	16.3%
	Unknown/Don't Know	78.9%	77.0%	76.1%	74.6%
	N	2,645	2,424	1,982	1,542
Black	Support	6.5%	10.7%	10.3%	5.6%
	Oppose	16.1%	10.7%	13.8%	11.1%
	Unknown/Don't Know	77.4%	78.6%	75.9%	83.3%
	N	31	28	29	18
Hispanic	Support	9.1%	7.7%	12.0%	13.0%
	Oppose	9.1%	19.2%	20.0%	34.8%
	Unknown/Don't Know	81.8%	73.1%	68.0%	52.2%
	N	22	26	25	23
Other	Support	10.8%	9.2%	8.0%	11.4%
	Oppose	15.2%	17.4%	12.5%	14.1%
	Unknown/Don't Know	74.0%	73.3%	79.5%	74.5%
	N	231	195	200	149

Table 9.15: South Carolina: Net Neutrality by Income

Income Bracket	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
\$0-49,999	Support	5.0%	6.4%	5.6%	7.4%
	Oppose	10.3%	12.2%	11.2%	13.1%
	Unknown/Don't Know	84.7%	81.4%	83.2%	79.4%
	N	842	730	588	457
\$50,000-99,999	Support	8.6%	8.5%	10.3%	8.6%
	Oppose	13.5%	15.4%	14.8%	15.0%
	Unknown/Don't Know	77.8%	76.1%	74.8%	76.4%
	N	960	872	755	567
\$100,000+	Support	11.9%	9.4%	12.9%	10.9%
	Oppose	13.6%	17.2%	16.0%	20.0%
	Unknown/Don't Know	74.5%	73.4%	71.0%	69.1%
	N	689	635	518	405
Income Unknown	Support	8.2%	9.6%	7.5%	11.2%
	Oppose	17.1%	15.4%	16.8%	18.5%
	Unknown/Don't Know	74.7%	75.0%	75.7%	70.3%
	N	438	436	375	303

9.4 US Foreign Intervention

In the same time frame as the previous reads, we surveyed likely Republican voters to determine their opinion on US foreign interventions. They were asked if they agree with the statements that we should play a strong leadership role when it comes to international security or if the US should avoid getting involved in foreign conflicts. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

Overall, it appears that around 55% of respondents support increasing US involvement in foreign affairs with 35% opposing and 10% unsure. People older than 55 showed the strongest support for US foreign involvement, with people in the 18-34 age group showing the strongest opposition to US foreign involvement. This may be due to a generational difference in how they view US foreign policy (see Table 9.16 and 9.17).

Males show stronger support for increased US foreign intervention (58% for males and 52% for females). Females showed stronger opposition to US foreign intervention, but only by a couple points (36% and 34%, respectively). This is also the same across all ethnicities, a majority support increase US foreign involvement with 55% affirming and 35% opposing. There was not enough sample size to determine the stances of Blacks and Hispanics on this issue (see Table 9.18 and 9.19).

People who make more than \$100,000 a year have the strongest support of increased US foreign involvement (57%), followed by people who make less than \$50,000 a year (55%), and then people who make between \$50,000-99,999 (52%). People who make between \$50,000-99,999 also showed the strongest opposition to US foreign involvement (see Table 9.20).

Table 9.16: South Carolina: US Foreign Intervention by Party

Party	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Republican	Support	54.2%	56.8%	52.9%	54.7%
	Oppose	33.9%	33.2%	36.7%	35.2%
	Unknown/Don't Know	11.9%	10.0%	10.5%	10.1%
	N	2,767	2,559	2,153	1,642

Table 9.17: South Carolina: US Foreign Intervention by Age

Age Group	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
18-34	Support	47.9%	55.0%	47.0%	54.5%
	Oppose	39.8%	36.4%	43.3%	38.6%
	Unknown/Don't Know	12.3%	8.5%	9.8%	6.9%
	N	211	129	164	145
35-54	Support	51.2%	50.8%	49.1%	47.8%
	Oppose	36.5%	39.5%	40.0%	39.3%
	Unknown/Don't Know	12.3%	9.7%	10.9%	12.9%
	N	803	712	672	575
55+	Support	56.30%	59.40%	55.5%	59.0%
	Oppose	32.0%	30.4%	34.2%	32.1%
	Unknown/Don't Know	11.7%	10.2%	10.3%	8.9%
	N	1,753	1,718	1,317	922

Table 9.18: South Carolina: US Foreign Intervention by Gender

Gender	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Female	Support	51.5%	54.1%	49.7%	50.8%
	Oppose	34.2%	34.7%	37.5%	37.6%
	Unknown/Don't Know	14.3%	11.2%	12.8%	11.7%
	N	1,374	1,238	1,051	780
Male	Support	56.8%	59.3%	55.9%	58.2%
	Oppose	33.6%	31.9%	35.90%	33.10%
	Unknown/Don't Know	9.6%	8.9%	8.20%	8.70%
	N	1,393	1,321	1,102	862

Table 9.19: South Carolina: US Foreign Intervention by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
White	Support	54.3%	57.3%	52.8%	54.8%
	Oppose	33.9%	32.5%	36.9%	34.9%
	Unknown/Don't Know	11.8%	10.1%	10.4%	10.2%
	N	2,493	2,320	1,910	1,466
Black	Support	43.3%	53.8%	34.5%	42.9%
	Oppose	43.3%	34.6%	44.8%	35.7%
	Unknown/Don't Know	13.3%	11.5%	20.7%	21.4%
	N	30	26	29	14
Hispanic	Support	71.4%	46.2%	52.4%	52.4%
	Oppose	9.5%	46.2%	23.8%	38.1%
	Unknown/Don't Know	19.0%	7.7%	23.8%	9.5%
	N	21	26	21	21
Other	Support	52.5%	51.9%	56.5%	54.6%
	Oppose	35.0%	39.6%	35.2%	37.6%
	Unknown/Don't Know	12.6%	8.6%	8.3%	7.8%
	N	223	187	193	141

Table 9.20: South Carolina: US Foreign Intervention by Income

Income Bracket	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
\$0-49,999	Support	54.4%	55.2%	53.9%	58.2%
	Oppose	32.0%	32.8%	37.0%	34.8%
	Unknown/Don't Know	13.5%	12.0%	9.1%	7.0%
	N	790	699	571	431
\$50,000-99,999	Support	52.5%	55.6%	51.7%	51.5%
	Oppose	36.6%	34.6%	35.5%	37.0%
	Unknown/Don't Know	10.9%	9.8%	12.8%	11.5%
	N	912	829	727	546
\$100,000+	Support	57.1%	61.9%	54.9%	57.5%
	Oppose	31.5%	28.9%	36.2%	31.0%
	Unknown/Don't Know	11.4%	9.2%	8.9%	11.5%
	N	641	606	497	381
Income Unknown	Support	52.8%	54.4%	50.6%	51.8%
	Oppose	35.1%	37.4%	39.4%	38.0%
	Unknown/Don't Know	12.0%	8.2%	10.1%	10.2%
	N	424	425	358	284

9.5 Marriage Equality

We asked likely Republican voters from September 25th to October 23rd if they would support or oppose gay marriage. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

The baseline response for marriage equality is that 80% of respondents oppose it. This is the same across the genders. For age groups, 18-34 and 35-54 cohorts had a higher support for marriage, with 27% and 24% supporting, respectively. The 55+ age group has a lower support than average, at 18%. Hispanics have the strongest support for marriage equality out of all the ethnicities, at 25% (see Tables 9.21, 9.22, 9.23, and 9.24).

There appears to be more support for gay marriage as one goes to the higher income levels. People in the lowest income level have the lowest support for gay marriage at 16%, while people in the highest income level have the highest support for marriage equality at 26%. This may be due to the fact that higher income people are more likely to have social liberal views (see Table 9.25).

Table 9.21: South Carolina: Marriage Equality by Party

Party	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Republican	Support	21.0%	19.6%	21.6%	19.9%
	Oppose	79.0%	80.4%	78.4%	80.1%
	N	2,664	2,465	2,074	1,592

Table 9.22: South Carolina: Marriage Equality by Age

Age Group	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
18-34	Support	27.3%	23.8%	32.1%	24.6%
	Oppose	72.7%	76.2%	67.9%	75.4%
	N	205	126	159	142
35-54	Support	24.5%	21.7%	24.7%	25.6%
	Oppose	75.5%	78.3%	75.3%	74.4%
	N	770	681	647	559
55+	Support	18.6%	18.4%	18.6%	15.6%
	Oppose	81.4%	81.6%	81.4%	84.4%
	N	1,689	1,658	1,268	891

Table 9.23: South Carolina: Marriage Equality by Gender

Gender	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Female	Support	23.5%	20.7%	21.5%	21.2%
	Oppose	76.5%	79.3%	78.5%	78.8%
	N	1,321	1,196	1,016	758
Male	Support	18.5%	18.5%	21.6%	18.7%
	Oppose	81.5%	81.5%	78.4%	81.3%
	N	1,343	1,269	1,058	834

Table 9.24: South Carolina: Marriage Equality by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
White	Support	20.6%	18.8%	21.3%	19.1%
	Oppose	79.4%	81.2%	78.7%	80.9%
	N	2,404	2,236	1,843	1,422
Black	Support	35.7%	7.7%	12.0%	21.4%
	Oppose	64.3%	92.3%	88.0%	78.6%
	N	28	26	25	14
Hispanic	Support	15.0%	36.0%	25.0%	52.4%
	Oppose	85.0%	64.0%	75.0%	47.6%
	N	20	25	20	21
Other	Support	24.1%	29.2%	24.7%	23.0%
	Oppose	75.9%	70.8%	75.3%	77.0%
	N	212	178	186	135

Table 9.25: South Carolina: Marriage Equality by Income

Income Bracket	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
\$0-49,999	Support	17.4%	14.7%	15.3%	16.2%
	Oppose	82.6%	85.3%	84.7%	83.8%
	N	769	681	548	419
\$50,000-99,999	Support	21.3%	19.3%	21.6%	20.1%
	Oppose	78.8%	80.7%	78.4%	79.9%
	N	880	798	700	527
\$100,000+	Support	27.1%	25.8%	29.7%	22.5%
	Oppose	72.9%	74.2%	70.3%	77.5%
	N	616	581	478	369
Income Unknown	Support	17.8%	19.5%	20.1%	21.7%
	Oppose	82.2%	80.5%	79.9%	78.3%
	N	399	405	348	277

9.6 US Domestic Spying

For this read, we asked likely Republican voters on their thoughts on domestic spying. From September 25th to October 23rd, we asked if they agree that government surveillance programs are necessary to keep us safe or if they go too far and undermine the right to privacy. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

Respondents are almost split 50/50 on domestic spying. This is the same for both genders and all ethnicities (except for Blacks and Hispanics, where there was not enough sample to make a determination). The only place where we see a pattern is in age groups and income levels. People in the youngest age group have the lowest support for US domestic spying (46%) while people in the highest income have the high support for US domestic spying (51%). For income levels, people in the highest income group have the highest support for domestic spying, at 54% (see Tables 9.26, 9.27, 9.28, 9.29, and 9.30).

Table 9.26: South Carolina: US Domestic Spying by Party

Republican	Support	49.9%	49.1%	47.4%	50.8%
	Oppose	50.1%	50.9%	52.6%	49.2%
N		2,824	2,593	2,187	1,673

Table 9.27: South Carolina: US Domestic Spying by Age

Gender	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Female	Support	48.8%	49.6%	48.7%	51.1%
	Oppose	51.2%	50.4%	51.3%	48.9%
	N	1,321	1,196	1,016	758
Male	Support	51.0%	48.7%	46.1%	50.5%
	Oppose	49.0%	51.3%	53.9%	49.5%
	N	1,343	1,269	1,058	834

Table 9.28: South Carolina: US Domestic Spying by Gender

Gender	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Female	Support	23.5%	20.7%	21.5%	21.2%
	Oppose	76.5%	79.3%	78.5%	78.8%
	N	1,321	1,196	1,016	758
Male	Support	18.5%	18.5%	21.6%	18.7%
	Oppose	81.5%	81.5%	78.4%	81.3%
	N	1,343	1,269	1,058	834

Table 9.29: South Carolina: US Domestic Spying by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
White	Support	49.7%	48.8%	47.3%	50.9%
	Oppose	50.3%	51.2%	52.7%	49.1%
	N	2,404	2,236	1,843	1,422
Black	Support	70.0%	65.4%	72.4%	46.7%
	Oppose	30.0%	34.6%	27.6%	53.3%
	N	28	26	25	14
Hispanic	Support	61.9%	46.2%	45.8%	40.9%
	Oppose	38.1%	53.8%	54.2%	59.1%
	N	20	25	20	21
Other	Support	48.9%	51.6%	44.9%	51.7%
	Oppose	51.1%	48.4%	55.1%	48.3%
	N	212	178	186	135

Table 9.30: South Carolina: US Domestic Spying by Income

Income Bracket	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
\$0-49,999	Support	47.4%	50.6%	46.7%	48.5%
	Oppose	52.6%	49.4%	53.3%	51.5%
	N	769	681	548	419
\$50,000-99,999	Support	47.9%	48.5%	46.4%	50.3%
	Oppose	52.1%	51.5%	53.6%	49.7%
	N	880	798	700	527
\$100,000+	Support	56.1%	50.7%	52.8%	55.8%
	Oppose	43.9%	49.3%	47.2%	44.2%
	N	616	581	478	369
Income Unknown	Support	49.8%	45.8%	42.9%	48.6%
	Oppose	50.2%	54.2%	57.1%	51.4%
	N	399	405	348	277

9.7 Immigration Reform

From the same time frame as the previous questions, we looked at respondent's sentiments on immigration reform. Respondents were offered a choice between allowing immigrants to be legal or prioritize stopping the flow of illegal immigrants. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

For Republicans, 23% of people believe that amnesty should be provided in immigration reform. This is consistent across both genders. Our segment show that younger Republicans are more likely to support amnesty by a small margin, at 27%. The oldest segment only showed 21% approving of amnesty. It also shows that people who are labeled as Other in ethnicity showed a slightly higher support for amnesty, at 25% (see Tables 9.31, 9.32, 9.33, and 9.34).

There is another pattern that emerges when it comes to income groups—19% of people in the lowest income group support amnesty and that support increases as we move up the income bracket. People in the middle income bracket (\$50-99,999) support amnesty at 23%. People in the highest income group have the strongest support for amnesty, at 28% (see Table 9.35).

Table 9.31: South Carolina: Immigration Reform by Party

Party	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Republican	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	22.3%	22.1%	24.2%	22.9%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	77.7%	77.9%	75.8%	77.1%
	N	2,711	2,511	2,110	1,622

Table 9.32: South Carolina: Immigration Reform by Age

Age Group	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
18-34	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	27.4%	23.8%	27.3%	28.0%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	72.6%	76.2%	72.7%	72.0%
	N	208	126	161	143
35-54	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	25.3%	26.1%	27.3%	23.9%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	74.7%	73.9%	72.7%	76.1%
	N	783	696	659	566
55+	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	20.3%	20.3%	22.2%	21.5%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	79.7%	79.7%	77.8%	78.5%
	N	1,720	1,689	1,290	913

Table 9.33: South Carolina: Immigration Reform by Gender

Gender	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
Female	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	23.0%	21.3%	25.1%	23.2%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	77.0%	78.7%	74.9%	76.8%
	N	1,345	1,217	1,032	770
Male	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	21.7%	22.9%	23.3%	22.5%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	78.3%	77.1%	76.7%	77.5%
	N	1,366	1,294	1,078	852

Table 9.34: South Carolina: Immigration Reform by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
White	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	21.7%	21.4%	23.9%	22.4%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	78.3%	78.6%	76.1%	77.6%
	N	2,445	2,275	1,871	1,450
Black	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	65.5%	50.0%	39.3%	42.9%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	34.5%	50.0%	60.7%	57.1%
	N	29	26	28	14
Hispanic	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	15.0%	30.8%	25.0%	33.3%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	85.0%	69.2%	75.0%	66.7%
	N	20	26	20	21
Other	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	24.0%	25.5%	24.6%	24.1%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	76.0%	74.5%	75.4%	75.9%
	N	217	184	191	137

Table 9.35: South Carolina: Immigration Reform by Income

Income Bracket	Response	2-Oct	9-Oct	16-Oct	23-Oct
\$0-49,999	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	19.1%	19.3%	18.3%	19.5%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	80.9%	80.7%	81.7%	80.5%
	N	779	685	557	426
\$50,000-99,999	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	22.7%	20.4%	25.9%	21.9%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	77.3%	79.6%	74.1%	78.1%
	N	890	814	715	540
\$100,000+	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	26.7%	27.7%	29.7%	27.9%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	73.3%	72.3%	70.3%	72.1%
	N	629	596	488	376
Income Unknown	Allow Immigrants to be Legal	20.8%	22.1%	22.3%	23.2%
	Stop Flow of Illegals	79.2%	77.9%	77.7%	76.8%
	N	413	416	350	280

9.8 Television Viewership

On the weekends of October 16th and October 23rd, we conducted surveys among likely voters to determine television viewership modes in Florida. We asked the respondent to pick their primary source of television in their household. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

Television viewership for likely Republicans in South Carolina is very different from previous reads. Approximately 30% of viewership comes from TV, a surprising 29% comes from TV over internet, 22% from broadcast, and 11% from satellite. The number of TV over internet is the highest from any segment reads. Interestingly, the number of TV over the internet is approximately 30% across all age groups. It is the highest form of viewership for the age 18-34 cohort and for the 35-54 cohort, by a very small margin. Predictably, cable broadcast is the highest form of viewership for the 55+ age group, followed by broadcast television (see Table 9.36 and 9.37).

Cable television is the highest form of viewership across both genders. Around 30% of both genders watch cable. Then it is followed by TV over the internet, which is around 29% for males and 28% for females. Then it is followed by broadcast and satellite TV. This pattern is the same for all the ethnic groups (again, Hispanic and Black samples were too low to state anything conclusively; see Table 9.38 and 9.39).

For income groups, people who make under \$50,000 primarily watch cable television (31%), followed by TV over internet (27%). The \$50-99,999 income group is split evenly when it comes to cable television and TV over internet, with 30% for each mode. The highest income group have the highest viewership of TV over internet, at 32%, followed by cable television (28%). It appears as we climb up the income brackets, TV over internet becomes likelier to be the mode of watching television (see Table 9.40).

Table 9.36: South Carolina: Television Viewership by Party

Party	Response	16-Oct	23-Oct
Republican	Cable Subscription	25.9%	35.2%
	Satellite Subscription	7.7%	15.1%
	Broadcast TV	23.7%	20.9%
	TV over Internet	35.4%	22.5%
	No TV in Home	7.3%	6.3%
	N	2,638	2,086

Table 9.37: South Carolina: Television Viewership by Age

Age Group	Response	16-Oct	23-Oct
18-34	Cable Subscription	22.3%	34.9%
	Satellite Subscription	6.6%	18.0%
	Broadcast TV	27.0%	19.0%
	TV over Internet	37.4%	21.7%
	No TV in Home	6.6%	6.3%
	N	211	189
35-54	Cable Subscription	28.3%	31.5%
	Satellite Subscription	7.7%	15.3%
	Broadcast TV	20.1%	22.2%
	TV over Internet	35.0%	24.2%
	No TV in Home	8.9%	6.9%
	N	831	744
55+	Cable Subscription	25.1%	37.6%
	Satellite Subscription	7.8%	14.4%
	Broadcast TV	25.2%	20.5%
	TV over Internet	35.4%	21.5%
	No TV in Home	6.5%	6.0%
	N	1,596	1,153

Table 9.38: South Carolina: Television Viewership by Gender

Gender	Response	16-Oct	23-Oct
Female	Cable Subscription	23.0%	36.9%
	Satellite Subscription	8.4%	15.5%
	Broadcast TV	24.9%	20.5%
	TV over Internet	36.2%	20.5%
	No TV in Home	7.4%	6.5%
	N	1,311	994
Male	Cable Subscription	28.6%	33.6%
	Satellite Subscription	7.0%	14.7%
	Broadcast TV	22.5%	21.3%
	TV over Internet	34.7%	24.3%
	No TV in Home	7.2%	6.1%
	N	1,327	1,092

Table 9.39: South Carolina: Television Viewership by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	16-Oct	23-Oct
White	Cable Subscription	25.8%	34.8%
	Satellite Subscription	7.7%	15.2%
	Broadcast TV	23.7%	21.6%
	TV over Internet	35.5%	22.6%
	No TV in Home	7.4%	5.8%
	N	2,349	1,850
Black	Cable Subscription	26.5%	36.0%
	Satellite Subscription	8.8%	20.0%
	Broadcast TV	23.5%	20.0%
	TV over Internet	35.3%	24.0%
	No TV in Home	5.9%	0.0%
	N	34	25
Hispanic	Cable Subscription	25.9%	41.4%
	Satellite Subscription	0.0%	13.8%
	Broadcast TV	33.3%	13.8%
	TV over Internet	22.2%	6.9%
	No TV in Home	18.5%	24.1%
	N	27	29
Other	Cable Subscription	26.8%	38.5%
	Satellite Subscription	8.3%	13.2%
	Broadcast TV	23.2%	15.9%
	TV over Internet	36.8%	23.1%
	No TV in Home	4.8%	9.3%
	N	228	182

Table 9.40: South Carolina: Television Viewership by Income

Income Bracket	Response	16-Oct	23-Oct
\$0-49,999	Cable Subscription	25.6%	37.0%
	Satellite Subscription	10.0%	15.7%
	Broadcast TV	25.6%	19.3%
	TV over Internet	32.2%	21.1%
	No TV in Home	6.6%	6.9%
	N	671	554
\$50,000-99,999	Cable Subscription	26.3%	34.8%
	Satellite Subscription	7.5%	15.1%
	Broadcast TV	21.7%	21.0%
	TV over Internet	36.2%	23.8%
	No TV in Home	8.3%	5.4%
	N	905	682
\$100,000+	Cable Subscription	23.5%	33.8%
	Satellite Subscription	6.4%	11.7%
	Broadcast TV	24.2%	22.9%
	TV over Internet	38.2%	24.7%
	No TV in Home	7.7%	6.9%
	N	608	494
Income Unknown	Cable Subscription	28.4%	35.1%
	Satellite Subscription	6.4%	18.5%
	Broadcast TV	24.4%	20.8%
	TV over Internet	35.0%	19.1%
	No TV in Home	5.7%	6.5%
	N	454	356

10 Florida

10.1 Government's Role in Creating Jobs

From August 24th to October 2nd, we conducted surveys among likely voters to gauge their sentiment on government and the economy. We asked if people feel that the government should do less and get out of the way for businesses to create jobs or if the government should do more and ensure that everyone gets their fair share of the economy. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

Regarding age, there is little difference between the three age groups (18-34, 35-54, 55+) as shown in Figure 1.2. All of these age groups prefer the government to do less and get out of the way over a more activist government. On average, 55% of all the age groups agree that the government should do less. Older age cohorts prefer a more free market approach to job creation than the 18-34 age group by 3-4% (see Table 10.1).

Both men and women in Florida, across all reads, prefer a less active government than a more active one. However, the divide between the opinions is starker among men. On average, 60.2% of men prefer the government, while for women, it is 54.1%. This may be due to the fact that women are more likely to be Democrat, which favor a more active government in job creation (see Table 10.3).

Almost 2/3rds of all Whites believe in a less activist government, while 19.9% of Blacks hold the same beliefs. Surprisingly, Hispanics and 'Others' prefer a less activist government as well. Only Blacks prefer a more active government (see Table 10.4).

Opinions on this question do not appear to vary significantly between income groups. Unsurprisingly, people who make more than \$100,000 a year strongly support a less active government more so than other income groups (65% vs. 55% and 53%, respectively). This may be due to the fact that higher income people are more likely to reject an active government. Even lower income people support a less active government (albeit by a thin margin, 53-47). The trend remains the same for people who we do not have income data for (see Table 10.5).

Table 10.1: Florida: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Party

Party	Response	24-Aug	4-Sep	11-Sep	18-Sep	25-Sep	2-Oct
Democratic	Less	33.1%	29.6%	30.2%	32.3%	28.9%	29.0%
	More	66.9%	70.4%	69.8%	67.7%	71.1%	71.0%
	N	1,258	602	480	808	415	803
Republican	Less	86.2%	78.8%	79.5%	79.1%	77.4%	80.0%
	More	13.8%	21.2%	20.5%	20.9%	22.6%	20.0%
	N	1,529	707	567	882	562	998
Non-Partisan	Less	58.9%	45.1%	63.2%	55.3%	48.9%	53.8%
	More	41.1%	54.9%	36.8%	44.7%	51.1%	46.2%
	N	630	244	201	197	135	236
Other	Less	50.0%	66.7%	66.7%	56.1%	53.3%	61.3%
	More	50.0%	33.3%	33.3%	43.9%	46.7%	38.7%
	N	4	3	18	180	15	31

Table 10.2: Florida: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Party

Age Group	Response	24-Aug	4-Sep	11-Sep	18-Sep	25-Sep	2-Oct
18-34	Less	64.6%	47.0%	54.6%	49.0%	53.8%	56.2%
	More	35.4%	53.0%	45.4%	51.0%	46.3%	43.8%
	N	573	168	163	157	80	235
35-54	Less	56.6%	57.9%	60.1%	61.0%	56.8%	55.5%
	More	43.4%	42.1%	39.9%	39.0%	43.2%	44.5%
	N	769	561	451	630	368	782
55+	Less	62.7%	53.6%	57.5%	55.3%	55.5%	58.1%
	More	37.3%	46.4%	42.5%	44.7%	44.5%	41.9%
	N	2,079	827	652	1,280	679	1,051

Table 10.3: Florida: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Gender

Gender	Response	24-Aug	4-Sep	11-Sep	18-Sep	25-Sep	2-Oct
Female	Less	58.3%	52.3%	55.5%	54.0%	53.2%	51.5%
	More	41.7%	47.7%	44.5%	46.0%	46.8%	48.5%
	N	1,517	799	620	1,055	558	1,026
Male	Less	64.3%	56.7%	60.5%	59.2%	58.3%	62.3%
	More	35.7%	43.3%	39.5%	40.8%	41.7%	37.7%
	N	1,904	757	646	1,012	569	1,042

Table 10.4: Florida: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	24-Aug	4-Sep	11-Sep	18-Sep	25-Sep	2-Oct
White	Less	67.4%	60.9%	63.8%	62.5%	60.8%	62.6%
	More	32.6%	39.1%	36.2%	37.5%	39.2%	37.4%
	N	2,601	1,083	907	1,526	830	1,489
Black	Less	20.9%	17.9%	24.6%	17.1%	19.3%	19.4%
	More	79.1%	82.1%	75.4%	82.9%	80.7%	80.6%
	N	335	173	142	222	109	222
Hispanic	Less	59.2%	54.9%	54.8%	59.9%	54.3%	57.7%
	More	40.8%	45.1%	45.2%	40.1%	45.7%	42.3%
	N	206	153	104	137	94	168
Other	Less	58.8%	49.0%	56.6%	52.2%	55.3%	55.6%
	More	41.2%	51.0%	43.4%	47.8%	44.7%	44.4%
	N	279	147	113	182	94	189

Table 10.5: Florida: Government's Role in Creating Jobs by Income

Income Group	Response	24-Aug	4-Sep	11-Sep	18-Sep	25-Sep	2-Oct
\$0-49,999	Less	57.8%	49.6%	53.2%	51.5%	51.8%	54.1%
	More	42.2%	50.4%	46.8%	48.5%	48.2%	45.9%
	N	1,036	466	408	678	363	604
\$50,000-99,999	Less	63.1%	52.5%	58.4%	58.5%	58.6%	55.2%
	More	36.9%	47.5%	41.6%	41.5%	41.4%	44.8%
	N	1,062	457	351	593	350	625
\$100,000+	Less	67.6%	62.0%	66.7%	62.4%	67.0%	63.7%
	More	32.4%	38.0%	33.3%	37.6%	33.0%	36.3%
	N	657	334	252	441	209	397
Income Unknown	Less	59.3%	56.5%	56.9%	55.8%	46.8%	57.0%
	More	40.7%	43.5%	43.1%	44.2%	53.2%	43.0%
	N	666	299	255	355	205	442

10.2 Marriage Equality

On the weekends of July 31st and August 17th, we conducted surveys among likely voters to gauge their sentiment on marriage equality. We asked if respondents believe that gay couples should have the right to be married in Florida. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

The issue of gay marriage is predictably split along partisan lines. A majority of Republicans oppose gay marriage, while Democrats support it overwhelmingly. Interestingly enough, the ratio of Republicans and Democrats that hold contrary beliefs to their party's platform is the same (29% of Republicans support gay marriage, while 31.6% of Democrats oppose it). A majority of Non-Partisans support gay marriage, similar to those from other parties (see Table 10.6).

Interestingly, young people's support for gay marriage is actually very small (2-3% points). Given the trend that gay marriage is becoming more acceptable, especially among young people, this data seems to be questionable. It is possible because the survey conducts only on landlines and young people who have land lines are very different from young people with cell phones. People who are 35-54 years old support gay marriage by a larger margin (6%, if you average out the reads). People who are older than 55 years old strongly oppose gay marriage (see Table 10.7).

Among different genders, there is a clear split. More females support gay marriage than oppose it, with approximately 9% of the sample unsure. Men, on the other hand, oppose gay marriage (51% oppose, 40% support, with 9% unsure) (See Table 10.8).

A larger majority of Whites support gay marriage than oppose it. People who were identified as other races support gay marriage to a larger extent than Whites (57% support for other races vs. 44% for Whites). A larger share of Blacks and Hispanics oppose gay marriage, although opposition to gay marriage is much stronger in Blacks. Hispanics oppose gay marriage by a slimmer margin (46%-43%, with 11% unsure). It is interesting to see Blacks show such strong opposition to gay marriage, even while a vast majority of them belong to the Democratic Party (See Table 10.9).

Among income groups, there is almost no discernable pattern. For the most part, we see 45% of respondents supporting gay marriage and 46% oppose. The \$100,000+ income group supports gay marriage by a much larger margin than the other groups. For the most part, we see there is an even split, for instance the Income Unknown group sees almost an even 46-46% split (See Table 10.10).

Table 10.6: Florida: Gay Marriage by Party

Party	Response	31-Jul	17-Aug
Democratic	Support	61.7%	60.4%
	Oppose	31.1%	32.0%
	Unsure	7.2%	7.7%
	N	1,593	4,304
Republican	Support	29.2%	28.9%
	Oppose	61.5%	62.7%
	Unsure	9.3%	8.4%
	N	1,730	5,034
Non-Partisan	Support	50.7%	53.8%
	Oppose	36.1%	37.5%
	Unsure	13.2%	8.6%
	N	363	823
Other	Support	0.0%	52.6%
	Oppose	0.0%	26.3%
	Unsure	0.0%	21.1%
	N	-	19

Table 10.7: Florida: Gay Marriage by Age

Age Group	Response	31-Jul	17-Aug
18-34	Support	45.0%	47.2%
	Oppose	43.1%	44.0%
	Unsure	11.9%	8.8%
	N	160	352
35-54	Support	50.4%	45.7%
	Oppose	39.9%	45.6%
	Unsure	9.7%	8.7%
	N	764	2,106
55+	Support	44.0%	43.7%
	Oppose	47.7%	48.3%
	Unsure	8.3%	7.9%
	N	2,762	7,722

Table 10.8: Florida: Gay Marriage by Gender

Gender	Response	31-Jul	17-Aug
Female	Support	48.8%	47.4%
	Oppose	41.6%	43.8%
	Unsure	9.6%	8.8%
	N	2,060	5,645
Male	Support	41.0%	40.4%
	Oppose	51.4%	52.3%
	Unsure	7.7%	7.3%
	N	1,626	4,535

Table 10.9: Florida: Gay Marriage by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	31-Jul	17-Aug
White	Support	45.3%	43.7%
	Oppose	46.4%	48.8%
	Unsure	8.3%	7.5%
	N	2,849	7,911
Black	Support	35.2%	36.8%
	Oppose	53.6%	50.3%
	Unsure	11.1%	12.9%
	N	332	889
Hispanic	Support	42.9%	44.0%
	Oppose	46.0%	47.5%
	Unsure	11.1%	8.5%
	N	198	562
Other	Support	58.6%	57.8%
	Oppose	32.6%	33.6%
	Unsure	8.8%	8.6%
	N	307	818

Table 10.10: Florida: Gay Marriage by Income

Income Bracket	Response	31-Jul	17-Aug
\$0-49,999	Support	45.3%	43.7%
	Oppose	46.4%	48.8%
	Unsure	8.3%	7.5%
	N	1,378	3,869
\$50,000-99,999	Support	45.2%	45.2%
	Oppose	45.8%	47.0%
	Unsure	9.0%	7.7%
	N	1,055	2,891
\$100,000+	Support	50.7%	47.2%
	Oppose	41.7%	44.7%
	Unsure	7.5%	8.1%
	N	690	1,840
Income Unknown	Support	46.2%	45.1%
	Oppose	45.6%	45.8%
	Unsure	8.2%	9.1%
	N	563	1,580

10.3 Immigration Reform

We approached this topic using two different questions. From July 31st to August 17th, we asked for people's support of immigration reform on a scale from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree. After August 17th to October 2nd, we gauged the respondent's policy position on how to approach immigration reform - either finding a legal pathway for illegals or provide amnesty or to enforce current border laws and deportations. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

Within parties, we see there is another clear split. Almost 66% of Democrats support or strongly support immigration reform. Republicans, surprisingly, are not that united when it comes to immigration reform, which around 53% oppose or strongly oppose immigration reform. Interestingly enough, when we offer policy solutions such as "Securing borders and enforcing existing immigration laws" vs. "Bringing Immigrants Out," we see a strong showing of Republicans preferring by a huge margin (90% for the former vs. 10% for the latter option). Non-Partisans skewed slightly towards immigration reform with 50-55% supporting or strongly supporting immigration reform. Oddly enough, Non-Partisans strongly favor securing our borders and enforcing existing immigration law by a huge margin (81-19%; see Tables 10.11 and 10.12).

Among different age groups, there have been some interesting patterns. Both the youngest and the oldest age group support or strongly support immigration reform at very similar levels (51.5% and 51.3%, respectively). The 35-54 age group support or strongly support at a slightly higher level, at 53%. All age groups support or strongly support immigration reform than oppose it for all age cohorts. Interestingly, enough when we present the policy options, all three groups overwhelming pick enforcing current laws and securing the border. It appears that all age group agree that there should be immigration reform, but that reform should be tailored in not providing amnesty. However, it is important to note that the youngest group support bringing illegals out at much higher level than the other two groups (see Tables 10.13 and 10.14).

Women are more likely to support or strongly support immigration reform by a 5-6% points over men. Men hold the same margin over women when it comes to opposing or strongly opposing immigration reform. Again, when we present policy options, there is almost no difference between men and women. Both genders support enforcing immigration laws and securing our borders over bringing illegal immigrants out by a wide margin (85-15%; see Table 10.15 and 10.16).

Among different ethnicities, Whites do not support or strongly support immigration reform as the same level as other ethnicities. Surprisingly enough, Blacks are the strongest proponents of immigration reform with approximately 68% supporting or strongly supporting immigration reform, followed by Hispanics (58.3%) and Other (58.0%). With policy proposals, Blacks are still the strong opponents of enforcing laws and securing borders with only around 53% choosing this option. This starkly contrasts with Whites (89%), Hispanics (67%), and Other (82%; see Table 10.17 and Table 10.18).

There is a pattern with income—as a person gets older the more likely they are to support or strongly support immigration reform. However, it is noteworthy to point out

that across all income groups, a majority support immigration reform. Unsurprisingly, we see the same pattern when it comes to the policy question. An average of 85% across all income groups support enforcing border and immigration laws over bringing immigrants out (see Tables 10.19 and 10.20).

Table 10.11: Florida: Immigration Reform by Party, Part A

Party	Response	31-Jul	7-Aug	17-Aug
Democratic	Strongly Agree	35.8%	38.7%	37.1%
	Somewhat Agree	28.7%	28.4%	28.7%
	Somewhat Disagree	12.7%	14.1%	14.1%
	Strongly Disagree	10.9%	11.3%	11.1%
	No Opinion	11.9%	7.5%	9.1%
	N	1,611	1,528	4,380
Republican	Strongly Agree	18.7%	16.6%	15.4%
	Somewhat Agree	20.8%	23.3%	23.7%
	Somewhat Disagree	19.6%	22.8%	23.0%
	Strongly Disagree	32.3%	31.8%	30.4%
	No Opinion	8.5%	5.5%	7.5%
	N	1,757	1,791	5,115
Non-Partisan	Strongly Agree	23.9%	28.9%	25.7%
	Somewhat Agree	25.3%	27.0%	26.1%
	Somewhat Disagree	17.7%	16.9%	18.1%
	Strongly Disagree	23.9%	21.1%	21.7%
	No Opinion	9.2%	6.1%	8.4%
	N	368	492	834
Other	Strongly Agree	0.0%	0.0%	10.5%
	Somewhat Agree	0.0%	0.0%	31.6%
	Somewhat Disagree	0.0%	0.0%	10.5%
	Strongly Disagree	0.0%	0.0%	47.4%
	No Opinion	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	N	-	-	19

Table 10.12: Florida: Immigration Reform by Party, Part B

Party	Response	24-Aug	4-Sep	11-Sep	18-Sep	25-Sep	2-Oct
Democratic	Bringing Immigrants Out	22.0%	30.9%	33.3%	24.5%	26.3%	22.0%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	78.0%	69.1%	66.7%	75.5%	73.7%	63.1%
	Neither						14.9%
	N	232	136	123	143	57	141
Republican	Bringing Immigrants Out	5.8%	5.6%	7.6%	6.8%	5.7%	6.9%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	94.2%	94.4%	92.4%	93.2%	94.3%	87.4%
	Neither						5.7%
	N	572	287	249	353	192	404
Non-Partisan	Bringing Immigrants Out	12.7%	17.6%	26.2%	12.3%	12.5%	15.7%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	87.3%	82.4%	73.8%	87.7%	87.5%	69.9%
	Neither						14.5%
	N	212	85	61	65	32	83
Other	Bringing Immigrants Out	0.0%	0.0%	28.6%	9.8%	0.0%	7.7%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	100.0%	100.0%	71.4%	90.2%	100.0%	92.3%
	Neither						0%
	N	1	1	7	61	5	13

Table 10.13: Florida: Immigration Reform by Age, Part A

Age Group	Response	31-Jul	7-Aug	17-Aug
18-34	Strongly Agree	27.2%	33.4%	32.2%
	Somewhat Agree	21.0%	23.2%	17.6%
	Somewhat Disagree	16.0%	13.9%	20.2%
	Strongly Disagree	23.5%	23.5%	21.0%
	No Opinion	12.3%	6.0%	9.0%
	N	162	302	357
35-54	Strongly Agree	29.2%	28.9%	26.3%
	Somewhat Agree	24.4%	26.1%	24.1%
	Somewhat Disagree	15.3%	15.8%	18.0%
	Strongly Disagree	21.9%	23.6%	23.2%
	No Opinion	9.3%	5.6%	8.3%
	N	778	1,408	2,146
55+	Strongly Agree	25.8%	24.9%	24.9%
	Somewhat Agree	25.0%	26.0%	26.9%
	Somewhat Disagree	16.8%	21.1%	18.9%
	Strongly Disagree	22.3%	21.0%	21.1%
	No Opinion	10.2%	6.9%	8.2%
	N	2,796	2,101	7,845

Table 10.14: Florida: Immigration Reform by Age, Part B

Age Group	Response	24-Aug	4-Sep	11-Sep	18-Sep	25-Sep	2-Oct
18-34	Bringing Immigrants Out	19.00%	11.50%	23.5%	14.0%	31.3%	21.9%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	81.00%	88.50%	76.5%	86.0%	68.8%	68.5%
	Neither						9.6%
	N	142	52	34	43	16	73
35-54	Bringing Immigrants Out	15.8%	18.0%	20.6%	13.9%	13.8%	8.1%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	84.2%	82.0%	79.4%	86.1%	86.2%	78.6%
	Neither						13.3%
	N	183	150	131	166	87	210
55+	Bringing Immigrants Out	7.9%	13.0%	15.6%	10.7%	7.1%	11.2%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	92.1%	87.0%	84.4%	89.3%	92.9%	83.0%
	Neither						5.9%
	N	692	307	275	413	183	358

Table 10.15: Florida: Immigration Reform by Gender, Part A

Gender	Response	31-Jul	7-Aug	17-Aug
Female	Strongly Agree	26.8%	27.5%	25.5%
	Somewhat Agree	26.0%	27.3%	27.5%
	Somewhat Disagree	16.8%	18.5%	18.9%
	Strongly Disagree	18.3%	19.7%	18.0%
	No Opinion	12.1%	7.0%	10.1%
	N	2,087	1,972	5,745
Male	Strongly Agree	26.3%	26.6%	25.3%
	Somewhat Agree	23.0%	24.3%	24.1%
	Somewhat Disagree	15.9%	18.7%	18.7%
	Strongly Disagree	27.3%	24.8%	25.9%
	No Opinion	7.5%	5.7%	5.9%
	N	1,649	1,839	4,603

Table 10.16: Florida: Immigration Reform by Gender, Part B

Gender	Response	24-Aug	4-Sep	11-Sep	18-Sep	25-Sep	2-Oct
Female	Bringing Immigrants Out	11.6%	15.4%	17.4%	10.9%	13.0%	12.2%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	88.4%	84.6%	82.6%	89.1%	87.0%	77.3%
	Neither						10.5%
	N	415	272	219	303	138	304
Male	Bringing Immigrants Out	10.5%	13.1%	18.1%	12.5%	8.1%	10.7%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	89.5%	86.9%	81.9%	87.5%	91.9%	82.2%
	Neither						7.1%
	N	602	237	221	319	148	337

Table 10.17: Florida: Immigration Reform by Ethnicity, Part A

Ethnicity	Response	31-Jul	7-Aug	17-Aug
White	Strongly Agree	24.3%	24.0%	22.7%
	Somewhat Agree	24.2%	25.3%	25.7%
	Somewhat Disagree	17.5%	20.1%	19.7%
	Strongly Disagree	24.8%	24.5%	24.3%
	No Opinion	9.2%	6.1%	7.5%
	N	2,885	2,841	8,027
Black	Strongly Agree	37.7%	42.9%	40.4%
	Somewhat Agree	27.3%	29.2%	27.9%
	Somewhat Disagree	11.0%	10.6%	13.6%
	Strongly Disagree	7.1%	7.7%	4.9%
	No Opinion	16.9%	9.6%	13.2%
	N	337	312	915
Hispanic	Strongly Agree	30.9%	36.6%	32.5%
	Somewhat Agree	25.5%	24.8%	24.5%
	Somewhat Disagree	15.7%	13.1%	18.8%
	Strongly Disagree	19.1%	19.1%	14.3%
	No Opinion	8.8%	6.4%	9.9%
	N	204	314	575
Other	Strongly Agree	32.9%	29.1%	30.6%
	Somewhat Agree	25.5%	28.2%	27.8%
	Somewhat Disagree	13.2%	18.3%	15.3%
	Strongly Disagree	17.1%	18.9%	18.1%
	No Opinion	11.3%	5.5%	8.3%
	N	310	344	831

Table 10.18: Florida: Immigration Reform by Ethnicity, Part B

Ethnicity	Response	24-Aug	4-Sep	11-Sep	18-Sep	25-Sep	2-Oct
White	Bringing Immigrants Out	8.7%	12.0%	14.6%	8.7%	8.3%	8.1%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	91.3%	88.0%	85.4%	91.3%	91.7%	84.6%
	Neither						7.3%
	N	870	416	357	517	242	519
Black	Bringing Immigrants Out	38.2%	55.0%	45.0%	36.4%	60.0%	31.0%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	61.8%	45.0%	55.0%	63.6%	40.0%	55.2%
	Neither						13.8%
	N	34	20	20	22	5	29
Hispanic	Bringing Immigrants Out	27.3%	25.8%	41.7%	28.2%	29.4%	31.4%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	72.7%	74.2%	58.3%	71.8%	70.6%	54.3%
	Neither						14.3%
	N	44	31	24	39	17	35
Other	Bringing Immigrants Out	14.5%	9.5%	17.9%	20.5%	9.1%	19.0%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	85.5%	90.5%	82.1%	79.5%	90.9%	65.5%
	Neither						15.5%
	N	69	42	39	44	22	58

Table 10.19: Florida: Immigration Reform by Income, Part A

Income Group	Response	31-Jul	7-Aug	17-Aug
\$0-49,999	Strongly Agree	25.4%	26.0%	24.3%
	Somewhat Agree	24.6%	24.9%	26.0%
	Somewhat Disagree	17.2%	21.1%	19.6%
	Strongly Disagree	21.3%	20.8%	19.9%
	N	1,395	1,209	3,950
\$50,000-99,999	Strongly Agree	26.8%	26.4%	25.8%
	Somewhat Agree	23.7%	24.9%	26.3%
	Somewhat Disagree	16.2%	19.0%	18.2%
	Strongly Disagree	24.2%	23.1%	22.9%
	No Opinion	9.2%	6.5%	6.8%
	N	1,071	1,150	2,929
\$100,000+	Strongly Agree	28.2%	27.8%	25.5%
	Somewhat Agree	25.8%	30.3%	26.3%
	Somewhat Disagree	16.7%	16.1%	18.9%
	Strongly Disagree	22.9%	21.5%	23.1%
	No Opinion	6.5%	4.2%	6.3%
	N	695	758	1,865
Income Unknown	Strongly Agree	27.1%	29.3%	27.6%
	Somewhat Agree	25.4%	24.1%	25.3%
	Somewhat Disagree	14.8%	16.0%	17.8%
	Strongly Disagree	20.2%	23.8%	21.1%
	No Opinion	12.5%	6.9%	8.1%
	N	575	694	1,604

Table 10.20: Florida: Immigration Reform by Income, Part B

Income Group	Response	24-Aug	4-Sep	11-Sep	18-Sep	25-Sep	2-Oct
\$0-49,999	Bringing Immigrants Out	8.8%	15.0%	12.3%	11.7%	13.4%	12.2%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	91.2%	85.0%	87.7%	88.3%	86.6%	81.4%
	Neither						6.4%
	N	328	167	130	205	82	172
\$50,000-99,999	Bringing Immigrants Out	12.3%	12.9%	21.9%	10.9%	10.0%	12.2%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	87.7%	87.1%	78.1%	89.1%	90.0%	77.6%
	Neither						10.2%
	N	301	163	128	183	90	196
\$100,000+	Bringing Immigrants Out	11.1%	16.3%	14.3%	11.9%	7.7%	9.2%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	88.9%	83.7%	85.7%	88.1%	92.3%	81.6%
	Neither						9.2%
	N	217	92	84	134	65	141
Income Unknown	Bringing Immigrants Out	12.3%	13.8%	22.4%	13.0%	10.2%	11.4%
	Enforcing Laws and Securing Borders	87.7%	86.2%	77.6%	87.0%	89.8%	79.5%
	Neither						9.1%
	N	171	87	98	100	49	132

10.4 Television Viewership

On the weekends of October 16th and October 23rd, we conducted surveys among likely voters to determine television viewership modes in Florida. We asked respondents to pick the primary source of television in their household. Below are the results of that question broken down by party affiliation, age, gender, ethnicity, and income groups.

There is almost no difference in TV watching between parties. Interestingly enough, Democrats have the highest broadcast television viewership. It is also important to point out that a higher percentage of Republicans have Internet only TV than Democrats (although it is by a small margin, 1-2%). Those who are Non-Partisans or identify with other parties have a much higher rate of internet-only television (22% and 26%, respectively; see Table 10.21).

An analysis of TV viewership methods between age group yielded some very counter-intuitive results. For instance, the number of broadcast TV viewership between all three age groups is roughly the same (35%), while the 55+ age cohort have a slightly higher Internet TV viewership over the 18-34 (by 0.2%, well within the margin of error). For all age groups, cable TV still remains as king, garnering around 35% of all TV viewership. Impressively, the 35-54 age group has the highest percentage of Internet TV viewership and lowest satellite subscription (see Table 10.22).

There are some notable patterns within gender. Females have a higher rate of subscribing to satellite and broadcast TV, while males have a higher rate of subscribing to cable television. Regarding internet TV, both are well within the margin of error and are only separated by less than 1%. Blacks, Hispanics, and “Others” have a higher rate of cable subscription than Whites. Whites have the highest rate of broadcast only television. Surprisingly, people who identify as White have the highest rate of TV over internet (21% vs. 19.6% for Blacks vs. 20.2% for Hispanics vs. 19.4% for Other; see Table 10.24).

Television viewership between each income group is pretty similar. Cable television account for a little bit over a third of television viewership for all groups. This is followed by broadcast TV, which has 25%, and then TV over internet, which captures 20% of the share (see Table 10.25).

Table 10.21: Florida: Television Viewership by Party

Party	Response	16-Oct	23-Oct
Democratic	Cable Subscription	37.5%	34.5%
	Satellite Subscription	16.5%	16.7%
	Broadcast TV	22.6%	23.1%
	TV over Internet	18.6%	21.1%
	No TV in Home	4.8%	4.7%
	N	1,599	1,603
Republican	Cable Subscription	35.1%	35.6%
	Satellite Subscription	15.3%	13.7%
	Broadcast TV	25.3%	24.7%
	TV over Internet	20.6%	21.4%
	No TV in Home	3.7%	4.5%
	N	1,767	1,944
Non-Partisan	Cable Subscription	32.7%	34.4%
	Satellite Subscription	15.6%	12.7%
	Broadcast TV	23.6%	24.1%
	TV over Internet	24.1%	21.0%
	No TV in Home	4.0%	7.9%
	N	474	457
Other	Cable Subscription	29.5%	39.5%
	Satellite Subscription	13.1%	21.1%
	Broadcast TV	21.3%	10.5%
	TV over Internet	31.1%	21.1%
	No TV in Home	4.9%	7.9%
	N	61	38

Table 10.22: Florida: Television Viewership by Age

Age Group	Response	16-Oct	23-Oct
18-34	Cable Subscription	35.5%	39.6%
	Satellite Subscription	16.7%	11.6%
	Broadcast TV	25.1%	21.5%
	TV over Internet	17.6%	20.8%
	No TV in Home	5.1%	6.5%
	N	335	414
35-54	Cable Subscription	36.7%	33.6%
	Satellite Subscription	14.5%	12.7%
	Broadcast TV	21.8%	23.4%
	TV over Internet	22.0%	25.0%
	No TV in Home	5.0%	5.3%
	N	1,388	1,370
55+	Cable Subscription	35.1%	35.1%
	Satellite Subscription	16.5%	16.7%
	Broadcast TV	25.1%	24.6%
	TV over Internet	19.7%	19.0%
	No TV in Home	3.6%	4.5%
	N	2,178	2,258

Table 10.23: Florida: Television Viewership by Gender

Gender	Response	16-Oct	23-Oct
Female	Cable Subscription	34.7%	33.9%
	Satellite Subscription	16.7%	15.5%
	Broadcast TV	24.2%	24.5%
	TV over Internet	20.1%	21.5%
	No TV in Home	4.4%	4.7%
	N	2,123	2,158
Male	Cable Subscription	37.0%	36.4%
	Satellite Subscription	14.7%	14.1%
	Broadcast TV	23.6%	23.2%
	TV over Internet	20.8%	20.9%
	No TV in Home	3.9%	5.4%
	N	1,778	1,884

Table 10.24: Florida: Television Viewership by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Response	16-Oct	23-Oct
White	Cable Subscription	35.0%	35.4%
	Satellite Subscription	15.1%	14.4%
	Broadcast TV	24.3%	24.3%
	TV over Internet	21.3%	21.1%
	No TV in Home	4.3%	4.8%
	N	2,879	3,000
Black	Cable Subscription	38.6%	32.0%
	Satellite Subscription	19.6%	18.8%
	Broadcast TV	20.9%	20.2%
	TV over Internet	16.4%	22.7%
	No TV in Home	4.6%	6.4%
	N	373	362
Hispanic	Cable Subscription	38.4%	33.4%
	Satellite Subscription	17.4%	16.6%
	Broadcast TV	20.6%	23.9%
	TV over Internet	19.2%	21.2%
	No TV in Home	4.3%	4.9%
	N	281	326
Other	Cable Subscription	36.4%	36.7%
	Satellite Subscription	16.0%	13.3%
	Broadcast TV	26.4%	24.0%
	TV over Internet	18.2%	20.6%
	No TV in Home	3.0%	5.4%
	N	368	354

Table 10.25: Florida: Television Viewership by Income

Income Bracket	Response	16-Oct	23-Oct
\$0-49,999	Cable Subscription	35.5%	33.6%
	Satellite Subscription	16.3%	17.3%
	Broadcast TV	24.8%	24.6%
	TV over Internet	20.1%	19.5%
	No TV in Home	3.4%	5.1%
	N	1,212	1,226
\$50,000-99,999	Cable Subscription	35.1%	35.5%
	Satellite Subscription	14.8%	12.9%
	Broadcast TV	25.0%	24.6%
	TV over Internet	20.5%	22.0%
	No TV in Home	4.6%	5.0%
	N	1,121	1,224
\$100,000+	Cable Subscription	36.1%	36.9%
	Satellite Subscription	14.3%	11.8%
	Broadcast TV	23.9%	23.0%
	TV over Internet	20.7%	23.7%
	No TV in Home	5.0%	4.6%
	N	812	834
Income Unknown	Cable Subscription	36.6%	34.6%
	Satellite Subscription	18.1%	17.4%
	Broadcast TV	21.0%	22.6%
	TV over Internet	20.2%	20.1%
	No TV in Home	4.0%	5.4%
	N	756	758

Part III

Case Studies

Media Consumption Drill-down in Texas

11

11.1 Overview

This analysis uses three commonly employed sets of strategies and tactics to illustrate how the general assumptions each relies on are incomplete, and the truths these strategies play at are actually more complex than they first appear. We also show how, using the correct tools and talent, campaigns and organizations can more accurately value their ads, as well as the strategies and tactics used to buy them, helping groups to improve the reach and the efficiency of their political messaging.

Campaigns and issue advocacy organizations spend money to get their messages in front of voters, and every cycle, the media focuses on the strategies and tactics they use to better communicate that message. Chief among the communication mediums covered by the media is TV spending, which often represents the majority of the money spent by a party, candidate or organization.

As more data related to political TV spending becomes available, our ability to check the underlying reasoning behind a number of popular buying strategies has been enhanced. This section introduces several of these strategies, and then, using new data from the very large Houston, Texas, market, evaluates them to determine their merit.

11.2 The Evolution Of A “New” Source Of TV Viewership Data

Campaigns, as well as commercial entities, have traditionally used Nielsen ratings to determine the value of a given ad slot. For decades, Nielsen has provided “ratings” for most major TV shows in major television markets. Simply said, a rating is an approximation of the audience watching a particular program. These ratings not only represent the viewers on a channel, but also a proxy television program’s price.

Nielsen represented the best information advertisers had for decades, but it had drawbacks.

For example, if Taco Bell wanted to target its audience outside of Nielsen’s established groups, it would face difficulties. While we claim no knowledge of Taco Bell’s true targets, let us suppose for a minute that Taco Bell wanted to reach low- to middle-income male Americans, aged 18-29, who live near a high concentration of Taco Bell franchises. Let’s call this the “actual target” Taco Bell wished to reach. The marketing department cut an ad that they believed would appeal to these “actual targets,” and then sought to deploy the ad across available TV channels to efficiently communicate with these targets.

This is where a problem arises: Nielsen ratings data are commonly produced in terms of age groupings. For example, a commonly used Nielsen metric is “adults 35+,” or those individuals 35 or older. These common ratings not only described what audiences were available, but also came to drive the pricing of the TV marketplace. So while Taco Bell sought to reach “actual targets,” the programming had been rated and priced in terms of Nielsen common audiences (such as adult 35+). This was a miss-match, but it was accepted because there was no better alternative available.

In a similar way, a political organization might seek to talk to registered voters who are likely to turn out, and who are unlikely to have already made up their minds about an election. While these are the individuals the political organization might want to communicate with, just like Taco Bell, the organization was stuck with the status quo: a market defined and priced by common Nielsen ratings.

This status quo was shifted as a side effect of other technological advances. As cable providers moved from analog to digital signals in the ‘90s and 2000s, the need arose for digital receivers at the “end point,” where TV was to be received and turned into an image for TV screens. You and I know these end points as the black boxes that sit under our TVs in our family rooms. While the primary purpose of the boxes was taking a complex data signal from a satellite or cable company and translating it into the images our TVs display, companies began to realize the tangential benefits of these boxes: the set-top-box knew which channel it was tuned to, which programs it recorded, and if a button on the user remote had been pushed. All this data could be sent back to the set-top-box provider.

Many of the set-top-box data providers came to realize a profitable use for this data: enhanced viewership intelligence. Where Nielsen pays consumers to understand what 500-1,000 individuals are watching in a given market to form their ratings, these set-top-box providers realized they were sitting on tens of thousands of users’ exact viewing histories—data that could be used to form ratings.

This data-set allows companies like Taco Bell to match a set of consumer targets (based on name, address, etc.) to set-top-box data. Utilizing the raw data provided by the set-top-boxes, Taco Bell can use data algorithms to sort and analyze this data. The end product of this analysis is a deep understanding of what their true targets are watching, and at what levels.

Similarly, campaigns no longer need to understand the market through the lens of common Nielsen viewership audiences—instead, campaigns can understand the TV market in terms of how many voters they actually want to communicate with are available, and at what times they are available.

The data sets provided by set-top-boxes are very rich. At their most detailed level, they are able to provide second-by-second tuner-viewing information for a given set-top-box. While the data can sometimes be messy (for example, boxes left on when TVs are left off, making it appear as if individuals watch TV for 12 hours straight; or a child watching TV at a box we associate with a parent), basic business rules can be used to clean up the data and make it very insightful.

11.3 The TV Assumptions We Examine

While the many firms that traditionally place political messaging on TVs utilize a number of diverse placement strategies, three tactical assumptions are held in common by many large players. We describe each of these three assumptions, in brief, below, and examine them more fully later in this report.

Assumption 1: Buying Prime Time Is Not Only “Worth It,” But Necessary

Prime time is the hours of the day when it is thought that the highest volume of Americans are watching TV—usually defined as 8 p.m.-10 p.m. As these hours have the highest levels of viewers, they are very often priced accordingly, representing the most expensive times to place an ad.

Firms argue that buying prime-time ads is a smart way to get to voters for three reasons: 1) prime time is a good value, because even though it is the most expensive, it draws the largest audiences; 2) prime time is particularly good at capturing hard-to-reach components of the electorate that are thought of as elusive; 3) prime time is uniquely guaranteed to be able to get to that portion of the electorate that consumes only prime-time content, and would miss your ads at other times.

Assumption 2: Broadcast News Represents A Particularly Efficient Way To Deliver Messaging To Voters

People often say that individuals who watch the news care about what’s going on, locally or nationally, and this interest results in higher voter-participation rates. Thus, the thinking goes, news program audiences have a naturally higher rate of voters than other programming, making buying ads in these time periods particularly valuable in terms of efficiency.

Assumption 3: Buying Live Sports, Such As Football, Is A Smart Move

With the advent and widespread adoption of DVR technology, many shows are recorded and watched at later dates. According to Leichtman Research,¹ 47% of households have DVR technology. Of those that have DVRs, many use DVRs to delay when they watch their TV content, as shown in Figure 11.1.

According to a recent YouGov study, 86% of people always fast-forward through ads while watching time-shifted shows. This suggests that large portions of TV audiences are not seeing the messaging that ad-buyers intend them to see.

Contrary to these trends, it is thought that sports programs are watched live at significantly higher rates. Since there is no way to skip over ads during live programming, it’s logical to assume that a higher proportion of ads placed during sport events are watched.

¹Leichtman Research Group. *On-Demand TV 2013: A Nationwide Study on VOD and DVRs — Twelfth Annual Study*. Available from: http://www.leichtmanresearch.com/research/on_demand_brochure.pdf

Distribution of digital video recorder (DVR) households in the U.S., by percentage of TV programs viewed using DVRs in May 2010




Figure 11.1: DVR Households (source: Centris Marketing Science, 2010)

11.4 Developing A Definition For “Worth It”

By now, it’s clear that these three claims build into their definition a notion of which ad-buys are “worth it.” The phrase is used in the political arena frequently, often without definition, and this likely leads to much of the disagreement related to political ad-buying strategy and tactics. To contemplate the assumptions we have listed above, and will explore in depth below, we will have to establish a definition for “worth it” – or, more accurately, for value.

To understand value in TV ad-targeting, a metric must be established that can serve as the yardstick to compare all potential strategies, tactics, and individual ad-buys against each other. To establish this common yardstick, we need to return to why a political campaign buys an ad in the first place, and attempt to measure how well a given ad achieves that original intention.

Political campaigns buy ads to deliver a particular message to a particular sub-set of the voting population. In the real world, campaigns and issue advocacy organizations are constrained by the finite budgets they can devote to communicate their message, so it is impossible to buy an ad at every possible opportunity to communicate with voters. Therefore, the purpose of an overall set of ad buys is to maximize the extent a particular message is delivered to a particular sub-set of voters using the available resources.

Given this line of thinking, some say we should simply be hunting for audience size when

planning ad-placement. This is the trap that many have fallen into in the political and issue-advocacy space as they race to achieve 1,000 Nielsen-point or 2,000 Nielsen-point ad-buys. These metrics are fundamentally about volume of impressions, and in the case of Nielsen points, volume of impressions on particular age groups of adults. This volume-centric view does not, however, help campaigns evaluate one ad opportunity against another.

Consider the example of a Kim Kardashian rerun attracting the same raw audience size as a daytime Dodgers game. From a volume perspective, the shows are equal, but surely they hold different values to a political effort.

To move beyond simplistic total-volume frameworks (e.g. Nielsen points), the key to developing a better metric is the realization that a political effort has very specific audiences it needs to message to. For example, the 2012 Obama campaign did not really want to message to all adults: The Obama campaign did not want to talk with unregistered voters who would not vote; did not want to talk to registered voters who could vote but who would not show up at the polls; and did not want to talk to voters who were hard partisans and had already made up their minds. What this means is that the Obama campaign, and others like it, were really interested in messaging to 5% or less of the total adult population watching TV.

So to understand if an ad is “worth it” or not, it is necessary to consider if the buy delivers large amounts of the sub-segment of voters the political effort is interested in messaging to. But focusing simply on the volume of these voters an ad delivers would be short-sighted as well.

When budgets are constrained, a good individual ad-purchase maximizes a limited TV budget’s reach. Therefore, the ad that costs \$500 and communicates with 1,000 voters is superior to the ad that costs \$1,000 and communicates with 1,000 voters. While both ads communicate with the same amount of voters, the former does so more efficiently, and leaves money available for other ad purchases—and more impressions on target voters.

This notion of efficiency leads to the primary metric when trying to value a given strategy or tactic—in other words, to determine if it’s “worth it.”

11.5 Value Metric = Cost Per Impression On Targeted Voter (SPIOTV)

Using cost-per-impression on targeted voter, we are able to evaluate the relative value of every ad opportunity in terms that truly align with the goals of a given political effort.

Here’s an example of how the relative value can be measured and compared: An ad that has a SPIOTV of \$.50 is better than an ad where the SPIOTV is \$1.00, because the former communicates more efficiently than the later, maximizing the reach of organization’s TV-spend budget. With this in mind, let’s explore the above three tactical assumptions held in common by many large players.

Assumption 1: Buying Prime Time Is ‘Worth It’ And Necessary

This assumption is justified by three sub-assumptions, which we will deal with individually.

Assumption 1A) Prime time is a good value; while it is true that it is the most expensive, it also draws the largest audiences, making it worth the added expense.

Consider the following graph (Figure 11.2), which shows the prices offered to political campaigns to buy ads on the NBC affiliate in Houston on a Wednesday during the fourth quarter.




Figure 11.2: Houston NBC Affiliate Prices

The graph shows the pricing by half-hour throughout the day. We have highlighted “prime time” in yellow. After quick inspection, the reader can quickly see that prime time represents some of the most expensive times to buy ads. To help start to determine value, below we’ve added in a red line that represents the total number of viewers watching the channel in the market. This number is calculated using the set-top-box data explained earlier.

For this particular channel, the introduction of the second line of data begins to chip away at assumption of prime time’s value. It appears that at the same time price is spiking, viewers are actually in a relative trough. In fact, when general efficiency (total viewers/cost) is calculated, we produce the efficiency plot in Figure 11.4.

This graph shows that NBC prime time in this market may be some of the least efficient time to buy a political ad. At this point, however, we have only considered gen-




Figure 11.3: Houston NBC Afiliate Prices: Selected Channel

eral efficiency. As discussed above, the value metric we are concerned with is cost-per-impression-on-targeted-voter. So next, we will consider two common types of campaigns, first establishing some “targeting” these hypothetical campaigns would pursue.

First, we’ll consider the case of a hypothetical Republican primary campaign in Texas. Often, these campaigns concentrate on introducing the candidate to the likely voter population. So we will say that this campaign is interested in targeting proven Republican primary voters. These individuals can be identified using a recently updated voter file, and passed to set-top-box data providers for matching to TV viewership data.

Second, we’ll consider a general election in Texas. Many modern campaigns now use modeling to isolate a “persuasion” universe, or universes that the campaign wishes to communicate with. But to avoid the debates related to modeling and its application in political efforts, we’ll define targeting without discussing the merits of particular modeling techniques.

Let’s assume a general campaign wants to talk to undecided voters. It is very difficult to look at a voter file and intuitively pick out undecided voters, but a process of elimination can be applied to isolate a pool of individuals that are likely to have relatively high concentrations of these types of undecided voters. For example, individuals who vote in primary elections tend to be relatively partisan. Individuals who are registered with a major party also happen to be relatively partisan. So if we take the voter file and remove those individuals who vote in primaries and those individuals who are registered to a party, we




Figure 11.4: Efficiency Plot

are left with a group of people we can expect to have a high concentration of undecided voters.

Also, the campaign is interested in talking to voters who will turn out for an election. Numerous academic studies have shown past-vote history to be a very good predictor of future voting, so we will further reduce our target universe to those who have a history of voting in general elections.

Now our targeting for a general election has become those individuals who don't vote in primaries (too partisan), are not registered to a major party (too partisan), but who do vote in general elections (likely voter).

Again, modern campaigns are capable of much more nuanced targeting, but these two pools of targeted voters allows us to skip longer discussions on the merits of particular modeling techniques, and instead focus on the discussion of selecting smart ad-buys.

By matching the targeted voters of these two types of campaigns to set-top-box data, we are able to plot the viewership of these types of voters, as shown below.

By taking into account price, we are able to plot efficiency by targeted voter audience.

From this graph, utilizing the valuation metric of cost-per-impression-on-targeted-voter, we can conclude that for these audiences on this channel in this market, prime time represents some of the worst times to purchase ads.




Figure 11.5: Viewership Plot

So, while there may still exist some prime-time content that is valuable in terms of CPIOTV, as a general rule, “buy prime time” is, at best, not generalizable.

Assumption 1B) Prime time is particularly valuable for capturing hard-to-reach components of the electorate, which are thought of as elusive.

In examining assumption 1A, we established efficiency— specifically CPIOTV— as a metric we can use to evaluate potential ad-buys. But a claim can be made that this metric is short-sighted.

Many say that the voters a political effort wishes to message are particularly elusive, and really only available in prime time. Using set-top-box audience plots, we have called this notion into doubt. The graph below (Figure 11.6) shows the targeted audiences of the primary and general election campaigns, as described earlier.

We highlighted the quantities of total viewers and target voters an ad would message to during prime time. When we do this, it becomes clear that these voters can be messaged to at other times of the day, and neither targeted group seems particularly “elusive.”




Figure 11.6: Efficiency of Targeted Voters Plot

Assumption 1C) Prime time is uniquely guaranteed to be able to get to that portion of the electorate that consumes only prime-time content.

Even after examining 1A and 1B, it can still be argued that efficiency may be leading us to inappropriate messaging strategies. For example, let us consider the case where we wish to message to 100 voters, where 80 of these voters are easily captured by buying based on efficiency, but 20 voters are missed because they only watch prime-time television. From the perspective of the political effort, 20 voters never heard our messaging, and so our TV-buying strategy has failed.

This assumption relies on the notion that there are large groups of voters we want to communicate with that watch exclusively prime time. We can quickly examine this notion using set-top-box data, which allows us second-by-second insight into the viewership habits of targeted voters. For example, we can consider the case of a Republican primary voter who is single, lives alone in his own house, and has no children. Via set-top-box data, we can determine that he does indeed watch NBC in Houston during prime time on Wednesday. However, we can also figure out if he watches other programming throughout the week—and thus, the degree to which the campaign could communicate with him on TV outside of prime time.

Using this method, and aggregating it across the two large groups of targeted voters




Figure 11.7: Targeted Audiences of Primary and General Election Voters

we established earlier, we can determine what percentages of target voters are truly prime-time-only viewers.

Below, we present three graphs that quantify the extent to which NBC's Wednesday night prime-time viewers watch non-prime-time content, in terms of segments (30-minute intervals) of non-prime-time content viewed in a one-week period.

The graphs above demonstrate that in addition to their prime-time viewing, general viewers, as well as our two groups of targeted voters, watch a significant amount of non-prime content. We have six or more non-prime opportunities to hit more than 95% of both target audiences outside of prime time. Therefore, the notion that large amounts of viewers are "prime-time-exclusive" appears to be false.

Assumption 2: Broadcast News Represents A Particularly Efficient Way To Deliver Messaging To Voters

As mentioned in the introduction, both local and national broadcast news programs are considered particularly worthy venues for placing ads. The reasoning is that individuals who watch the news care about what is going on in their communities, making them more likely to vote—meaning news programs enjoy higher concentrations of voters when compared to other TV audiences.

On its face, we like this chain of logic, as it is a play at efficiency. While it is on the right track in theory, in execution the rule that says "news is good" is over-generalized.

Wednesday night NBC prime-time Houston viewers, broken out by how many non-prime-time broadcast + cable segments (30 min) were watched that week




Figure 11.8: Prime Time Viewers

Again using set-top-box data from Houston, and assuming a Republican primary targeting audience (as established above), we constructed Figure 11.8).




Figure 11.9: NBC News Program Inventory

In this chart, the bubble size represents the total number of targeted voters watching each news program offered by the NBC affiliate in Houston. The Y-axis represents the cost to place a given ad to message to that audience. The X-axis represents the metric we established earlier: cost per impression on targeted voter (CPIOTV).

Here, we point out three different examples on the chart—examples that should help the viewer understand what we are seeing. To walk through one example, a candidate could purchase an ad during the Houston NBC affiliate’s Local 2 News at 5 p.m. for \$625. Utilizing set-top-box data, we can determine that ad would be shown to 6,578 target voters. Thus, the CPIOTV is 9.5 cents.

The user can quickly see from this figure that some news programs are smarter buys than others. Specifically, there are sizable audiences available at very high efficiency points (bottom left corner). In Figure 11.10, we introduced a gradation of value, based on efficiency.




Figure 11.10: NBC News Program Inventory with Efficiency

Then we went a step further, and added two more broadcast channels, plus content that is also available in Houston.

Now we have even more opportunities to buy efficiently or inefficiently, illustrating that the “buy-news” is only a very general a rule: Some news programs are very smart buys for political messaging, and some are very inefficient.

Assumption 3: Buying Live Sports, Such As Football, Is A Smart Move

As established earlier, buying football is often considered “smart” because of the high rates of live-viewing associated with America’s No. 1 sports programming. We don’t doubt this




Figure 11.11: Expanded Program Inventory with Efficiency

contention, but we still ask this question: Even when taking its high rates of live viewership into account, is football worth the hefty price tag?

Consider below the minute-by-minute CPIOTV for the Republican primary voter audience, based on various price-points for an ad.

To contextualize Figure 11.12, it indicates that at the 3 p.m. start of the Cardinals vs. Broncos game, if it cost \$10,000 to buy an ad, the CPIOTV was just above \$1.25 a voter.

Consider the case of a Republican primary campaign being offered an ad at \$7,500 at the start of this game. As represented by blue line above, we project that the CPIOTV will be \$1.00. And, because the entirety of that audience will be watching live (an assumption, but let's go with it), we truly believe you will be paying \$1.00 per impression, as no one will be fast forwarding.

Now let's consider the case of an efficient news program in the same market (see Figure 11.11). Let's say you purchased a news program that would deliver a CPIOTV of \$.05. Now let's assume that 75% of that audience is actually watching the news program live, and the other 25% is recording the programming and will be fast-forwarding through commercials. This means the true audience for our ad is only 75% of the total audience, causing the cost-per-impression to go up. So the true CPIOTV is \$.066 higher, but still considerably more efficient than buying the football program.

What happens if 50% of the audience is watching the news live? Then the CPIOTV goes up to \$.10, and is now only 10x more efficient than the football program. What happens if 25% of the audience is watching live? Even if we assume the dubious premise that a lot of




Figure 11.12: Minute-by-minute CPIOTV for Republican Primary Voter Audience

people record news to watch it later that night, CPIOTV goes up to \$.20, and is now only 5x more efficient than the football buy.

The point here is not that football buys are universally bad, but that they are not universally good. In this case, we have demonstrated a game that would have provided relatively inefficient opportunities when compared to other programs in-market. There are likely football games offered at particular price points with targeted audience sizes that make them smart buys. The key, as in news and all TV programing, is valuing the program based on a common measurement—CPIOTV—that can be compared to other programs.

11.6 Conclusion

This analysis used three commonly employed sets of strategies and tactics to illustrate the degree to which political messaging decisions are more complex than they may first appear, and to show that campaigns, political parties, and issue-advocacy organizations have the ability to tell good ad-buy opportunities from bad opportunities. The key to doing this is accurate valuation, which is achieved by arriving at a metric that aligns with the goals of the campaign. That can be accomplished by introducing cost-per-impression-on-targeted-voter as the metric, and then using this metric to value the ads, as well as the strategies and tactics used to buy them. As we have shown, this strategy will help all types of groups to improve the reach and the efficiency of their political messaging.

12

High Sample Reads in Florida and Iowa

12.1 Introduction

Poll findings that surprised us are presented in this section, along with our commentary on what we had expected to find, and what our unexpected results might mean. The questions below are hand-picked from a larger number of questions asked during our high-n reads across multiple states. All of the questions are documented in detail in other parts of this report.

In addition, this section focuses on two states with major electoral impacts—Florida and Iowa. Florida, a classic swing state, has narrowly voted for the winning presidential candidate over the last few cycles. If Florida is where American presidential politics end on Election Day, then Iowa is where these presidential elections begin during primaries: it is traditionally the first state to hold its presidential primary.

Given their importance, we chose to ask voters in these two states a number of questions to confirm or refute the conventional wisdom on voter opinion.

12.2 Florida

Economic Conditions Assessment

The deep and long-lasting recession of the late 2000s has impacted Americans in serious ways. “Jobs and the economy” are consistently cited as top priorities for Americans in polling, and the economy has become the focus of messaging for Democratic and Republican candidates alike.

We wanted to determine to what degree the Florida electorate saw the economy improving, so we asked the question presented in Figure 12.1.

As you can see, roughly two-thirds of those surveyed believe that the economy is either deteriorating or staying the same. This general pattern holds across different regions in Florida, with some minor fluctuations.

Next, we turned to examine whether age played a role in perceptions of the economy. It is often said that younger individuals are being hit particularly hard by the recession, as evidenced by higher-than-average unemployment statistics. Yet Figure 12.2 below seems to indicate no clearly perceived signal related to age.

Finally, we examined the role that gender plays in the perception of the economy, with the results shown in Figure 12.3.

Thinking about yourself and your family, would you say Florida's economy is improving, deteriorating, or staying about the same for people like you?

If you think Florida's economy is improving, press 1

If you think Florida's economy is worsening, press 2

If you think Florida's economy isn't getting worse or better, press 3




Figure 12.1: Florida Economy by Area




Figure 12.2: Florida Economy by Age




Figure 12.3: Florida Economy by Age by Gender

We noticed here that young females and males seem to have similar perceptions of the economy, but that females become noticeably more pessimistic as they grow older.

Fair Pay

Fair pay seems to be an issue on the rise, and as the likeliness of a major party nominating a woman for president grows, we don't expect it to disappear. So we asked the question in Figure 12.4 to get at attitudes toward fair pay, with both sides of the argument fairly presented.




Figure 12.4: Florida Fair Pay by Gender by Registered Party

As you can see, roughly 50% of all males support fair pay, and a clear majority of females support fair pay. This seems to indicate that this could be a “winning” issue to be behind going into a general election. We noted that strong female support extends even to Republican ranks, who are just shy of breaking even in terms of attitudes toward fair pay.

When bringing age into consideration alongside gender, we observed the interesting trends presented in Figure 12.5.

We noted that female and male support starts at about equal footing at the youngest demographic, but the sexes diverge with age. Male support for fair pay seems to diminish with age, while female support grows consistently through mid-late career years, only to decline slightly in the eldest age groups.

Government's Role In The Economy

One of the central disagreements between the major parties is the role of government in the economic lives of its citizens. One side of the debate, anecdotally personified by progressives like Sen. Elizabeth Warren, advocates for a government that does more to ensure everyone gets a “fair shake.” The other side of the debate, anecdotally personified by conservatives like Rep. Paul Ryan, advocates that the government do less, and “get out of the way of the private sector.” We put those opposing worldviews to the test in Florida utilizing the question presented in Figure 12.6.

Surprisingly, we found that all major Florida party categories support the “government should do less” viewpoint. We expected this viewpoint out of Republicans, but were sur-




Figure 12.5: Florida Fair Pay by Gender by Age




Figure 12.6: Florida Jobs & The Economy by Gender by Registered Party

prised by the general acceptance of a basic bias for small-government among Democrats and Non-Partisans.

In addition, we observed that this general bias toward “doing less” seems to hold across all age groups as is apparent in Figure 12.7.

We expected a preference for smaller government to increase with age, but found no evidence of that trend in Florida.

Attitudes Toward The Hispanic Vote's Role In Future Elections

Since former Gov. Mitt Romney lost the Hispanic vote by sizable margins in 2012, significant media attention has been paid to the idea that the Republican Party needs to do better among this large and growing demographic bloc. Based solely on demographic trends, the




Figure 12.7: Florida Jobs & The Economy by Gender by Age

growing role of the Hispanic voters has been frequently noted by academics and political practitioners alike.

But we wanted to determine if this is simply an opinion of the elite pundit class, or if it is shared by everyday voters. So to determine the degree to which this idea is accepted by voters, we asked the question in Figure 12.8.




Figure 12.8: Florida: GOP needs more Hispanic votes question by Registered Party

We had expected to find some degree of resistance among Republicans, but were surprised to find the opinion-split on this issue between Republicans and Democrats was roughly the same. This seems to suggest that Republicans accept the premise that the Hispanic demographic represents the future success or failure of the party.

This sentiment held even as we looked at Republicans who were primary voters—a group that is arguably a more conservative subset of general Republicans. This may suggest that, based on the need to win future elections, GOP candidates who are more open to immigration reform may be able to get traction in the future.




Figure 12.9: Florida: GOP needs more Hispanic votes question for only Republicans

12.3 Iowa

Top Issues

We asked Iowans to help us understand what they think about the most important issues facing our elected officials, using the question below:




Figure 12.10: Iowa: Top Issue Question by Registered Party

As you can see, jobs were consistently the No. 1 issue (not a surprise), and health care was the No. 2 issue. The only big differences we saw when looking at the results by partisanship, was the degree to which immigration was considered an important issue. The more conservative respondents were, the more important immigration was to them.

Diving into the health care question, we asked those who thought it was the most

important issue the question presented in Figure 12.11.




Figure 12.11: Iowa: Obamacare Question by Registered Party

We expected Republicans to disagree with the statement above, but were surprised when strong majorities of Democrats and Non-Partisan voters did as well. This may suggest a continued liability for this signature Democratic issue.

Medicare

The single largest liability facing the American government is medical entitlements, with the growth of its costs expected to drive long-term deficits well beyond desirable levels (as a percent of GDP). Some call for an overhaul of the old-age medical entitlements provided under Medicare, so we sought to understand reactions to reform pitches, using the question in Figure 12.12.

The results we observed were expected: We clearly see that older people want nothing changed about the system they have assumed will be in place, while younger people are roughly split when it comes to reform. We then cut the data to look across parties (Figure 12.13).

Again, the results were expected: Republicans are much more open to reform (as their party is pushing it) than Non-Partisans, or Democrats. The interesting point comes when we break the data by party and age (Figure 12.14).

We noted that old voters seem reluctant to endorse reforms regardless of how conservative they are. While old Republican primary voters back reform at a higher rate than Democrat voters, even in this staunchly conservative group the support level is well below 50%.

This finding could have significant implications for any debate for reforming Medicare, as older voters turn out at the highest rates in both general and primary elections.

Thinking about Medicare for a moment, some people say that Medicare needs to be reformed to ensure its financial viability for future retirees. Others say that no changes should be made to Medicare and that we have made promises to seniors that should not be changed at all. Which position do you agree with more?

If you believe that Medicare should be reformed, press 1
If you believe Medicare benefits should remain the same, press 2




Figure 12.12: Iowa: Medicare by Age




Figure 12.13: Iowa: Medicare by Registered Party




Figure 12.14: Iowa: Medicare by Registered Party by Age

13

Brief Look at Voter Migration between California, Texas, and Florida

By James Gimpel, Ph.D.

13.1 Overview

An extraordinarily large number of people in the United States change residences every year. The resulting migration patterns are not random, as social scientists have long observed that potential migrants weigh costs and benefits at both origin and among alternative destinations when considering relocation. Political scientists have previously shown that relocation depresses turnout because movers have to re-register, and even after they register they might be slow to vote. Moving is also connected to individuals changing their partisan registration, and sufficiently large flows over a sustained period of time can change the party composition of neighborhoods, communities and entire regions.

Here we summarize the relocation patterns of thousands of voters who are moving between Florida, Texas and California from 2008 to 2014. Demographers and economists have long noted that the migration decision is primarily an economic one, driven by the push-pull conditions of labor markets. Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, the American Community Survey of the U.S. Census has reported that large numbers of Californians have fled the Golden State for what they hoped would be greener pastures, leading to net losses in the state's population. Much of this out-migration has been the consequence of a slumping California economy, pushing out residents of all ages. Meanwhile, a thousand miles east, the state of Texas was experiencing record growth in population originating from outside the state, including California. Buoyed by an economy closely tied to the surging energy sector, lower housing prices and a reasonable cost of living, residents from other states had been flocking to the Lone Star state at a rate at least twice as fast as anywhere else since 1990. The growth during the 2000s was a continuation and acceleration of that course, with job growth following population increase.

Table 13.1 shows the data from matching voter files from 2008–2010, 2010–2012, and from 2012–2014. These figures only capture **adult** movers, those over the age of 18, and only the movers who re-register to vote upon relocation. Since approximately 25% of all movers are under age 18, about one-fourth of those captured in the census American Community Survey (ACS) will be missed in figures that only capture the adult population.

What is most remarkable about the flows in Table 13.1 is how balanced they are. For example, from 2012 to 2014, about 93,100 migrants move from California to Texas. But that is countered by a flow of 91,531 who move from Texas to California. According to these figures, Texas gains only a small number of net migrants, about 1,569 in the exchange of voters.

Table 13.1: State-to-State Migration Flows Across Two and Four-Year Cycles: California, Florida and Texas

	2008–2010	2010–2012	2012–2014
CA ⇒ TX	93,925	89,925	93,100
CA ⇒ FL	46,001	49,652	62,586
TX ⇒ CA	95,553	97,675	91,531
TX ⇒ FL	77,150	88,645	97,751
FL ⇒ TX	118,115	73,174	89,004
FL ⇒ CA	63,754	47,899	54,926

Source: Matched Voter Files for approximate closing dates for each year.

The same is true of migration to and from Florida, though Florida does gain a larger number. Florida sends about 89,000 voters to Texas from 2012 to 2014, but Texas sends Florida 97,751, for a net gain of 8,751 new voters in the Sunshine State. California also sends Florida 7,660 more voters than Florida sends to California over the same period.

What we do not see in the voter migration figures are the imbalances in total migration reported in the census ACS mobility figures. These imbalances probably occur among the population of unregistered citizens and non-citizens. Those estimates suggest that approximately double the number of Californians are relocating to Texas than Texans are going to California. If so, then probably what Table 13.1 captures are the more affluent and politically-interested Californians moving to Texas, those who are quick to re-register, but not the many who do not re-register for several years, or those who are not eligible to register at all. Similarly, the flow of Texans to California shows that there are a remarkably robust number who find themselves drawn to employment opportunities in the Golden State, in spite of lingering recession, and who register to vote upon their arrival.

13.2 Migration Internal To Florida, California and Texas

Each year, a large percentage of people move short distances, as Table 2 shows. Most moves are local, but even local moves can have an important political impact, requiring voters to re-register at their new address. Although movement is lower in states with recessions, and also declines in recessionary periods, we still find that 6.1% of Californians voters changed zips codes between 2012 and 2014. In Florida, the figure was much higher at nearly 11%, while in Texas it was squarely in between at 8.6 (see Table 13.2).

Moving across counties represents a move of moderate distance, not as close as into the next zip code, but not as far as across state lines. About half a million voters made moves

Table 13.2: Migration Internal to States, 2012–2014

State	Across Zip Codes 2012–2014	Across Counties 2012–2014
California	1,082,634	254,201
% of Total	6.1	1.4
Florida	1,379,624	501,483
% of Total	10.7	3.9
Texas	1,166,775	557,126
% of Total	8.6	4.1

across county lines in Florida and Texas, while only half that number did so in California from 2012–2014. Dominant destinations include all of the major metro areas in these states that reflect the locations of employment and family ties.

Digital Marketing Effect on Turnout in Texas

14

14.1 Methods

The overall objective of this test was to measure the ability of digital ad targeting to increase voter turnout among Republican primary voters supporting a particular candidate in the 2014 Texas Republican Primaries. Optimus worked in conjunction with Engage LLC to design and execute a test of a digital persuasion campaign 1.5 months ahead of the home-stretch of the campaign, to determine if persuasion ads can increase voter turnout.

We used polling results to identify cities in which baseline support for the primary candidates was similar, and then created 10 treatment blocks (see Table 14.1). Cities needed to meet a number of criteria including having at least 6,000 Republican primary voter households (as counted from the voter file). Second, cities could not be geographically contiguous. Finally, each city had to be ‘targetable’ by digital persuasion ads. Within each of these treatment blocks, one city was randomly assigned to receive the treatment condition, while two cities were randomly assigned to act as controls. Thus, a total of 10 treatment cities were selected and a total of 20 control cities were selected (see Figure 14.1).

Given that errors were expected to correlate within groups (assigned block), we utilized a cluster-robust logistic regression model to estimate the impact of the digital treatment effects on turnout. This cluster-robust approach entailed calculating clustered standard errors for each regression coefficients following methods outlined by Mahmood Arai at Stockholm University (see <http://people.su.se/~ma/clustering.pdf>). This step was necessary because the randomization occurred at the city-level and not at the individual-level (see http://lynnvavreck.com/Site/PUBLICATIONS_files/PA2_2.pdf).

14.2 Results

Turnout is presented in Table 14.2. The results of the logistic regression with robust-clustered standard errors are presented in Table 14.3. Despite a higher average turnout among the treatment groups (46.05%) compared to the control groups (44.65%), this difference was not statistically significant when taking into account the correlated errors within each block. The β coefficient for treatment was 0.089 with a robust-clustered standard error of 0.157 ($p = 0.59$). Overall, block and treatment were poor predictors of voter turnout, although treatment blocks were significantly associated with turnout rates in most cases.




Figure 14.1: Map of Treatment and Control Groups

Table 14.1: Block Random Assignments

City	Group	Condition	Primary Voter HHs	Candidate Support	Surveys
San Angelo	A	Treatment	8,266	33.05%	100
Amarillo	A	Control	17,544	32.07%	50
Round Rock	A	Control	7,797	31.45%	50
Odessa	B	Treatment	8,734	30.95%	100
Denton	B	Control	6,079	30.68%	50
Granbury	B	Control	5,961	30.00%	50
Weatherford	C	Control	7,327	29.21%	50
Waco	C	Control	7,167	27.66%	50
Midland	C	Treatment	10,595	26.87%	100
Georgetown	D	Control	8,815	26.44%	50
Arlington	D	Treatment	19,117	26.43%	100
Victoria	D	Control	6,158	26.09%	50
Plano	E	Control	17,756	25.52%	50
Abilene	E	Treatment	10,001	25.20%	100
New Braunfels	E	Control	7,327	25.00%	50
Wichita Falls	F	Control	8,063	25.00%	50
McKinney	F	Control	8,690	24.18%	50
Katy	F	Treatment	11,978	24.12%	100
Longview	G	Control	8,066	23.81%	50
Sugar Land	G	Treatment	10,206	23.35%	100
Pearland	G	Control	6,811	23.26%	50
College Station	H	Control	6,194	22.61%	50
Kingwood	H	Control	6,906	22.00%	50
El Paso	H	Treatment	17,168	21.89%	100
The Woodlands	I	Control	8,543	21.37%	50
Tyler	I	Control	12,332	21.24%	50
Conroe	I	Treatment	9,270	19.67%	100
Cypress	J	Treatment	8,039	18.37%	100
Spring	J	Control	16,016	17.54%	50
Richmond	J	Control	5,969	15.38%	50

Table 14.2: Turnout Results

City	N	Block	Group	Turnout	
				#	%
Round Rock	9,853	A	Control	4,018	40.78%
San Angelo	10,676	A	Treatment	5,112	47.88%
Amarillo	22,011	A	Control	9,392	42.67%
Odessa	11,900	B	Treatment	3,626	30.47%
Granbury	8,495	B	Control	3,912	46.05%
Denton	8,438	B	Control	3,975	47.11%
Waco	9,723	C	Control	4,709	48.43%
Weatherford	10,627	C	Control	5,032	47.35%
Midland	13,955	C	Treatment	7,440	53.31%
Arlington	24,762	D	Treatment	11,283	45.57%
Georgetown	13,499	D	Control	6,192	45.87%
Victoria	8,842	D	Control	3,411	38.58%
Plano	23,368	E	Control	11,792	50.46%
New Braunfels	10,434	E	Control	5,710	54.72%
Abilene	13,206	E	Treatment	7,704	58.34%
McKinney	11,873	F	Control	5,086	42.84%
Katy	15,442	F	Treatment	7,613	49.30%
Wichita Falls	10,675	F	Control	2,916	27.32%
Pearland	8,958	G	Control	4,589	51.23%
Longview	11,037	G	Control	4,613	41.80%
Sugar Land	15,120	G	Treatment	8,117	53.68%
College Station	9,569	H	Control	4,745	49.59%
El Paso	17,711	H	Treatment	4,233	23.90%
Kingwood	9,607	H	Control	4,709	49.02%
The Woodlands	11,384	I	Control	5,878	51.63%
Tyler	17,102	I	Control	5,253	30.72%
Conroe	13,304	I	Treatment	7,502	56.39%
Cypress	10,127	J	Treatment	4,697	46.38%
Richmond	8,871	J	Control	4,283	48.28%
Spring	21,359	J	Control	9,503	44.49%

Table 14.3: Logistic Regression Results with Robust-Clustered Standard Errors

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Turned out to Vote
Group=Treatment	0.089 (0.157)
Block=B	-0.163*** (0.026)
Block=C	0.249*** (0.024)
Block=D	0.008 (0.043)
Block=E	0.402*** (0.004)
Block=F	-0.114*** (0.025)
Block=G	0.217*** (0.028)
Block=H	-0.288*** (0.037)
Block=I	0.036*** (0.011)
Block=J	0.091*** (0.0001)
Constant	-0.282*** (0.040)
Observations	391,928
R ²	0.013
χ^2	3,727.886*** (df = 10)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01